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Abstract 
With the spread of digital surveillance technologies from the domains of military and medical 
to those of personal and everyday, we have seen invention of novel metaphors to 
conceptualise our daily practices as well as our selves in relation to such emerging 
technologies as Big Data, which aggregate, crunch and sort our personal information 
collected from the sensors and cameras embedded ubiquitously now in our living 
environment, known as an ‘infosphere.’ They sort our selves in a new way, thus altering our 
self-concept and informing a new, data-driven self culture.  
The epitome of this trend is the Quantified Self (QS) movement. The participants, known as 
QSers and who are prosumers, seek ‘self knowledge through numbers’ generated by 
commercial self-monitoring devices, such as Fitbit and Mi Band. They put their bodily 
activities under self-surveillance for becoming the experts of self-management and self-
optimisation. The global popularisation of QS culture has three implications for our human 
condition. First, it creates a sham utopia. The platform economy brings into being a precariat, 
who struggle daily for security and success. In response, the QS gadget companies advertise 
to a white, middle-class clientele that they can offer them both. Second, it promotes 
neoliberal reflexive practices and discourse of selfhood. QS culture is historically rooted in 
the American success culture, which prizes individual success made through self-reliance and 
continuous self-reinvention. This culture foregrounds personal agency in influencing 
individuals’ living conditions and life chances, while discounting social structural factors. 
Third, it makes privacy, hence self-reinvention, problematic. 
When it comes to the issue of ownership of QSers’ self-data, it is cognitively ambiguous to 
whom they belong and whether the QSers can still enjoy ‘the right to forget’ once the data are 
uploaded to the cloud. 
Sociologists have studied the QS culture and its relations to neoliberalism, but they have not 
tackled the QSers’ subjective experience, particularly their own discourse and mind, in a 
systematic manner. Meanwhile, although cognitive linguists have had the tools to probe 
QSers’ discourse, mind and culture, or the cognitive schemas and structures that influence 
QSers’ beliefs and behaviours, they have not done so, either. Therefore, my thesis contributes 
to the QS research by cross-fertilising, or transgressing the boundaries of, the disciplines, 
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adding to it another dimension of cognitively-informed critical metaphor analysis of QSers’ 
mind. 
I have applied critical discourse analysis for both literature review and empirical analysis. For 
the empirical chapters, I have systematically mapped out the relations between a QSer’s use 
of conceptual metaphors in a blog post and the underlying cognitive schemas, which 
constitute a cultural model of the Quantified Self for a sample consisting of a small corpus 
(52,177 words in total). I used the methods of MIP and SMA to identify the linguistic, 
conceptual and systematic metaphors in a prototypical blog post, sampled from my 
proprietary corpus of 40 unique QSers’ blog texts. Based on the identifications, I further 
traced three metaphor trajectories, or the blogger’s thought patterns, that involved the self, 
QS tools and data. I found that 1) the blogger thought their HEALTH CONDITIONS WERE 
OBJECTS that could be managed and controlled with hard work and help from self-monitoring 
devices, thus giving them a sense of self-made success and being in control. 2) They thought 
the QS TOOLS WERE PEOPLE, who were productive, capable, intelligent and friendly. This 
reflects the infosphere’s structural influence on people’s cognition, which decentres the 
humans and places them on par with other informational agents or cognisers. 3) They 
conceived that their DATA WERE VALUABLE RESOURCES, whose ownership was unclear. 
Meanwhile, alternative metaphors that were relegated to the background by the QS culture 
were revived and discussed along these trajectories. Altogether, they have demonstrated the 
framing effects of QS metaphors, i.e. the metaphors can both enable and constrain a QSer’s 
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1. Introduction  1
I bought a used self-balancing scooter in 2016 at a bargain on a Chinese ‘second-hand’ digital 
trading platform, similar to ebay, and I rode it around the university campus almost everyday. 
It moved as fast as a leisurely pedalled bicycle, without me pedalling it. I simply stood 
steadily and still on this hoverboard, leaning slightly forward to accelerate and backward to 
break. It sensed my nanoscopic bodily movements and postures precisely in real-time, and 
responded to them nimbly. It almost felt like the hoverboard had a mind of its own, which 
was seamlessly connected with mine and obeyed my control so that I could mind-steer it. I 
was fleet-footed. Perhaps it was as the British science fiction writer Arthur C Clarke put it, 
‘Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.’ 
Being a long-time practising spectator for my magician friend, I knew that behind any 
sufficiently smooth magic there are rigorous logic, meticulous calculation and refined 
techniques. According to my hoverboard’s Chinese manufacturer Xiaomi, which bought over 
its US originator in 2015,  this 1,999-yuan-priced 800-watts-dual-motor-powered sleek-
designed compact white gadget had a “cutting-edge control algorithm” working together with 
“multiple sensors of weight, gestures, speed, temperatures, and current” embedded in it, so 
that it could calculate “every little motion” of my body and adjust the vehicle accordingly “at 
a speed of 200 times per second,” in order to to keep me balanced and steady on the scooter 
all the time, no matter crossing speed bumps or gritty surfaces (https://ninebot.asia/ninebot-
mini/). In other words, my body and I were simply quantified by it tremendously. 
Furthermore, beyond me and my machine, my desires and needs were also quantified when I 
made my purchase on the digital trading platform with a smartphone app, so that the platform 
could use my behaviour data to guesstimate what I wanted next time and make 
recommendations or nudge. (In the end, I sold my scooter for a pair of real pedals.) In this 
human-machine-network configuration, the boundary between the master and the slave was 
blurred. 
I was fascinated by the fact that so many advanced cybernetic techniques were applied to 
measure and regulate such a small machine in real-time in an effort to eliminate 
uncontrollable situations on the road and give me an illusion of being fully in charge, which 
 This doctoral research was carried out at the International Doctoral Innovation Centre (IDIC). The author 1
acknowledge the financial support from Ningbo Education Bureau, Ningbo Science and Technology Bureau, 
China's MOST, and the University of Nottingham. The work is also partially supported by EPSRC grant no EP/
G037574/1.
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would serve as a daily stimulant of ego-boosting self-deception for any struggling, self-
efficacy-deficient PhD student. The experience of being on top of it, I’d say, was fairly secure 
and pleasurable. 
Moreover, as a researcher critiquing the Quantified Self (QS) movement from the humanities’ 
perspectives, I also wondered what consequences it would have for the human conditions if 
this supernova explosion of cutting-edge sensors, quantification and high-speed data 
crunching techniques, with its extremely empirical and reductionist state of mind, was 
applied to a human being rather than a machine, with the aims of regulating their own 
behaviours and gaining (a positive illusion of) control of their own body ?  How would that 2
person feel and conceive of it ? This is a pertinent and urgent question to our time, because 
the more developed regions in the world are increasingly becoming an ‘infosphere,’ where 
digital technologies and sensors are becoming ubiquitous, like infrastructures, thus turning 
not only everything but also every(body) into information (see Floridi 2014: 40-56). In such 
an infosphere, Floridi said, 
‘We may need to reconsider and redesign our conceptual vocabulary and our ways of 
giving meaning to, and making sense of, the world (our semanticizing processes and 
practices) in order to gain a better grasp of our age, and hence a better chance to 
shape it in the best way and deal successfully with its open problems.’ (ibid: Preface) 
Consequently, Floridi invented the term ‘inforgs,’ a critique of the concept of cyborgs, to 
refer to the humans and other informational organisms embedded in a hyper-informational 
and hyper-historical environment, where the boundary between online and offline has 
 Following the usage guides of they in both the Oxford Dictionary of English (https://www.lexico.com/en/2
definition/they) and Merriam-Webster Dictionary (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/their#usage-1), 
I use they, them, themselves and their for the gender-neutral third-person singular, though the Macmillan 
Dictionary advised against it (https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/they).
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Photo 1: My hoverboard
disappeared and humans are no longer the centre of infosphere, but rather share the same 
environment with other informational agents such as smartphones and banks. (ibid: 94-96). 
To find out the answers for the human conditions of being inforgs, I studied the Quantified 
Self (QS) movement, where a group of enthusiasts have used emerging information and 
communications technologies (ICTs), such as wearable computers and mobile phones, 
furnished with sensors, to measure their own bodily activities. I analysed a proprietary corpus 
of 40 unique blogs written between 2013 and 2014 by the QSers about their self-tracking 
experiences. In particular, I examined systematically which linguistic and conceptual 
metaphors the bloggers had used to signify their own conceptualisations of self and data 
during the activities of self-monitoring. 
In the following sections of this chapter, I will introduce the origin, background and 
development of the QS movement in connection with the social impacts of the digital 
technology expansion, especially its impacts on our self-cultivation. I will draw from 
sociology, philosophy, literature and politics. I will also briefly mention the epistemological 
and ethical consequences of changing forms of identity coming along with the QS (NB: Not 
to be confused with Quacquarelli Symonds). 
1.1 Introducing QS 
Since there is no universal definition of the QS, I offer to describe what this growing social, 
cultural phenomenon is. People have been using various methods, such as writing diaries 
with pen and paper, to track themselves (including their dreams and psyches) since Greco-
Roman time in the West, but the self-tracking using smartphone apps, wearable computers 
and other emerging digital technologies for life-optimisation and fitness lifestyle purposes is 
a new phenomenon. 
What is particularly novel here is the QS gadgets themselves can automatically generate a 
large and complex set of data on a daily basis, constituting a QSer’s data diary. The raw data 
are rendered visually by algorithms or computer programmes into pictures, videos, charts and 
graphs for their users to see, watch and read on a computer screen. Some of the QSers just 
keep the data diaries to themselves, while many others share them on social networks, such as 
posting a status update on Facebook or WeChat Moments, thus constructing and maintaining 
their digital presence in the infosphere. Still, some more active QSers put down in words their 
thoughts and feelings and experiences after reading their own data diaries and upload them to 
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the blogosphere, presenting themselves digitally but also serving as knowledge brokers in the 
QS community. 
The practice of writing diaries with numbers, however, has been foreseen by the American 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who wrote in 1980, 
‘This genre blurring is more than just a matter of Harry Houdini or Richard Nixon turning up 
as characters in novels or of midwestern murder sprees described as though a gothic 
romancer had imagined them. It is philosophical inquiries looking like literary criticism 
(think of Stanley Cavell on Beckett or Thoreau, Sartre on Flaubert), scientific discussions 
looking like belles lettres morceaux (Lewis Thomas, Loren Eiseley), baroque fantasies 
presented as deadpan empirical observations (Borges, Barthelme), histories that consist of 
equations and tables or law court testimony (Fogel and Engerman, Le Roi Ladurie), 
documentaries that read like true confessions (Mailer), parables posing as ethnographies 
(Castenada), theoretical treatises set out as travelogues (LÈvi-Strauss), ideological arguments 
cast as historiographical inquiries (Edward Said), epistemological studies constructed like 
political tracts (Paul Feyerabend), methodological polemics got up as personal memoirs 
(James Watson). Nabokov Pale Fire, that impossible object made of poetry and fiction, 
footnotes and images from the clinic, seems very much of the time; one waits only for 
quantum theory in verse or biography in algebra.’ (Geertz 1980: 165) 
Geertz further commented, ’[T]he present jumbling of varieties of discourse has grown to the 
point where it is becoming difficult either to label authors (What is Foucault — historian, 
philosopher, political theorist ? What Thomas Kuhn — historian, philosopher, sociologist of 
knowledge ?) or to classify works (What is George Steiner After Babel--linguistics, criticism, 
culture history ? What William Gass On Being Blue — treatise, causerie, apologetic ?). And 
thus it is more than a matter of odd sports and occasional curiosities, or of the admitted fact 
that the innovative is, by definition, hard to categorize. It is a phenomenon general enough 
and distinctive enough to suggest that what we are seeing is not just another redrawing of the 
cultural map — the moving of a few disputed borders, the marking of some more picturesque 
mountain lakes — but an alteration of the principles of mapping.’ (ibid: 166) 
More than three decades later now, for the QSers this new principle of cognitive mapping of 
the domain or space of the self is known by their slogan as ‘Self knowledge through 
numbers.’ 
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1.1.1 Origin, development and philosophical lineage 
The first QS meet-up, a gathering specifically for this type of self-trackers, was launched in 
the Bay Area in San Francisco, United States in October 2007 (see Kelly 2007). During a 
typical meet-up, several QSers would give short presentations, called show-and-tells, to share 
their self-tracking experiences with an audience. The video recordings of the show-and-tells 
would later be uploaded online for wider sharing (see Wolf online). Most of these talks were 
around the themes of health, fitness and life-hacking (such as how to be more efficient and 
productive, how to control risks, etc.). As of this writing, there were 221 QS gatherings 
around the world (mostly in the more developed regions) with 96,077 members (https://
www.meetup.com/topics/quantified-self/). (Disclosure: I joined it in 2014 for my research.) 
The development of the QS is closely connected with the development of new computer 
technologies and the propagation of their knowledge. The co-founders of the Quantified Self 
are Wired Magazine editors Kevin Kelly and Gary Wolf. Initially, they were ‘looking at some 
new practices that seemed, loosely, to belong together: life logging, personal genomics, 
location tracking, biometrics. These new tools… all… had something in common: they added 
a computational dimension to ordinary existence,’ Wolf (2011) said. ‘We saw a parallel to the 
way computers, originally developed to serve military and corporate requirements, became a 
tool of communication. Could something similar happen with personal data? We hoped 
so.’ (ibid) Therefore, the QS movement was launched riding on a new wave of expansion of 
the computer technologies, which have been expected to extend to a more personal level of 
use in everyday life. 
1.1.1.1 Empiricism, Wired ideology and radicalisation of Humean causality 
According to Wikipedia (2015), Wired is “a monthly American magazine… that reports on 
how emerging technologies affect culture, the economy and politics.” It is also known 
recently as an active proponent of the concept of big data. For instance, its former editor-in-
chief Chris Anderson (2008), who is now the head of TED, the non-profit organisation of the 
popular TED talks, wrote in a controversial editorial in 2008 titled The End of Theory: The 
Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete, arguing for the superiority of big data 
over traditional scientific theories and models for discovery of natural and social laws. 
He cited the example of Google, one of the more successful digital companies in our time, 
writing, ‘Peter Norvig, Google's research director, offered an update to George Box's maxim: 
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“All models are wrong, and increasingly you can succeed without them.” This is a world 
where massive amounts of data and applied mathematics replace every other tool that might 
be brought to bear. Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics to sociology. 
Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what they do? The 
point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With enough 
data, the numbers speak for themselves.’  
‘Petabytes allow us to say: “Correlation is enough.” We can stop looking for models. We can 
analyze the data without hypotheses about what it might show. We can throw the numbers 
into the biggest computing clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms find 
patterns where science cannot,’ he added. 
This rhetoric for identifying patterns without an understanding of underlying mechanisms (or 
the denial of necessity between cause and effect) is reminiscent of a radical interpretation of 
the British empiricist philosopher David Hume’s concept of causality — ‘Causation means 
nothing but constant conjunction of objects in experience.’ (Psillos: 57) Philosophically, it is 
known as the Regularity View of Causation (RVC), which states, 
‘c causes e iff  
(a) c is spatiotemporally contiguous to e;  
(b) e succeeds c in time; and  
(c) all events of type C (i.e., events that are like c) are regularly followed by (or are 
constantly conjoined with) events of type E (i.e. events like e).’ (ibid: 19) 
Hume’s account has been taken to be a reductive one, because ‘on RVC, causation reduces to 
spatiotemporal contiguity, succession and constant conjunction (regularity). It reduces, that 
is, to non-causal facts. A corollary of RVC is that there is no necessity in causation: there is 
no necessary connection between the cause c and the effect e that goes beyond – or underpins 
– their regular association.’ RVC has been taken to be the official Humean view and has been 
embraced by many eminent philosophers ever since, including Mill, Russell, Ayer, Quine, 
Carnap, Kripke, a few of whom are also philosophers of language interestingly. (ibid: 19-20) 
For coming up with his inductive fallibilism, Hume was inspired by Isaac Newton’s 
methodology of natural science (applied most notably perhaps in Newtons’ discovery of the 
law of gravity and laws of motion), and aspired to be ‘the Newton of a new science of human 
nature.’ (De Pierris: 148) ‘In his conception of both the scientific method and the origin and 
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meaning of our idea of causation, Hume is deeply indebted to what he takes to be the 
Newtonian inductive methodology for the study of nature.’ (ibid: 149) 
Intentionally critiquing the deductive rationalists of his time, exemplified by René Descartes 
and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Hume rejects a priori knowledge in his radically skeptical 
empiricism, as contrasted with John Locke’s more rational conception of scientific 
methodology. ‘Hume’s notion of inductive proof, which is at the heart of his conception of 
causation and scientific methodology, consists in a universalization (whenever possible and 
subject to future experimental revisions) of our past and present uniform experience, with the 
attendant assumption that nature is, in Newton’s words, “ever consonant with itself” 
(Principia, 795).’ (ibid: 149) 
Thus the Humean ‘inductive derivation of laws from manifest uniform phenomena takes 
priority over the hypothetical postulation, prior to what experience can teach us, of a hidden 
microstructure of primary qualities — which, according to the mechanical philosophy (shared 
by both Descartes and Locke), necessitates the causal relations among bodies and between 
bodies and our senses.’ (ibid:150) 
1.1.1.2 Correlation, laws of nature and prediction 
The Humean conception of causality not only has everything to do with our contemporary 
methods for discovering scientific laws but also with making predictions. According to 
Psillos (2009: 215-218), modern logical empiricists or positivists like Rudolf Carnap and 
Moritz Schlik inherited and twisted or refined the Humean legacy when applying it to 
modern science. 
‘Within science, Carnap stressed, “causality means nothing but a functional dependency of a 
certain sort” (1928: 264). The functional dependency is between two states of a system, and it 
can be called a “causal law” if the two states are in temporal proximity, and one precedes the 
other in time. Schlick expressed this idea succinctly by pointing out that:  
the difference between a mere temporal sequence and a causal sequence is the 
regularity, the uniformity of the latter. If C is regularly followed by E, then C is the 
cause of E; if E only ‘happens’ to follow C now and then, the sequence is called mere 
chance. (1932: 239) [original emphasis] 
Any further attempt to show that there was a necessary “tie” between two causally connected 
events, or a “kind of glue” that holds them together, was taken to have been proved futile by 
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Hume, who maintained that “it was impossible to discover any ‘impression’ of the causal 
nexus” (Schlick 1932: 246).’ (Psillos: 215-218) 
The positivists even take the concept of causation as a test case for distinction between 
science and metaphysics. They argue that for metaphysicists, to examine causal relations is a 
matter of investigating the essence of causation, which goes beyond the phenomenal 
regularity. ‘[I]t relies on the “erroneous assumption” that there is something in causation 
beyond correlation (“i.e. beyond mathematical function”),’ as Carnap (1928: 35– 6) 
explicated (cited by Psillos: 216). The rejection of ‘essence’ arguably also helps set the 
modern scientists apart from the folks , who hold a common sense view of essentialism in 3
everyday life (e.g. the essence of the self).  In contrast, the scientists within the empirical 4
lineage investigate what events are correlated. Carnap claimed that ‘the problem of 
correlation is none other than finding “the laws of nature”. But for him, these “laws of 
nature” are not causal… To be sure, Carnap did not want to excise talk of “cause” and 
“effect” from science, although he certainly toyed with this idea. But he insisted that the only 
meaningful content this talk can have is when we call “cause” the event, or the physical 
magnitude, or the physical state, which temporally precedes another one nomologically 
dependent on the former.’ (ibid, emphasis mine)  
This can be related to the phenomenon that much applied scientific research nowadays has 
been dedicated to accumulating know-how instead of ‘know-why.’ For example, many 
computer scientists researching big data and artificial intelligence (AI) in the topical area of 
machine learning (such as deep learning and reinforcement learning) for such applications as 
computational visual pattern recognition and natural language processing take an agnostic 
 The folks are not a fixed demographic, but dynamic. An expert stepping outside the area of their expertise may 3
become a folk person, and a folk person, who is not professionalised in a certain discipline, can still have 
specialised knowledge in that domain. The folk model of knowledge simply refers to the everyday, common 
sense and conventional habits of knowing and perceiving the world, and it is neither superior nor inferior to the 
scientific or expert model. According to Keesing (1987: 380), ‘a cognitive theory of folk models, as culturally 
construed common sense, would perhaps in the long run…take these models as…representing a set of operating 
strategies for using cultural knowledge in the world; they comprise sets of shortcuts, idealizations, and 
simplifying paradigms that work just well enough yet need not fit together without contradiction into global 
systems of coherent knowledge.’ A respect for the common sense tradition is also a form of conservatism, as 
favoured and embodied by, notably, Edmund Burke. More to be discussed in Section 1.1.2 where I deal with the 
popularisation of scientific knowledge.
 C.f. D’Andrade (1995, The theory of essences: 176-178) ‘It is a common belief, found in many western 4
cultures, that certain things are the way they are because of some essence. [original emphasis] Thus, tigers are 
said to have a certain essence which makes them tigers, which is not the same thing as the various properties 
tigers have, like stripes, tails, whiskers, claws, etc… Slightly differing doctrines of essence have been 
propounded by Aristotle, Aquinas, and various Scholastics: the general doctrine has been attacked by Locke and 
other empiricists, as Bertrand Russell outlines in his History of Western Philosophy.’
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approach towards the processes behind the machine learning. They do not aim to proffer any 
theory to explicate how their algorithms actually ‘learn’ to ‘see’ or ‘read,’ but rather devote 
themselves to finding out which data sets can better ‘train’ their algorithms and which 
mathematical functions and parameterisation methods can help them get better learning 
results, mainly in terms of higher predictive accuracies, the closer to what they or their 
sponsors desire the better. There is nothing beyond, behind or below such utilisation of 
mathematics and statistics. (Some ethical implications of this will be discussed in Section 
1.2.) The same can be argued about applied linguistics and, in particular, the rise of corpus 
and computational linguistics, where searching for regularly and repeatedly appearing 
patterns such as collocations, lexical bundles and n-grams in large corpora (or big databases) 
is made more feasible and easier, and arguably it has taken precedence over researching the 
historical and etymological explanations about how those patterns arise, evolve and come 
about. 
‘“In essence, the imaginary of Big Data resolves the essential problem of modernity 
and modernist epistemologies, the problem of unintended consequences or side-
effects caused by unknown causation, through work on the datafication of the self in 
its relational embeddedness” (Chandler 2015: 11). What this argument implies is that 
recording data flows from the self and the world makes it possible to collect personal 
information and social practices on an unprecedented scale at the micro level of 
analysis. At that point, big data analytics can interpret their ontological complexity, 
i.e. not “by generic laws and rules but by feedback loops and changes through 
iterative and complex relational processes” (Chandler 2015: 18). In medicine, for 
example, “machine-learning algorithms can improve the accuracy of prediction over 
the use of conventional regression models by capturing complex, nonlinear 
relationships in the data” (Chen and Asch 2017: 2507).’ (Paganoni 2019: 7-8) 
Prediction is paramount, as it is the image of scientists as soothsayers, be they economists or 
ecologists, that legitimises their entire empirical enterprise in the society. According to Psillos 
(ibid: 217), for the empiricists the ‘operationalization of the concept of causation they were 
after was not merely an attempt to legitimize the concept of causation,’ which is intimately 
linked with the concept of natural law. ‘Rather, it was part and parcel of their view that 
science aims at prediction. If prediction is what really matters, then the fact that there can be 
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regularities, which are not causal in the ordinary sense of the word, appears to be irrelevant. A 
regularity can be used to predict a future occurrence of an event irrespective of whether it is 
deemed to be causal or not. The farmer can predict that dawn has broken on hearing the 
cock’s crow irrespective of whether or not the crow causes the sunrise. In physics, one can 
predict the length of the pendulum’s rod, given its period, irrespective of the causal 
connection between these two magnitudes. Correlations can serve prediction, even though 
they leave untouched some intuitive aspect of causation, according to which not all 
regularities are causal.’ [original emphases] 
So the empirical prediction only makes use of the past and present observations and memory 
and is supported by a operationalised Humean account of causation in terms of correlation, 
without prescribing any necessary or reliable connection between cause and effect, i.e. 
inductive fallibilism. This model of prediction has become the sole criterion for measuring 
success for the scientists with an empirical leaning. And this model of prediction has spread 
from the scientific community to everyday life through popularisation. 
1.1.2 Propagating QS idea 
What is particularly interesting to me is how the idea of the QS propagates, i.e. how the idea 
of self-tracking, or life-logging, for fitness and improving one’s life and wellbeing has started 
small with a niche of practitioners, and has grown into a global phenomenon in many 
developed parts of the world over the years, entering into the public discourse and provoking 
actions.  
1.1.2.1 Knowledge dissemination venues 
I first map out the venues and space of QS knowledge dissemination. Kelly (2012) recounted 
the history of QS, saying that he came up with the idea of launching a website gathering all 
the tools for people to measure themselves after chatting with a local paediatrician who had 
gone on an all-organic diet. Kelly was immediately thinking what tools the doctor could use 
to measure the changes on himself brought about by the change in diet. Developing from 
such a thought, Kelly and Wolf started, alongside the physical meet-ups they organised in the 
Bay Area, their blog quantifiedself.com in 2007, which later turned into a website run by 
their California-based social enterprise QS Labs, LLC.  So the QS movement’s major 5
campaigner organises two types of venues, online and offline, to spread the words for QS.  
 I interviewed the QS Labs’ then programme director Ernesto Ramirez in Santa Monica in early 2015 and also 5
met with Gary Wolf in San Francisco the same year.
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Their online venue, quantifiedself.com, serves as a hub of information, helping the QSers 
exchange their largely do-it-yourself (DIY) ideas and experiences, while promoting the 
adoption of such new ideas, new practices and new technologies to a wider audience on their 
website. Anyone who has registered on their website can participate in their QS forum 
discussions. People are also encouraged to organise their own local QS meetups, following 
some simple guidelines published on the website, as a form of active participation in the QS 
movement. The influence of the movement strengthens as the number of QS meetups and 
localities rises. The QSers who organise meetups themselves can get permission to upload the 
edited videos of their meetup presentations, in a format similar to TED talks organised by 
Kelly and Wolf’s former colleague at Wired, to the website for sharing. For instance, Adriana 
Lukas was an active organiser and founder of the London QS meetup group. I went to two of 
its monthly events in 2013 and 2014, respectively. QS Labs also send out regular, free email 
newsletters, called What We’re Reading, to subscribers on updates of QS events, suggested 
readings as well as recommended show-and-tell articles and blogs — my construction of the 
QS corpus has used the leads from the newsletters in 2014. They also host two annual 
conferences in San Francisco, US and Amsterdam, the Netherlands (for European QSers 
mainly), respectively, gathering QSers but also QS-interested researchers as well as 
companies from around the world. (I went to one of their annual conferences in Amsterdam 
in 2017.) Therefore, the concept of QS has entered not only the enthusiasts’ discourse but 
also those of the academics and corporates. 
Beside the QS Labs as the major propagating space, many QSers also publish their self-
tracking experiences and ideas on their own blogs and websites for sharing with like-minded 
enthusiasts. They serve as knowledge brokers in the QS community. Companies such as Nike 
and Fitbit have jumped on the bandwagon lately to advertise their branded QS products in an 
effort to monetise such novel, initially DIY sort of practices. In the meantime, “[b]oth news 
coverage of the quantified self and interest on the part of Google Search users… have 
steadily grown since 2009.” (Lupton, 2013a, p26) A Forbes Magazine article called 2013 the 
Year of the Quantified Self. (Clay, 2013) 
Thus, the propagation of the QS idea has been helped to a large extent by the news media, 
both old and new. In fact, a similar pattern of knowledge dissemination has been identified 
recently by Paganoni (2019) about the popularisation of the concept of big data, which may 
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count the QS as a subordinate category of big data in everyday life. As Paganoni put it, 
‘[W]ithin the domain of knowledge dissemination, the news media exercise strong influence 
as knowledge brokers in the field of science and technology. Journalists, bloggers, academics, 
freelance writers and critics work to bridge the knowledge gap between technological 
progress and the general audience, recontextualising and reconceptualising expert opinion 
from different societal sectors (Bondi et al. 2015; Watson 2016) by means of strategies of 
popularisation.’ 
1.1.2.2 Popularisation strategies 
However, the popularisation of scientific knowledge is not linear or one-way from the expert 
to lay audience. According to Corbett (2006: 756), more recent models see the process of 
popularization ‘as part of a nonlinear, dynamic process of translation and negotiation, 
whereby scientists align themselves with other social groups to contest and redefine the 
public meanings of scientific discoveries. This view is consistent with specialists’ own 
contribution to popularization and dissolves diffusion’s dichotomy between specialist and 
nonspecialist groups. As van Dijck (1998: 10) observed: 
Despite their powerful position on the discursive hierarchy, scientists have never had 
absolute authority over the interpretation of knowledge, and thus had to look for 
effective strategies to propel and defend a specific interested position [. . .] 
Popularizations are therefore a forum in which specialists can attempt to form alliances and 
engage in negotiating the public meaning of specialist knowledge.’ 
Discourse analyst Myers (2003: 274) also pointed out that the boundary between the 
scientific and non-scientific knowledge is an artificial construct, which are effortfully 
maintained — ‘for most of the issues in which popularization matters, such a carefully 
bounded, single-minded, and authoritative science is not possible. We cannot understand why 
there are tensions about genetically modified organisms, vaccinations, or climate change if 
we assume that science is distinct from the rest of culture, and that the public is, on scientific 
matters, a blank slate.’ ‘Maintaining such boundaries takes work. That is the claim made by 
Thomas Gieryn in a classic article (1983), in which he traces the emergence of disciplines 
and debates about authority in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Such divisions between 
science and non-science, professional and non-professional, divisions that we take for 
granted, were formed in historical struggles, and are re-formed in everyday practices: the way 
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a quoted speaker is introduced, a metaphor used instead of a technical term, a table 
summarized and simplified.’ (ibid) 
Therefore, there is another strategy for the popularisation of the concept of self-tracking and 
for the scientists and engineers to negotiate with the public for adopting the scientific model 
of prediction in everyday life, that is, the reifications or embodiment of their ideas in QS 
tools. The new technologies here mainly include the wearable computers (small sensors to 
collect body data) and smartphone apps (for processing the data and visualising the results). 
This process of popularisation has been largely spurred by the commercialisation of such 
novel life-logging practices. Popular QS gadgets that were off-the-shelf on the market 
included such computerised bracelets as Fitbit, Nike Fuelband and Mi Band, and any 
smartphones people put into their pockets. They all incorporated various sorts of sensors for 
collecting human body data. The technology companies thus saved the more generic ICT 
users the work of DIY design, assemblage and programming, and also made the QS gadgets 
more affordable thanks to their economies of scale. The cheapest bracelet, Mi Band, made by 
the same Chinese company Xiaomi that produced my hoverboard, cost only 999 Indian 
rupees (15.6 US dollars) a piece (http://www.mi.com/in/miband/#01). Meanwhile, those well-
funded public companies contributed to raising the awareness of QS through large-scale 
advertising and continuous promotions to an increasingly larger population of potential users. 
When Fitbit went public in 2015, the company producing the branded self-tracking bracelets 
caused a sensation by raising 732 million US dollars at a public initial offering (IPO) in New 
York, giving itself a valuation of 4.1 billion US dollars. (Bhattacharya 2015) ‘Fitbit has sold 
over 20.8 million devices, as of the end of March. The popular brand's most famous fan is 
President Obama, who is a fan of the Fitbit Surge. Other celebrities like Ryan Reynolds and 
Britney Spears have been spotted sporting the Fitbit Flex,’ CNNMoney reported in June 
2015. It ‘sells products in over 45,000 retail stores in more than 50 countries as well as 
through retailers' websites, their own website and as part of corporate wellness offering.’ Its 
IPO was expected to help Fitbit develop more products and acquire other companies. Fitbit is 
considered a most successful business case that has hugely benefited from the fad of leading 
a fitness lifestyle digitally. Consumer electronics giant Apple also released its first Apple 
Watch in 2015, which incorporated self-tracking functions and a platform for third-party 
fitness apps. This may have signalled the coming of age of the QS market.  
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Following the lead of Fitbit and Apple, there arrived a burgeoning of QS apps available for 
downloading onto smartphones freely or for a small fee, and they could help record such 
body data as step counts, sleeping patterns, weight loss, records of stoping smoking, diabetes, 
insomnia and sexual health and performance. For example, Sex Stamina Tester, iThrust and 
Spreadsheets are apps that measure male performance and gamify sexual activities. The 
catchphrase during the high days of self-quantification was ‘Name anything you want to 
measure, and there’s an app for that.’ Because of the affordability and availability of the 
devices and apps as well as the continuous upgrading thereof, after more than eight years 
development since the first meetup in 2007, the idea of QS has been accepted by many 
consumers as well as app and device makers. 
The QS’s winning over its public audience was also thanks to, arguably, the empirical 
prediction model itself, which gave rise to the QS movement in the first place. This was 
because, as mentioned earlier in Section 1.1.1.1, Hume’s notions of inductive reasoning and 
causation for observing human nature were modelled after the Newtonian ones for nature, 
assuming that nature ‘is ever constant with itself,’ so the model idealistically presupposed the 
universalisation of uniform human experience from our past and present to the future. The 
results from the experiments done according to such a prediction model was less likely to 
violate a self-tracking device user’s expectations about themselves or threaten social norms. 
Indeed, they mainly served to uncover the habits the user had already formed but might not 
be aware of, and reveal the social patterns that had already been in existence. These kinds of 
self-confirming, norm-conforming, self-validating and meaning-making experiments were 
perhaps naturally welcomed and taken up by an increasing number of QSers. This may be the 
best strategy for the QS idea’s successful propagation over an expansive area and a large 
population. 
Analogically, the analytic philosophy of language also highlights that the wide circulation 
and use of a language, hence its meaningfulness, depend on following rules and conventions 
in a language community, irrespective of the nature of that language. (cf Miller 2006, ) 
Indeed, there may not be any innate essence or underlying mechanism of language, meaning 
or contents of thoughts, but just language in (public) use for collaboration and performing 
collective acts and tasks. Meaning is a derivative from rule-following. Examples include 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later investigation into language games and rule-following, arguing 
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against the feasibility of a private language, Herbert Paul Grice’s cooperative principle and 
the speech act theory founded by John Langshaw Austin.  
However, there is a distinction between the methodology of later-Wittgenstein-inspired 
linguistics and the algorithm-wielding, number-crunching empirical model of big data (and 
perhaps also the logical positivism of the early Wittgenstein) for finding patterns. Except for 
the new breed of computational linguists committed to natural language processing, most 
conventionalists and pragmatic linguists accept an anti-reductionism account of meaning, 
which means the properties of mental contents do not reduce to any physical, functional or 
mathematical properties. (Boghossian 2002: 178-180) Therefore, following this tradition, the 
applied linguists are tasked with finding out the habitual patterns of language use in certain 
communities and our society in general without reduction. 
Therefore, I argue here that it is the analytical empirical model of pattern recognition and 
prediction that gives the QS idea legs and the QSers ways and means of safeguarding their 
jobs and life by helping them staying fit, especially at such a precarious time when humans 
are removed from the centre of infosphere, when artificial intelligence is replacing human 
labour in many traditional areas, and when the powerful digital platforms sponsored by 
Internet leviathans and venture capitals, such as Didi, Uber, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and 
Starbucks, are ushering in a new sharing economy. In such a platform economy, an increasing 
number of people are working for gigs without benefits or social security and on radically 
flexible schedules that stretch them to breaking points. (Kenney, Zysman 2016) Meanwhile, it 
is also the reductionism to mathematical functions and statistics, which is inherent in most 
QS apps’ and devices’ prediction models, that gives rise to some ethical implications, which I 
will discuss next. 
1.2 Ethical implications of QS 
As mentioned in Section 1.1.1.2 above, most of the research in artificial intelligence 
concerning machine learning is dedicated to pattern recognition by mathematical means, and 
there is a lack of theory to explicate how the machine learns by itself, or what learning 
processes are involved. Most of the computer science researchers are satisfied with just 
finding out the right parameterisation method for a desired effect or a required accuracy rate, 
in accordance with the Humean account of causation. This is perfectly fine for lab research. 
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However, as the AI and big data technologies have been increasingly applied to many critical 
domains in human life, from medical diagnosis and treatment to court decision-making and 
automated driving, there emerges the needs for explanations. For instance, a patient may ask 
a doctor to explain their decision for a prescription or diagnosis in human-understandable 
terms. A driver may appeal against a court ruling, seeking redress for a wrongful judgement. 
In these circumstances, doctors, lawyers, judges and police may find themselves in dilemmas, 
because their decisions have been made with the assistance of AI, or even completely 
automated by AI, so they do not know how the decisions have been made. It is all a matter of 
pattern recognition, and how the computer algorithms find patterns from a cosmic database of 
precedents mathematically is, up to now, still a mystery in a blackbox. 
Although some people would accept nomological explanations, just like non-linguists would 
accept idiomatic uses and verbal phrases as they are, in democratic societies where citizens 
deliberate on all sorts of issues, especially on matters immediately concerning the human 
rights and conditions, it is deontic that the decisions are explicable in human and common 
sense languages. 
Through commercialisation, the QS, which originated as a niche culture of DIYers, has 
already been incorporated and integrated in the big data business. Most of the off-the-shelf 
self-tracking devices and apps are also in the big data business network. The detailed body 
data their users have collected for themselves are also stored by the QS companies for 
product development but also user profiling. For constructing, maintaining and enriching 
their digital presence, many QSers themselves also voluntarily share their data on social 
networks, facilitated or encouraged by the social functions embedded in the apps. It is widely 
known that such social platforms as WeChat, Facebook, Twitter and Youtube are profiling 
their users for exploitation, either for commercial purposes or complying with government 
requirements. The aggregated user profiles, though mostly anonymised, can be mined for 
patterns in-house or sold to other AI companies for exploitation, probably together with the 
databases aggregated from elsewhere. In the big data business, the bigger the data the better. 
‘Contrary to McLuhan’s global village, the internet isolates individuals and 
fragments demographics (Turkle, 2011), in a consumer panopticon where user 
activity is constantly recorded and sold for marketing (Schneier, 2014; Neff & Nafus, 
2016; Turow, 2017). In the hands of governments and corporations, the internet 
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augments efforts to exacerbate asymmetries of information and control, in part by 
commodifying and exploiting people’s self-model (Ferguson, 2017). The primary 
source of profit for social media is the personal information that individuals 
exchange (Papacharissi, 2009, 2012; van Dijck, 2013; Martinez, 2016). To increase 
profits, social media websites conduct research on how to make their platforms more 
immersive and addictive (Bosker, 2016). Today, the internet funds itself by 
constructing digital profiles for its inhabitants and dictating consumer-friendly 
trajectories for their development, through recommender algorithms that tailor 
advertisements and products. Advertisers bid over personality constructs in massive 
markets, such as the digital ad exchange run by Google, where publishers present the 
numbers and kinds of individuals they are selling (Turow, 2011). Algorithmic 
mediations of the self, fueled by the interests of corporate and political power, have 
undergone an evolutionary transition with the invention and injection of fully 
simulated selves into online environments.’ (Guilbeault, Finkelstein 2019: 154) 
Meanwhile, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies are testing with some pilot schemes of 
incorporating patients’ self-monitoring data in treatment and drug development; insurance 
companies are offering the corporate schemes, in which employees can choose to participate 
by contributing their own fitness data for insurance discounts; large corporations such as 
Tesco in the UK have repurposed self-tracking bracelets to monitoring the efficiency of their 
warehouse workers — Taylorism 2.0. 
With so many real and possibly more future applications of self-tracking technologies, we 
can expect that disputes around such issues as healthcare insurance fees, labour conflicts and 
identity theft can arise, and people would demand explanations. As a consequence, currently 
new research are underway to find a way to help explain the rationales behind the results 
generated by big data and QS technologies. One of my PhD colleagues is researching how to 
explain to humans the medical diagnoses done by AI on a Chinese online diagnosing 
platform, for instance. In Europe, there are ethical AI and algorithm design programmes 
studying how to protect user privacy and make redress possible for AI decisions, including 
passing new laws such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), taking effect in 
May 2018. 
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1.2.1 The company we keep and social self 
The rise of the QS culture can be considered as a digitised extension of the self-culture in 
modern society, and the influence the QS technologies and discourses have on people’s 
identity building also entails ethical considerations, especially given that the QS gadgets and 
smartphones are designed to be ubiquitous and always switched on and online, i.e. to be the 
company we keep all the time. In the 1980s when there was still a large reading public, the 
American rhetorician and literary critic Wayne C Booth in his book The company we keep: 
an ethics of fiction argued that the modern society has turned to a self-culture: 
‘Regardless of where we stand on that “obligation outward,” our culture seems to talk 
more naturally about “obligations inward”: “self”-cultivation, “self”-fulfillment, 
“personal growth,” “psychic health,” “self-change.” Instead of trying to combat such 
(obviously?) self-destructive modes, we may as well begin with our “selves,” 
whatever they are, saving our worries about other people for later on… The chief 
duty, subsuming all the rest, is to make of oneself the best “character” possible, given 
one’s “circumstances.”’ (Booth 1988: 166) 
Analogically, the QS movement is a new millennium form of self-cultivation, carried out 
digitally. The rugged individualism is also socially encouraged, palpable in many other areas 
of social life. My personal experience as a PhD candidate in a British university testifies that 
the contemporary training of professional researchers has put much emphasis on self-
responsibility as well as personal choice (and implicitly personal risks), thereby relieving the 
university, as a civic educational institution, of its traditional responsibilities to the students 
as citizens, but also distancing the students from their own social environment and concerns. 
So the QS movement has arguably moved along with, or even serves to lead and constitute 
the general direction of mainstream neoliberal culture, despite its origin as a DIY culture, a 
legacy of the 1960s counterculture movement. 
Ironically, many of the hippies in the 1960s had later become the yuppies who were mainly 
concerned about financial success in the 1980s in the US. Steven Jobs, the late co-founder of 
the Apple computer company was an epitome, while Burning Man, an ongoing annual 
counter-culture bonfire festival started in the 1980s in San Francisco, which embraced a 
syncretism of New Age spiritualities and anti-consumerism, is another case. It is now a 
popular holiday destination for Silicon Valley billionaires to spend their summers and sums. 
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Regular attendants include Elon Musk from Tesla Motors and Space X and Google 
cofounders Larry Page and Sergey Brin and its CEO Eric Schmidt. Google has also 
incorporated Burning Man in its corporate culture in an effort to ‘help to shape and legitimate 
the collaborative manufacturing processes driving’ its growth as well as personal gains. 
(Turner 2009). Meanwhile, Musk was reported to be among the technocrats to eschew the 
tent life at Burning Man’s dessert venue, ‘paying for an elaborate compound consisting of 
eight recreational vehicles and trailers stocked with food, linens, groceries and other 
essentials for himself and his friends and family.’ The price for eking out a personal oasis for 
a few days there was 5,500 to 10,000 US dollars per RV. (Carrigan 2015) So the free spirit 
and solidarity witnessed during the 1960s, such as at the People’s Park in Berkeley, 
California, have been appropriated for commercial purposes, and the counter-cultures from 
DIY to Burning Man are now, arguably, part and parcel of the mainstream consumerism.  6
Similarly in the UK, some of the major hipster musical festivals such as the Glastonbury 
Festival, charging only 1 pound (including free milk from the farm) in 1970,  are now some 7
of the most expensive artistic events in the country. A full-pass ticket for Glastonbury Festival 
in 2020 costs 265 pounds plus a five pounds booking fee, according to the festival’s official 
website. Musicians have turned into entrepreneurs, so have our selves. 
Despite the society’s recalcitrant tendency for navel-gazing and focus on self-sufficiency as 
well as self-success, Booth insisted on the stance that the self is social, which was against the 
notion of atomic individualism, because he argued that the self-cultivation cannot be 
accomplished without the others. 
‘If I think of myself not as an atomic unit bumping other atoms but as a character–as 
someone doing my best to enact the various roles “assigned” me–I discover that there 
are no clear boundaries between the others who are somehow both outside and inside 
me and the “me” that the others are “in.” As Gregory Bateson puts it, in that fine, 
strange, rambling book Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972), I am not bounded by my 
skin.’ (ibid: 239) 
 ‘Who would have predicted that less than thirty years after the battle for People’s Park, squares and hippies 6
would together create the Californian Ideology? Who would have thought that such a contradictory mix of 
technological determinism and libertarian individualism would becoming (sic) the hybrid orthodoxy of the 
information age? And who would have suspected that as technology and freedom were worshipped more and 
more, it would become less and less possible to say anything sensible about the society in which they were 
applied?’ (Barbrook, Cameron 2001: 366-367)
 Official Glastonbury Festival history, https://www.glastonburyfestivals.co.uk/history/history-1970/7
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Besides siding with the systems theory’s point of view that an organism such as a human 
being is an open rather than a closed system, Booth has also tried to defend the social self 
view by citing various Marxists, including Marx himself (Marx [1844] 1964: p77; Lukacs 
1963; Jameson 1981: ch3), Hegelians (Bradley [1876] 1951: 98-147), behaviourists (Skinner 
1969, 1971), social psychologists (Dewey 1922; Mead 1982; Royce 1969), Michael Polanyi 
(in his account of a ‘personal’ knowledge pursued by scientists who necessarily live 
convivially (1972, esp chs 7-8), Charles Taylor (in his account of how the self can fill its 
responsibility to itself by aspiring to be a different self (1976, 1985)), Joseph Raz (in his 
defence of liberalism (1986)), Jacques Lacan (in his accounts of how the Subject remakes 
itself in encounters with the Other (1968; 1978: esp 203-76) and Aristotle (‘[W]e are 
“political animals” precisely in the sense that we become human only in a polis.’) (ibid: 238) 
Therefore, although the QS movement claims to help the QSers gain self-knowledge through 
numbers, the solipsism and reductionism that come along with it are actually not so 
conducive to self-cultivation and self-formation, given that the self is social. So unlike the 
novels that Booth has analysed, which allow their readers to explore and enjoy the fuzzy and 
ambiguous boundaries between the self and others by giving them licence to play the roles 
other than their ‘authentic selves’ (to be discussed in the next section), the self-tracking 
gadgets and apps the QSers keep as their daily company make them narrowly focus on their 
own atomic individuals, which, admittedly, can be measured in a variety of innovative and 
interesting ways. (More on this in Chapter 2.)  
1.2.2 QS and role-play 
Since self-formation involves playing multiple social roles, Booth (ibid: 255-260) argued that 
literature can have a significant impact on its readers’ character-shaping precisely because it 
can provide them different roles to play, to be someone different from their ‘authentic selves.’ 
‘In short, the ideal of purging oneself of responses to persons, the ideal of refusing to 
play the human roles offered us by literature, is never realized by any actual reader 
who reads a compelling fiction for the sake of reading it (rather than for the sake of 
obtaining material for an essay, dissertation, or book). It is of course true that in 
reading some modern works we take on selves who repudiate tears and laughter and 
share other human pleasures with the author, pleasures like shuddering at the horrors 
of the abyss, or mocking sentimentalists, or enjoying textual play of various kinds. 
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When we read such works with full engagement, these are our forms of “hypocritical 
aspiration.” Even in the purest of textual gambols we will play the roles–so long as 
we continue to “listen”–that the text demands of us.’ (ibid: 255-256) 
He went on to give an account of the poet George Santayana as an evidence, for Santayana’s 
aspirations to be like three great poets in history that he had read (namely, Lucretius, Dante 
and Goethe) helped shape his character as the Santayana his readers came to know. (ibid: 
257) 
In comparison, the QS discourse (including show-and-tells, blogs and visualisation of the 
self-data) can also influence the self-trackers’ sense of who they are and their behaviours by 
inviting them to role-play different selves, which are largely defined by numbers and 
biometrics this time. However, these roles of quantified selves are mostly digital variations of 
their own authentic selves, which are situated and embedded in their own everyday contexts 
and are usually uploaded to the infosphere to create a digital layer of their authentic selves. 
Thus the QS discourse is rather autobiographical than fictional, and their writers-readers can 
have many roles to play but within a limited range in their own familiar environment. Even if 
they read the blogs of another QSer, who has drastically different life experience from 
themselves, they cannot easily become the narrator like they can in a novel, or take on a 
protagonist’s point-of-view, because the QSers write their blogs from an external and 
objective perspective with the assistance of the QS machines and data. Therefore, by simply 
writing-reading the QS discourse, they would not get many opportunities to play the roles of 
others in totally different or imaginative time-space and socioeconomic situations.  8
That said, sociologist Deborah Lupton (2012), a leading expert on the QS research, suggested 
that the QSers are being studied as people seeking to transform their bodies/selves through 
numbers. Lupton said since the QS technologies have given a self-tracker ‘the ability to 
produce “numbers” measuring aspects of one’s life,’ they can assess the improvement or 
progress of their persona enterprise, such as being more productive, wealthier, wiser and 
healthier, by using hard/objective data. In other words, the QSers take on the roles of 
different idealised selves, often preconfigured in the apps based on certain scientific models 
and measurements, and they try to hit the specific numeric targets in order to become those 
 According to cognitive studies of literature recently, not all novels are equally effective in creating the effects 8
of ‘transportation’ and ‘empathy,’ or putting the readers affectively in a character’s shoes through tapping into 
the readers’ theory of mind. Some literary novels are better at it than other non-fictions and popular fictions. 
(Bal, Veltkamp 2013; Kidd, Castano 2013)
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roles, rather than, say, imitating the style of a great poet. In this sense, quantification offers an 
impression of certainty, for how is a self-tracker to know whether they play the roles well or 
not when they are all by themselves ? As Lupton observed, for the QSers, ‘it becomes easier 
to trust the “numbers” over physical sensations.’ (ibid) Thus, she said the self-trackers are 
those who subject their bodies/selves to scientific measurement by computerised 
technologies, and are products of, or transformed by, the scientific interpretation by such 
technologies. 
There is also a social, or social-media, dimension to the QSers’ role-play, or what Lupton 
called the ‘performative mode’ in the QS movement. According to surveillance society 
literature (e.g. Lyon, 2007), digital technologies are becoming ubiquitous and are used by 
governments and businesses to monitor individuals. However, the digital technologies are 
adopted by the QSers voluntarily for their own purposes, such as broadcasting their body data 
to their friends and followers on social media platforms, such as Facebook and WeChat. 
Lupton (ibid) said that their voluntary participation in such self-surveillance ‘moves from an 
inner-directed preoccupation with the body/self to a performative mode, inviting further 
scrutiny from one’s friends and followers,’ and even comparing and competing with the 
others’ data. For example, many running apps can share a runner’s records on social media 
and invite their friends to compete. 
This particular discovery echoes with other research on the development of the Internet and 
social media in general. In the early days of the Internet in the 1990s, researchers already 
noticed the Internet surfers were experimenting with multiple online identities, taking 
advantage of the anonymity engendered by the then new technology. “The most prominent of 
the early proponents of online voluntaristic forms of identity was Shelly Turkle, who argued 
that ‘you are who you pretend to be’ (1995: 192)… However, these ‘pretend’ identities were 
not developed in isolation but through interaction with others in the network (Lister et al, 
2003: 348).” (White, 2014) 
White’s (ibid) recent research also showed that the identity changes brought about by the 
digital media would affect knowledge and usher in a new form of politics. He explained how 
people have been experimenting and playing with their new-founded online identities made 
possible by the advent of the Internet, and how they have since formed new communities 
based on these identity changes. 
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‘[I]dentity is an important factor in the way in which we construct knowledge; 
changes in identity will, then, impact on knowledge construction. What can be said 
generally about the move away from identities based on individuality (literate culture) 
and anonymity (1990s Internet cultures) to ones that are more public in orientation 
(social networking) is that it subtly alters the relationship between the private and 
public spheres as traditionally conceived in political theory’ (ibid: 42) 
As the Internet has developed into an age of Web 2.0 and with the social media’s arrival on 
the scene, some novel forms of identity have emerged. What is particular relevant to the QS 
role-play is what Allison Cavanagh calls a “productive” form of identity (2007: 122, cited in 
White, 2014: 33-34) In the current new situation, if a blogger or a creator of other types of 
online content wants to be taken seriously, then they must find ways to convince the potential 
audience of their credibility. As a result, the game of impersonation and anonymity from the 
old days are no longer played. Nowadays, the most effective ways to boost one’s 
trustworthiness online is to make use of social media, which can put a virtual identity in a 
network of relations, giving it credentials. ‘At the same time, this network of relationships 
must be grounded in real world identities for it to have a credible foundation.’ (Caldas-
Coulthard, 2005, cited in White, ibid) From this perspective, we can see the reason why some 
QSers publish their self-reports online, share their data in social media and participate in 
show-and-tells which can later be uploaded is that they are trying to give their new identities 
and new roles in the infosphere credibility. In Web 2.0 where misinformation can spread 
quickly through such rumour mills as Twitter, construction of authentic and real identities is a 
major concern for all the netizens, including the QSers and the POTUS (tellingly, the 
incumbent US President’s Twitter account name is ‘realDonaldTrump.’) 
In sum, just as Booth has carefully studied the novels that keep us company before, it is 
important, or even imperative, for us to ask now what roles our new QS companions are 
suggesting and persuading us to play and what types of life scripts and lifestyle patterns the 
QS discourse is constantly encouraging or nudging us to follow and lead. In other words, 
what is the cultural model of the Quantified Self ? 
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2. Literature review 
When I first started studying the QS culture in 2013, most of the research was done by 
sociologists of science and technology studies (STS) and cultural scholars of Internet and 
new media studies. The linguists and discourse analysts did not pay much attention to this 
area of development until recently (c.f. Paganoni 2019), although discourse analysts have 
already dedicated themselves to studying computer-mediated discourse (CMD), including 
blogs as a genre in general. Therefore, in this chapter I review mainly the work done by the 
sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and cultural scholars whose research are 
related to the QS and big data, and identify the research gap that can be filled by cognitively-
informed critical discourse analysts. 
2.1 Metrics, panopticon and self-surveillance 
As sociologist Lupton (2013a: 25) defined, the QS refers to the practice of regularly self-
tracking bodily functions and behaviours, using such digital devices as mobile phones and 
wearable computers with associated apps, and analysing the statistics thus generated for life-
optimisation purposes. The QSers, or self-trackers, use global positioning devices, 
gyroscopes, altimeters, and accelerometers, branded as many different kinds of consumer 
electronics products, to collect data on a myriad of lifestyle variables, including ‘moods, diet, 
dreams, social encounters, posture, sexual activity, blood chemistry, heart rate, body 
temperature, exercise patterns, brain function, alcohol, coffee and tobacco 
consumption.’ (ibid: p25) 
According to Lupton (2013a), what is new about the QS are a) coinage of the term “the 
quantified self” in a bid to categorise those self-trackers who are identified with emerging 
digital technologies; b) use of media to propagate the QS ideas in a bid to associate new 
technologies with ‘prosumers’ and everyday life; and c) the organisation of online 
communities and physical show-and-tells to share self-tracking knowledge and experiences. 
(Promsuers are individuals in a Web 2.0 context where people simultaneously produce and 
consume the user-generated content.) 
In particular, wellbeing is an important notion related to the self-quantifying practice, since 
the QS is not only about physical health but rather, more broadly, about fitness (it is no 
coincidence that one of the best-selling QS bracelets is called Fitbit). Borrowing from 
Foucault’s (1988: 16-49) idea of the care of the self, Lupton (2012) has called the QS 
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practices new technologies of the self, in contrast to the other technologies of the self 
throughout the Western history since the Greco-Roman times. Lupton proposed a perspective 
that sees the QSers as voluntarily taking on the new self-technologies to achieve self-interest 
and conform to state objectives at the same time. A QSer then may be considered as a 
neoliberal ‘citizen who needs no coercion to behave productively and in the interests of the 
state.’ (ibid) The QSers need no coercion because ‘the controlling mechanisms of software 
and computer code are hidden thus acting as a subtle form of control,’ exerted through 
‘multiplying the possibilities for controlled freedom’ said sociologist Christopher Till (2006), 
and the subtle control is a feature of ‘the societies of control.’ (c.f. Deleuze 1992) 
This observation about the QS is in line with the general development of the use of metrics in 
the modern society. As Adkins and Lury (2012) observed, ‘the use of metrics in many aspects 
of social life… has been greatly impelled by the development of technologies for achieving 
quantification.’ When measurements and statistics are already extensively used, accepted as a 
social institution and reinforced by technologies, their extensions to such areas as the 
quantification of bodily activities are less likely to be challenged.  
This growing trend of getting to know one’s self quantitatively (i.e. the QS slogan, 'Self 
knowledge through numbers’) has far more implications on our society than on the QSers’ 
self-(trans)formation alone. Lupton (2012) said that the implications of ‘[s]uch a 
transformation extends further… to… the increasing focus on the metrics as a valued source 
of knowledge in many other aspects of social life.’ 
Actually, it is not difficult for us to reflect by ourselves how our everyday life in the modern 
world is permeated and governed by data and measurement, from exam scores in schools to 
key performance indicators (KPI) in companies to the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) 
carried out every five years in British universities (RAE was recently replaced by the new 
Research Excellence Framework (REF) in 2014, a technological upgrade) to government 
census. A main and important domain for the universal use of measurement and 
quantification is in our economic life, from accounting, credit rating and investment decision-
making to business and management analysis and insurance. 
Indeed, economics since the time of Adam Smith, who also wrote extensively on morality, 
rhetoric and language, has gradually replaced religion in secular discourse as a central arbiter 
on value(s) and ethics. According to the sociologists who study quantification and valuation, 
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the ‘economy enjoys a reputation as the origin and arbiter of value. In almost all domains of 
life, it is the economist who is called upon to (e-)valuate benefits and costs and provide the 
basis for decision-making.’ (Kornberger, Justesen, Mouritsen, Madsen 2015: 2-3)  
However, it was the first major utilitarian proponent Jeremy Bentham who introduced 
calculative practices that were able to deliver numbers ‘to quantify pain and pleasure and to 
use them as inputs in a calculation of utility that results in a clear guidance for decision-
makers. In the reframed discussion, calculation replaces the judge, and numbers substitute 
arguments.’ (ibid: 3) 
‘What Bentham proposed, and what the economist would put into action, is a new 
way of thinking and arguing—a new rhetoric (McCloskey 1994)—in which to 
articulate and justify political ideas. Bentham’s political philosophy—his moral 
panopticon—can be seen as an implicit critique of justifications of social order, such 
as Rousseau’s social contract or Hobbes’ imaginary Leviathan. For Bentham, they 
were nothing but metaphysical niceties that put a form of theatre, an abstract 
representation, at the heart of society. Bentham replaced this spectacle, which he 
viewed as corrupt, with a calculation of pain and pleasure. Consequently, the debate 
shifts from the issue of representations, contracts, and principles to a calculation of 
grades and degrees. Bentham’s shift poses a costly challenge; it requires an 
evaluative infrastructure that is able to (or at least can claim to) measure and quantify 
pain and pleasure adequately.’ (ibid: 4) 
Despite that Bentham loathed Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s political and social theories as being 
like fiction and theatre, his own idea of a panopticon, which he calculated was the most 
efficient way to run a prison, was also a form of theatre — ‘a play with illusion, a mirage of 
perspective and lights that would fool prisoners into subordination.’ (ibid: 16)  
‘The panopticon is an exemplary prison in which a small number of prison guards watch a 
large number of prisoners from a central hidden position. The idea of this concept of 
watching is that because the prisoners are never able to tell when they are being watched, 
they learn to engage in self-discipline, internalising the guards’ regulatory gaze,’ according to 
Lupton (2015b: 35). Panopticon has been used as a metaphor for social control by the French 
historian and philosopher Michel Foucault in his book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of 
the Prison (1995), which has been influential in surveillance studies, including digital 
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(self-)surveillance. Panoptic surveillance ‘is a feature of non-coercive disciplinary power 
involving the few watching the many.’ (ibid: 35) For Bentham, ‘in order to maximize the 
utility of punishment, it has to be turned into a spectacle,’ which is a fictitious entity, and 
‘what people call their own interest (the desire for pleasure and avoidance of pain) is a 
discursive accomplishment, a fiction, something that comes alive in staged events and 
theatrical performances.’ (Kornberger, Justesen, Mouritsen, Madsen 2015: 16-17)  
So from the standpoint of sociologists, self-tracking is a form of self-surveillance, a voluntary 
participation in a (post-)panoptic society, and although this participation is arguably 
utilitarian, it is also fictional, theatrical and rhetorical. ‘In this  post-panoptic society  
(Caluya 2010), coming under the surveillance of others using apps is a largely voluntary 
practice. What has been described as  participatory surveillance  (Best 2010) involves the 
voluntary turn of the gaze upon oneself for one ’s own purposes. Participatory surveillance 
in relation to self-tracking technologies tends to be implicated with self-reflection and 
examination [Lupton 2013b]. In this respect it adheres to Foucault ’s (1988) concept of the 
technologies or practices of the self: those activities that are directed at self-care, self-
management or self-improvement.’ (Lupton 2015a) Perhaps like all other fictions, for the 
fiction of self-care and self-improvement through numbers to work, it is in need of some 
metaphors. And the conceptual metaphors in the QS discourse will be key to my discovery of 
the cultural model in QS movement. But before going on to discuss the metaphors of big data 
and QS in Section 2.3, I will review the literature on idealised selves, metrology and politics 
of quantification in Section 2.2. 
2.2 Idealised selves, metrological chains and politics of quantification 
In a sense, the Quantified Selfers are playing the roles of idealised selves measured in 
numbers. Although some of the QS activists following the DIY tradition may not choose to 
imitate any celebrity but prefer building their own algorithms (e.g. experimenting with the 
daily coffee intake and measuring it against mental tasks performance (Fawkes, 2015)), they 
are still trying to perform idealised roles (e.g. a productive knowledge worker or a scientist), 
whose sources may come from some idealised examples in popular culture and scientific 
literature. Certain tendencies in the QS movement which aim to quantify, idealise and 
rationalise every aspect of a human body may signal an excess of reason, which, as Foucault 
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(1983a) has argued, will have political consequences. As the French STS expert Latour 
(1985: 28) pointed out, 
‘“Rationalization” has very little to do with the reason of bureau and technocrats, but 
has a lot to do with the maintenance of metrological chains (Uselding, 1981). This 
building of long networks provides the stability of the main physical constants, but 
there are many other metrological activities for less “universal” measures (polls, 
questionnaires, forms to fill in, accounts, tallies).’ 
‘Metrology is the scientific organization of stable measurement and standards. Without it no 
measurement is stable enough to allow either the homogeneity of the inscriptions or their 
return… Thanks to metrological organization the basic physical constants (time, space, 
weight, wave-length) and many biological and chemical standards may be extended 
“everywhere” (Zerubavel, 1982 ; Landes, 1983). The universality of science and technology 
is a cliché of epistemology but metrology is the practical achievement of this mystical 
universality…Metrology is only the official and primary component of an ever increasing 
number of measuring activities we all have to undertake in daily life. Every time we look at 
our wristwatch or weigh a sausage at the butchers shop; every time applied laboratories 
measure lead pollution, water purity, or control the quality of industrial goods, we allow more 
immutable mobiles to reach new places.’ (ibid) 
Therefore, it is due to the development of metrology that those which were once not 
comparable, which were dispersed in time and space and qualitatively different from each 
other, have become quantitatively comparable, or commensurable, within a stable and 
universal metric system, hence being manageable. This is particularly conducive to 
modernisation, or modern national building, a process in which large-scale projects from 
railroads to rockets, from hospitals to high-rise buildings, from national schools to national 
defence, have been done and replicated across the nations and the world, entailing 
coordination of massive amount of labour and materials of all sorts, often over an extensive 
period of time. The modern institutions are hence tasked to impose and enforce 
standardisation and commensuration in order to assure the success of the projects and assess 
the health of the national economy. Indeed, the metrology itself was a brainchild born from 
the French Revolution, representing their idealism and passion for modernity. 
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Nowadays, the metrological systems have continued to develop apace and the International 
Bureau of Weights and Measures has recently agreed unanimously to replace, or digitise, the 
physical prototypes of some metric units (e.g. the kilogramme) with mathematical functions, 
quickening our steps into the digital epoch in all walks of life.  The QSers are thus deeply 9
embedded and interconnected with other humans and non-humans alike in this network of 
universal and standard measurements. They have willingly put themselves in metrological 
chains, which are constructed, maintained and enforced by the governments and institutions 
rather than individuals, in exchange for an idealised posthuman life. Their life and standards 
of living will appear to remain (quantitatively) the same and thus controllable (as qualitative 
differences are rendered invisible or reduced to the minimum, not under digital surveillance) 
wherever they go and whenever they are, so long as they stay connected to their self-tracking 
devices and the Internet, and thus to the metrological network.  
For example, when I go jogging in a park wearing my running tracker and heart-rate monitor, 
connected to a running app (using the metric system) via Bluetooth on my smartphone, which 
is connected to a 4G mobile network and the Global Positioning System (GPS), I can get the 
same performance report after jogging as the one I can get from an advanced treadmill in a 
gym, or even better with more details, nicer graphs and even animation of my own digital 
tracks on GPS. The difference in my subjective experience, however, between running on a 
treadmill and a road is not taken into account, not automatically by the devices and the app, at 
least. As Paganoni (2019: 8) summarised, 
‘Among the tenets of posthumanistic thinking is the vision of the human as embodied 
and embedded in cultural and technological environments with intelligence and 
agency distributed between humans and nonhumans (Hollinger 2009)…Rosi 
Braidotti (2013) sees posthuman subjectivity as a tendency inherent in human and 
 ‘The 2019 redefinition of the SI base units came into force on 20 May 2019,[1][2] the 144th anniversary of the 9
Metre Convention. In the redefinition, four of the seven SI base units – the kilogram, ampere, kelvin, and mole – 
were redefined by setting exact numerical values for the Planck constant (h), the elementary electric charge (e), 
the Boltzmann constant (k), and the Avogadro constant (NA), respectively. The second, metre, and candela were 
already defined by physical constants and were subject to correction to their definitions. The new definitions 
aimed to improve the SI without changing the value of any units, ensuring continuity with existing 
measurements.[3][4] In November 2018, the 26th General Conference on Weights and Measures (CGPM) 
unanimously approved these changes,[5][6] which the International Committee for Weights and Measures 
(CIPM) had proposed earlier that year after determining that previously agreed conditions for the change had 
been met.[7]’ (https://newsucan2use.com/revised-definitions-of-the-si-base-units-adopted-at-the-26th-general-
conference-on-weights-and-measures-cgpm-that-came-into-force-on-20-may-2019/). So what’s the fuss all this 
updating metric units about ? As a Reuters report put it, ‘It may not change how you buy bananas, but scientists 
have voted to redefine the value of a kilogram, in what they called a landmark decision that will boost the 
accuracy of scientific measurements.’ (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-science-kilogram-idUSKCN1NL21P)
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nonhuman living systems alike “to affiliate with other living systems to form new 
functional assemblages” (Roden 2013: n.p.) and argues that a new notion of the self 
as networked with capital and communication technologies across real and virtual 
contexts has emerged, discarding old modernist idealisation of the subject (Goodley 
2014).’ 
As the sociologists of quantification pointed out, to measure and to make commensurate (i.e. 
to be measured together, from late Latin commensuratus) often contribute to valuation and 
evaluation, which have political and ethical impacts. ‘Valuing is a complex process that 
shapes how we think about the world, one that highlights certain relations and objects but 
obscures others. Valuing often contributes to making what was once visible invisible, and 
vice versa.’ In institutional settings, valuation is ‘transformed through the imposition of 
rigorous calculative practices… new forms of evaluation changed what people noticed and 
how they behaved… That which is hard to measure or, for some, that which is most 
meaningful and deeply integrated into their cultures, or the ethical dimensions of a decision, 
are often made invisible through processes of simplification and 
commensuration.’  (Espeland, Lom 2015: 19) 
‘There are some general patterns in how commensuration shapes cognition. It unifies 
disparate objects or events by imposing a shared metric on them. This may be a shallow form 
of unity compared with other forms, such as a common identity or common language, but the 
effect can be profound. One only needs to consider the implications of pricing to appreciate 
the power of universalizing forms for social relations. But the truly generative aspect of 
commensuration is that it creates precise distinctions at the same time that it unifies. These 
distinctions may reflect pre-existing cultural understandings, but their precision is often 
something new. Precise distinctions force comparisons and stratification. It is impossible not 
to notice who or what is higher or lower. This attention to difference is fundamental to 
making judgements about quality.’ (ibid: 35) 
An example the sociologists cited was university ranking by the media. Seeking for guidance 
on choosing among a variety of universities and a great range of postgraduate and 
professional programmes, each of them being a unique opportunity, the students and parents 
in the US have been persuaded by Morton Zuckerman, the publisher of US News and World 
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Report, to follow the surveys of certain selected universities and programmes the weekly 
news magazine has compiled since 1983.  
“[I]t didn’t take long for deans of admissions to realize that prospective students were 
using rankings to decide which schools to apply to and attend. Once newspapers 
began reporting rankings annually, it was impossible to ignore them… 
Rankings have catalysed broad changes in universities. Schools now admit students 
to boost their selectivity statistics… Millions of dollars are spent on marketing in an 
effort to boost results from surveys of reputations… 
Rankings have redirected our attention in crucial ways. They have created a new 
status system in which every school has a specific location. Rankings have made 
winners and losers clearly visible… there is no opting out. Because of the precise 
relations that rankings create among schools, rankings also reveal ‘differences’ that 
may not have existed or may have been invisible. Tiny, insignificant differences, the 
‘noise’ of measurement, may mean the difference between being in the first or second 
tier, a ‘top 100’ university or not. Moreover, small, meaningless shifts must now be 
explained in terms of rankings factors. The things that matter that are not reflected in 
the rankings become irrelevant… 
Most importantly, qualitative differences have disappeared as this new means of 
sorting has taken hold. Qualities that could distinguish a school, like catering to poor 
or rural people, specializing in the arts, participating in an experiment to end 
segregation, or emphasizing teaching, are all back-stage to rankings, and the rankings 
punish schools for these kinds of innovations—or they are made invisible.” (ibid: 
27-29) 
As this example has tellingly shown, quantification uses the same rod to make commensurate 
qualitatively different schools and programmes, each of which is a different breed and has its 
own features and characteristics, and the consequence is that the only indicator for the quality 
of these schools and programmes has become their ranking status on an ordered list, the 
higher the better. The qualitative distinctions have been reduced to the bare minimum, while 
numbers and statistics reign supreme, causing unnecessary but inevitable anxieties and 
misrepresentation.  
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The same can be applied to the QSers. When they use their self-tracking apps, they also apply 
the embedded shared metrics, such as cadence and heart rate, to their docile bodies, thus 
putting their bodily activities to be compared on the same objective list with the others’. 
Some QSers may enjoy this feeling of competition, while others may find devious ways to 
game the system.  Nevertheless, what matters is that their attention has been redirected to 10
things more quantitative, limiting their conceptualisation about their own fitness and self-
improvement. No matter winning or losing, they are focused for a while everyday on step 
counts and body weights, for instance, instead of on some other meaningful aspects about 
how fit they are, such as whom they have helped and what new things they have learnt. 
Sometimes, they may be misdirected by their apps to focus on some popular but insignificant 
measures (e.g. body mass index (BMI) instead of cardiovascular health), or sometimes, the 
measurements done by their consumer-grade micro-monitors are not accurate enough to 
generate medically significant results. (I was once scoffed at by my physician when I tried to 
show her my sleep quality recorded by my app. She kindly suggested that I should check out 
the hospital’s polysomnography.) 
An ‘important pattern in quantification is that we are more likely to emphasize that which is 
easiest to measure. The algorithm USN used to create rankings included measures that 
schools routinely collected. For example, students’ satisfaction with their school was 
operationalized as the percentage of students who donated to their university. This clearly 
benefits schools with wealthy students compared to those with poorer students. Rankings 
criteria also include the statistics that schools routinely collect, such as test scores and grade 
averages. The quality of libraries is measured by the number of their books.’ (Espeland, Lom 
2015: 35) 
For the QSers, the easiness of measurement also depends on the functionalities, or 
technological affordances, of their smart devices. For example, the reason why most of the 
fitness and weight control apps use the inaccurate metrics of BMI is not only because the 
index is popular and conventional but also because the majority of the smartphones do not 
have sensors for measuring cardiovascular health and total lung capacity, which are medically 
more accurate. Of course, there are always add-on sensors and QS accessories for the 
 WeChat has a popular social function for comparing users’ daily step counts, encouraging them to exercise 10
more often. However, some online vendors have taken the opportunity to sell smartphone holders that can shake 
or rock the phones automatically, thus cheating the system for steps and helping the users boost their rankings.
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enthusiasts to experiment or play with. For cost-benefit reasons, however, most app makers 
vying for mass consumers may not take special hardware add-ons into the consideration of 
their default app designs, especially when the hardware needs to be custom-made or is 
supplied by a third-party, which they cannot control. 
As mentioned earlier in this section, the QSers are empiricists in their approach but idealists 
in aspiration for universality, or even immortality.  This has caused debates among the QS 11
researchers. Sociologists have studied the QS for some time, and they differed on what sorts 
of social logic it represented. Lupton (2012) claims that a QSer should be considered as a 
neoliberal ‘citizen who needs no coercion to behave productively and in the interests of the 
state’. They buy into the state apparatus’ control through accepting the metrics and the 
imposition of metrological chains on their own volition. Perhaps there is also a smack of 
cosmopolitanism that affects the QSers positively, since the Quantified Self is considered an 
international movement with a distributed network of local meetup groups in the major cities 
of the more developed regions. That helps explain why some people willingly participate in 
this movement. Actually, cosmopolitanism has always been a magnet since modernity to 
draw the people who aspire to be ‘citizens of the world’ into such social movements as 
Bloomsbury Group. 
Meanwhile, Nafus and Sherman (2014: 1785, 1790-1792) considered the QS as a form of 
‘soft resistance,’ ‘an important modality of resistance to dominant modes of living with data,’ 
because the self-trackers challenged and disrupted the traditional modes of data aggregation 
by their idiosyncratic data gathering practices and often shifting priorities. 
All of the above sociologists’ arguments have their own merits, based on their respective 
surveys and interviews with the QSers, yielding objective accounts of the QS movement from 
various perspectives. However, my research was carried out using a cognitive linguistics 
approach, focusing on identifying the conceptual metaphors in the QS community and, by 
inference, the cultural models of the Quantified Self. In my case, the QSers could be 
‘neoliberal citizens’ who voluntarily conformed to state objectives or the people who put up 
‘soft resistance’ to the corporate and scientific hegemony, or mixed with both. 
 Some of the posthumanists have proposed the idea of uploading their brain data, such as brainwaves records, 11
their equivalent to consciousness, into the cloud, so in the future when technologies become sufficiently 
advanced, scientists can download their consciousness from the cloud into an artificial human body, hence 
immortality.
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Unlike the sociologists who study the QS through interviews and surveys, I choose to 
examine QS blogs, aided by cognitive linguistics theory, which returns the materiality to 
language. By the materiality of language I mean that, while sociologists consider language as 
a means of conveying ideas, cognitive linguists insist that the way we use language and 
construct a phrase directly reflects our thoughts, rather than language mediating them. 
According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, clusters of linguistic metaphors (or metaphorical 
expressions) can reflect the underlying concepts in people's mind and reveal the hidden 
beliefs they hold. (Lakoff, 2007, 1990; Lakoff, Johnson, 1999, 2003)  By close reading the 
QS blogs, I am looking directly at some of the QSers’ explicit and implicit thinking patterns, 
the same as gesture scholars looking at people’s gestures and infer about their thoughts. More 
specifically, I research the QS conceptual metaphors related to self, data and self-control, 
which is a critical component of the contemporary conceptualisation of wellbeing. 
2.3 Blogs, cultural models and metaphors of big data 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, few linguists have paid attention to the 
discourse of the Quantified Self, except for Paganoni (2019) and Jones (2015), so this is a 
quite new topic for linguistics and discourse analysis. Furthermore, as far as I know, no 
linguist or discourse analyst had systematically examined the relations between the QSers’ 
discourse and their mind, or the cultural models of Quantified Self.  Since I was interested 12
in studying the QSers’ subjective experience rather than studying how the public perceived 
the QS movement, I have chosen to analyse the QSers’ show-and-tells blogs instead of the 
news coverage of QS.  13
2.3.1 Blogs as a type of computer-mediated discourse (CMD) 
Linguists have studied blogs for some time, as a subgenre of the computer-mediated 
discourse, and I here offer a brief overview in relation to my research on QS blogs, mainly 
with reference to Baym (2006) and Herring and Androutsopoulos (2015). 
The study of computer-mediated discourse (CMD) is ‘a specialization within the broader 
interdisciplinary study of computer-mediated communication (CMC), distinguished by its 
focus on language and language use and by its use of methods of discourse analysis to 
 For a detailed discussion of the Quantified Self culture in relation to selfies and blogs, see Rettberg (2014: 12
61-78).
 Paganoni (2019: 21-58) studied the English news coverage of big data in order to analyse ‘the strategies 13
deployed in the construction and dissemination of expert discourse about big data.’ 
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address that focus.’ (Herring, Androutsopoulos 2015: 127, original emphases) The academic 
interest in how humans use language to communicate on the Internet began in late 1970s (e.g. 
Hiltz and Turoff 1978), and researchers including linguists, communication scholars and 
sociologists have since studied mainly two types of computer-mediated communication 
(CMC), namely, synchronous CMC and asynchronous CMC. The former includes chat 
rooms, instant messaging, online games, MUDS (multiuser dimensions or multiuser 
dungeons), and the latter includes email, static websites, webboards, bulletin boards, 
newsgroups and weblogs (or ‘blogs’), though in practice the lines between the two are often 
blurred. (Baym 2006: 523) In terms of CMD, the first research was conducted in the 1980s 
(Murray 1985, 1988; Severinson Eklundh 1986), ‘but language scholars did not begin to take 
serious notice of CMD until 1991, with the publication of Ferrara, Brunner, and Whittemore’s 
“Interactive written discourse as an emergent genre.”’ (Herring, Androutsopoulos 2015: 127) 
Scholars, who noted that speech and writing are not dichotomous but rather are situated along 
a continuum (see Biber 1988), ‘have distinguished between synchronous and asynchronous 
CMD, situating asynchronous modes such as email closer to the written end of the written–
spoken continuum than synchronous modes such as chat, which tend to exhibit more “oral” 
features.’ (ibid: 129)  
Alternatively, CMC can be categorised as text-based and multimodal. (ibid: 127) In text-
based CMC ‘messages were typed on a computer keyboard and read as text on a computer 
screen – and accessed through stand-alone clients. Text-based CMC modes include email, 
discussion forums, newsgroups, chat, MUDs and MOOs (MUDs, object oriented), blogs, 
microblogs, and wikis.’ As the Internet entered into the age of Web 2.0, textual CMC has 
been increasingly supplemented by graphical, audio, and/or video channels of 
communication, and multiple modes of CMC are available on Web 2.0 platforms and 
smartphones. ‘All of these environments provide rich contexts in which to observe verbal 
interaction and the relationship between discourse and social practice.’ (ibid: 127) 
Specifically related to my research, the blogs are a type of online discourse, in which ‘a 
writer or collective of writers posts comments on a daily or even hourly basis. Readers can 
often engage in discussion of those comments through hyperlinked sections that appear as 
second pages.’ However, the degree of interactivity a weblog offers varies, ‘depending on 
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whether the author includes the means for readers to leave comments or reply to those 
comments that are left.’ (Baym 2006: 523) 
According to the linguists, CMD types and genres can be classified in familiar terms, 
‘particularly when these are viewed not so much as fixed sets of features than as responses to 
common communicative exigencies, as suggested by Giltrow (2013). For example, the blog 
(sub)genres of filter blog and personal journal recall the offline genres of journalistic 
commentary and diary, respectively (Herring et al. 2004).’  (Herring, Androutsopoulos 2015: 
129) 
Forms of CMC are often compared to other forms of language use, such as face-to-face 
communication (the usual standard for comparison in CMC research), telephone calls, and 
traditional letters. By comparison, CMC offers three empowering and democratising 
advantages. First, the ‘ability for each Internet user to communicate one-to-many is an 
unprecedented transformation in the landscape of communication media, which have 
historically limited this capacity to a small number of influential mass media 
producers.’ (Baym 2006: 523) Each QSer can talk to an unlimited number of fellow QSers 
and others through their blogs. 
Second, computer mediation can also greatly increase the opportunities people have to use 
language with those far away. ‘In strong contrast to face-to-face interaction and to a lesser 
extent the telephone, computer-mediated language media seem to transcend space. So long as 
people are online, messages exchanged across continents are indistinguishable from those 
sent between rooms in the same building, both in form and speed of transmission. This can 
create a sense of being close to one another.’ (ibid: 524) In this way, the online presence of 
QS websites, mailing lists, forums and blogs can contribute to knitting the QSers, who are 
geographically dispersed, closely together as a community. 
Third, ‘[b]y virtue of being electronic, computer-mediated language can be stored and 
replicated.’ However, storing and archiving examples of online language use has proven to be 
a difficult logistical challenge, because the cyberspace is constantly changing as everyone 
uploads, deletes and updates their online contents as they like all the time. (The 2014 film 
The Maze Runner serves as a good visual metaphor for this.) ‘Computer-mediated language 
sites that are present one day may be gone or transformed the next.’ (ibid: 524) That is why 
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when collecting blogs data for my corpus construction, I saved a copy of each selected blog 
page on the spot, and used the copies as the sources for my QS blogs corpus. 
Researchers have also identified a continuum from lean CMC to rich CMC. ‘CMC media 
differ in richness (Daft and Lengel 1984), or the extent to which nonverbal cues are 
apparent,’ such as the ability to format messages by varying fonts and colors and embedding 
images, sounds and hyperlinks. Text-based forms of CMC is often leaner. (ibid: 524) Given 
that I did corpus-assisted discourse analysis and my corpus tools AntConc and ProtAnt only 
accepted txt-format files, I had manually deleted all the nonverbal cues from my QS blogs. 
The languages used in CMC, overall, resemble a hybrid of writing and speaking (particularly 
English, French, Swedish, and Norwegian). (Baron, 2000; Baron and Ling, 2003; Baym, 
1996; Danet, 1997; Ferrera et al., 1991; Hardaf Segerstad, 2005; Herring, 2001; Ling, 2005). 
CMC is like writing in many ways. For example, the text usually bears an address; messages 
can be edited prior to transmission; the author and reader are usually geographically (and 
often temporally) separated; messages can often be read by anonymous readers who may not 
respond. Vocabulary, syntax, spelling, and the use of uncontracted forms may make online 
interaction more like writing than speech. (ibid: 526) 
“On the other hand, there are many ways in which online language better resembles speech. 
Messages are generally related to prior ones, often through turn-taking, although disrupted 
turn adjacency and lack of feedback can render turn-taking challenging (Herring, 2001). 
Messages are based in a relationship between writer and reader. There is often a history of 
shared referents and speech conventions (e.g., Hymes, 1986)… Furthermore, online language 
can be marked by colloquial and nonstandard spellings that foreground phonetic qualities 
(e.g., ‘gotta’ instead of ‘have to’).” (ibid: 526) 
‘Ultimately, many scholars conclude that online language is an ‘‘interactive written 
register’’ (Ferrera et al., 1991), hybrid (Danet, 1997), creole (Baron, 1998), or ‘‘uncooked 
linguistic stew’’ (Baron and Ling, 2003) that blends elements of written and oral language 
with features that are distinctive to this mediu.’ “Among the most commented upon features 
of online writing are the use of abbreviation (e.g., TTYL for ‘talk to you later’), the use of 
asterisks as brackets to simulate underlines, and upper case lettering to indicate emphasis. A 
number of deletions have also been noted, including the deletion of subject pronouns (e.g., 
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‘gotta go now’), vowels, and punctuation.”  (ibid: 526) These linguistic properties have also 
been observed in the QS blogs. 
In terms of CMD’s discourse structure, Herring and Androutsopoulos (2015: 131) observed, 
‘Some of the most iconic properties of computer-mediated language are structural features at 
the sentence level and below: creative and non-standard typography, spelling, word-
formation processes, and syntax. A recent overview of such features can be found in Herring 
(2012).’ 
‘People often produce grammatically correct sentences in textual CMD, especially in 
asynchronous modes such as email (which allow more time for editing) when the writers are 
well educated, the purpose of the communication is professional, and the tone is serious. Yet 
deviations from standard sentence structure also occur often – elided elements, missing or 
incorrect capitalization and punctuation, sentence fragments, and so on. Thus it makes sense 
to consider “utterances,” rather than “sentences,” as the basic units that constitute and 
combine to form messages in CMD, where utterance is defined as a sequence of one or more 
words that is preceded and followed by silence (space) or a change in communicator.’ (ibid: 
131) 
An interesting area of CMD research is the study of the writer-speaker’s attitudes and 
sentiments through word count. ‘The choice, frequency, and distribution of words can 
indicate what a segment of discourse is about (topicality), as well as communicators’ attitudes 
and affective states. For example, Cohn, Mehl, and Pennebaker (2004) compared LiveJournal 
bloggers’ affective and psychological states before and after the events of 9/11 using the 
LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) data-analysis tool… Automated tools such as 
LIWC enable large samples of text to be mined for meaning at minimum cost.’ (ibid: 134) 
Although LIWC is a powerful tool, it was designed for a different purpose from mine, that is, 
to test attitudes and sentiments rather than identifying conceptual and cultural models. 
Theoretically, LIWC drew from psychometrics and personality theories, rather than 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory and cognitive and cultural anthropology. 
Researchers also draw from Speech Act Theory to study intentions in CMD. ’People 
interacting via CMD also produce meaning intentionally, via utterances that aim to convey a 
particular illocutionary force (see Searle 1975).’ (ibid 134) In order to learn how people 
signal their intentions, the researchers have turned to analysing the speech acts used in CMD. 
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Herring, Das, and Penumarthy (2005) proposed a coding scheme consisting of 16 “CMC 
acts,” which they claimed could be used to analyze all types of CMD. ‘Each act – roughly the 
semantic equivalent of a structural utterance – is further classified according to whether it 
expresses the utterer directly or the speech/thought of someone else, and whether the act is 
bona fide or non-bona fide (e.g., humorous, ironic, sarcastic, deceptive). Thus in CMD, as in 
speech, illocutionary acts mirror the message producers’ communicative goals.’ (ibid 134) 
Intertextuality, manifested through implicit cultural references, is another feature in CMD. 
‘CMD users incorporate outside context to create meaning by paraphrasing, quoting, 
retweeting, or linking to other texts elsewhere on the Web,’ afforded and facilitated by the 
multimedia and interactive technologies of Web 2.0. (ibid: 136) 
Since the QS is considered as a social movement and community, it is also worthy of 
mentioning ‘research on CMD as social practice.’ Research in this direction ‘started with 
exploratory work on computer-mediated interaction and community in the 1990s (e.g., Baym 
1995; Cherny 1999) and was consolidated in the 2000s as a “second wave” in linguistic 
Internet studies (Androutsopoulos 2006), which coincided with the broader turn to language 
practices in socially oriented linguistics. The social aspects of CMD are shaped by the 
progressive digitization of society and the embedding of digital communication technologies 
in everyday life, along with the medium and situation factors… The very distinction between 
offline and online communication is now increasingly fuzzy, as people are “always on” 
(Baron 2008). One impact of these changes on CMD research has been a turn from discourse 
in virtual communities as separate social entities to digital language practices that mediate 
between offline and online practices by individuals and communities.’ (ibid: 138) 
Self-presentation is one of the more important social functions of the Internet. The CMC, due 
to its empowering, enabling and democratising nature, as mentioned above, has actually 
encouraged the development and innovation of self-expression and self-presentation in the 
cyberspace. Everyone can have a megaphone on the Web, and there is a burgeoning growth 
of avatars in all areas of the Web, from online games to online forums and social networks. 
‘The locus of research on individual self-presentation in CMD has shifted since the 1990s 
from personal homepages to blogs to social network sites. Blogs commonly present an 
individual blogger’s thoughts and feelings and adopt a first-person perspective (Herring et al. 
2004), although Puschmann (2013), contrasting what he terms the “author-centric” and the 
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“topic-centric” styles, shows that the purposes of blogging influence audience design, style, 
and content.’ (Herring, Androutsopoulos 2015: 140) Given that QSers’ blogs were mainly 
about their own self-tracking experience, they were more ‘author-centric’ than ‘topic-centric.’ 
(c.f. Puschmann 2013: 98-102) However, the picture is not so clear or straightforward, as the 
QSers’ blogs also exhibited certain properties that are typically ‘topic-centric,’ such as their 
expository mode when they tried to give others instructions on how to carry out, or explain 
how they did, a self-experiment. Some of them also served as partially self-narration and 
partially products reviews. Many of the QSers also use their real names instead of 
pseudonyms in their blogs for the purpose of presenting themselves as credible and authentic, 
and this is especially a salient feature, given the consideration that the QSers would also 
regularly meet each others offline. 
As Puschmann (2013: 100) said, ‘Fluidity of purpose (and, resulting from this, fluidity of 
style and content) is endemic to blogs, and therefore a wide area of intermediate forms of use 
lies between the two extremes. The distinction between topic-centric and author-centric styles 
is not intended as a clear-cut system of categorization, but rather as a way of systematizing 
the different audiences and intentions that bloggers associate with their activity.’ 
‘CMC technology continues to innovate at a rapid pace, and new and up-to-the-minute 
research is needed to document its appropriation and consequences for discourse. For 
example, we can anticipate structural and cultural changes in online communication as 
smartphones and other portable devices enable ubiquitous mobile access to the 
Web.’ (Herring, Androutsopoulos 2015: 143) 
2.3.2 Cultural/folk models  
Both cognitive linguists (e.g. Kovecses, Lakoff 1987; Sweetser 1987; Kövecses 1986) and 
cognitive/cultural anthropologists (e.g. Quinn 1987; D’Andrade 1987; Strauss, Quinn 1997) 
have made use of the schema theory and cultural models (also known as folk models) to 
analyse and describe a group of people’s subjective cultural experiences and understandings. 
‘The idea of cognitive models was introduced by Kenneth Craik in the 1940s in his book, The 
Nature of Explanation. Craik stressed the use of models in thinking: 
If the organism carries a “small-scale model” of external reality and of its won 
possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude 
which is the best of them, react to future situation before they arise, utilize the 
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knowledge of past events in dealing with the present and future, and in every way to 
react in a much fuller, safer, and more competent manner to the emergencies which 
face it. (1943: 13)’ D’Andrade (1995: 151) 
According to D’Andrade (ibid: 151), a model ‘consists of an interrelated set of elements 
which fit together to represent something. Typically one uses a model to reason with or 
calculate from by mentally manipulating the parts of the model in order to solve some 
problem. Every schema serves as a simple model in the sense that it is a representation of 
some object of event.’ For example, the schemas of commercial transaction and the real self. 
More specifically, a schema refers to ‘the organization of cognitive elements into an abstract 
mental object capable of being held in working memory with default values or open slots 
which can be variously filled in with appropriate specifics.’ Within the schema theory, a 
prototype refers to ‘a typical example of a type of object capable of being held in working 
memory, often with many properties “chuncked” together to form a rich, specific image. For 
example, a robin is a prototypic bird, a penguin is not. A prototype is the instantiation of a 
schema.’ (ibid: 179)  14
However, D’Andrade (ibid: 152) also pointed out that many models are not schemas 
themselves, but are composed of schemas. ‘Models are not schemas when the collection of 
element is too large and complex to hold in short-term memory (by definition, a schema, as a 
“bounded, distinct, and unitary representation,” must fit into short-term memory).’ 
Meanwhile, cultural models, which are implicit, are differentiated from cultural theories, 
which are more general, overarching and loosely defined, and are formulated as ‘explicit 
declarative knowledge.’ (ibid: 180) ‘A cultural theory consists of an interrelated set of 
propositions which describe the nature of some general phenomena,’ such as the theory of 
evolution and the Aristotelian theory of essence. (ibid: 172) And ‘a proposition is the sense of 
something said about something (typically a sentence) and involves the integration of a 
 In relation to language, each word, or lexical unit, is an instance of schematic encoding. For instance, the 14
utterance ‘the cat is on the mat’ includes the schemas not only for cat, on and mat, respectively, but is and the, 
respectively. The lexical units are schematic, or abstract, mental representations, since they lack specificity (e.g. 
Whose cat ? What’s her name ? Which breed or pedigree ? When was she seen on the mat ? Why was she 
there ? Where was the mat ?) thanks to layers of abstraction from the particulars in reality to universals. Thus, 
they can serve perfectly as labels or containers for conceptual categorisation, which include an innumerable 
number of particulars across space and time. As long as the contents of these labels or containers are held 
constant across a speech community (though they can always be contested, from desk to democracy, especially 
in politics and academia), they can serve as tools for facilitating human collaboration and communication in the 
community. (C.f. Lakoff’s (2008a: 177-189) discussion on ‘Contested Concepts Everywhere.’
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relatively small number of separate schemas into a more complex schema; a proposition 
asserts the relation between this integrated schema and he world.’ (ibid: 180) 
‘Several things distinguish cultural models from cultural theories. First, the propositions of a 
culture theory are statements which are made by the natives, unlike the propositions of many 
cultural models, which are typically assertions by the analyst of the way people represent 
something based on the way they reason or their understanding about it, or which is implicit 
in what they say about it. While the knowledge which makes up a cultural model often is 
procedural in character, a cultural theory is made up primarily of declarative knowledge, 
which means that one can ask directly about the phenomena in question and receive direct 
answers. Also culture theories are often about very general and abstract topics, like the origin 
of life or the character of the supernatural, and the propositions which describe this topic may 
be only loosely related to each other.’ (D’Andrade 1995: 172-173) 
Accordingly, my research of the QSers’ conceptualisations of their selves aimed to identify 
their cultural models, rather than theories, from the language they use. 
2.3.2.1 Lexical, textual approach to cultural models 
Kövecses (1986: 1) has proposed a lexical approach to folk models and the structure of 
concepts, which can also be applied to my case, because I did not have the resources to have 
deep interviews with my research subjects. “Since it would be impossible to have deep 
interviews with every member of a speech community in the search for the structure of 
particular concepts associated with particular aspects of the world, we have to resort to a 
more practicable method. Although we cannot interview everyone, we can probe the 
language used by everyone. Since the goal is to get at our conceptual system, and the folk 
models within this system, through the lexicon of the English language, we can call such a 
method a ‘lexical approach’ (cf. Verschueren 1985). The various folk models corresponding 
to various areas of experience can in turn be called ‘language-based’ folk models.” 
“This lexical approach to our conceptual system can be regarded as a continuation of some 
respectable traditions in the study of cognitive systems. One tradition I have in mind is what 
is called ‘linguistic analysis’ as represented in the works of Wittgenstein (1963), Austin 
(1961), Ryle (1949) and others. These philosophers use ordinary language for discovering 
subtle conceptual distinctions among such philosophically interesting categories as ‘action’, 
‘meaning’, ‘mind’, ‘emotion’, etc. The other tradition comes from ethnography and 
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anthropology. Ethnographers and anthropologists who are interested in the cognitive systems 
of various peoples look at language as an important tool in the job of learning about these 
cognitive systems. Researchers in this area owe a great deal to the pioneering work of Sapir 
(1949) and Whorf (1956). One of the most influential recent advocates of this methodology, 
Charles Frake, sees the role of language in this connection in the following way:  
“The analysis of a culture's terminological systems will not, of course, exhaustively 
reveal the cognitive world of its members, but it will certainly tap a central portion of 
it. Culturally significant cognitive features must be communicable between persons 
in one of the standard symbolic systems of the culture. A major share of these 
features will undoubtedly be codable in a society's most flexible and productive 
communicative device, its language” (in Dil(ed.)1980:3). (ibid: 1-2) 
Similarly, in anthropology, schema analysis is also an established approach and constituent 
part of text analysis for studying cultural models. (Bernard 2011: 439-443; Wutich, Ryan, 
Bernard 2015: 539-541) ‘Everyday life—to say nothing of special situations, like major 
rituals—is just too complex for people to deal with one scene at a time. There must, the 
reasoning goes, be some rules—a grammar—that help us make sense of so much 
information. These rules comprise schemas (Casson 1983:430),’ said Bernard (2011: 441). 
‘When many people in a society share a schema, then the schema is cultural. How can we 
learn about cultural schemas? Most anthropologists do this by analyzing narratives.’  
A classic example of textual schema analysis in cognitive cultural anthropology is Quinn’s 
series of studies about the American marriage schema. Quinn interviewed 11 American 
couples about marriage, and analyzed the interview transcripts ‘to discover the concepts 
underlying American marriage and to show how these concepts are tied together—how they 
form a cultural schema, shared by people from different backgrounds about what constitutes 
success and failure in marriage (Quinn 1982, 1987, 1992, 1996, 1997).’ (ibid: 441) 
Quinn drew inspiration from the Conceptual Metaphor Theory and took it further. She treated 
the conceptual metaphors as proxies for analytical themes, and deduced the schemas, or 
underlying principles, that could produce those metaphors. ‘For instance, Quinn’s informants 
often compared marriages (their own and those of others) to manufactured and durable 
products (‘‘It was put together pretty good’’) and to journeys (‘‘We made it up as we went 
along; it was a sort of do-it-yourself project’’). And when people were surprised at the 
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breakup of a marriage, they would say things like ‘‘That marriage was like the Rock of 
Gibraltar’’ or ‘‘It was nailed in cement.’’ People use these metaphors because they assume 
that their listeners know that cement and the Rock of Gibraltar are things that last 
forever.’ (ibid: 441-442) 
Quinn reasoned that ‘if schemas are what make it possible for people to fill in around the bare 
bones of a metaphor, then the metaphors must be surface phenomena and cannot themselves 
be the basis for shared understanding. She tries to understand how metaphors group together 
and finds that the hundreds of metaphors in her enormous corpus of text all fit into just eight 
classes: lastingness, sharedness, compatibility, mutual benefit, difficulty, effort, success (or 
failure), and risk of failure.’ (ibid: 442) 
An important insight from Quinn’s study of the cultural schemas of marriage shard by the 
American people (i.e. the colonialists from Europe and their descendants) throughout the US 
history was that the concepts of success (in marriage but also in the American life in general) 
and self-reliance are historically linked. Quinn (1997: 281, n32) quoted James Oliver 
Robertson as saying, 
‘Success—survival—was the measure of fitness. Success had long been, for 
Americans, a moral goal. The Puritans had brought with them, later Americans 
believed, the idea that success was a sign of God’s Grace, a sign that the successful 
individual was one of the elect. That aura continues to cling to the vision of success. 
For the social Darwinists, success was a sign that the racial and moral character of 
the individual was the highest. If successful Americans could no longer claim to be 
among God’s elect, they could still claim to be among nature’s select. It was the 
individual who triumphed over competition, who succeeded by hard work, careful 
self-training, and eye to the main chance, the luck to be in the right place at the right 
time, and who had the versatility to grasp opportunity. The jack-of-all-trades, sturdy, 
independent, free American could not have been improved upon, in the imagination 
of most Americans, as a fit survivor. Horatio Alger’s heroes were such survivors, and 
there have been few American heroes or heroines since Alger whose success was not 
a result of natural selection (Robertson 1980: 290). 
The ethos of this kind of rugged individualism and survivor mentality  is arguably well and 15
 Perhaps not coincidentally, Survivor is also the title of an international competition reality TV show, which is 15
popular in the US, running on its 38th season now since premiering in 2000.
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alive in the QS movement, which is mainly about personal fitness to work hard and lead a 
good life, and such fitness relies on a QSer’s self-cultivation (self-training, self-monitoring 
and self-discipline) and resourcefulness in carrying out self-experiments (or paying for and 
playing with different kinds of QS gadgets and tools.) 
As Quinn (ibid: 281, n32) also noted, ‘While Robertson views success and independence as 
joined in the individualism popularized by social Darwinism, another writer, Loren Baritz 
points to the “difficult success” of the pioneer experience as shaping the distinctive American 
brand of individualism that stresses hard work and independence (see also Bellah et al. 
(1985:148-149): 
To the pioneers, individualism was a fact of life, not a prejudgment or a theory. 
Whereas for the Puritans individuals was a postulate deduced from their theology, for 
the pioneers it was a position induced from their daily experience. Living in perhaps 
dangerous isolation, threatened with destruction if he stepped wrong, the pioneer, 
whether he flourished or failed, had only himself to thank or blame. For him, success 
came from self-reliance and independence was proof of virtue (Baritz 1982:5) 
Next I will review the literature on the cultural model of the self. 
2.3.2.2 Scientific and cultural models of self 
Contrary to everyday cultural (folk) belief, neuroscientists have found that there is no such a 
thing as the self (i.e. an essential, unified core entity as conceived in common sense). Some 
philosophers and buddhists have also contemplated on the problem of self, and came up with 
such conceptualisations as bundles of sensations and experiences and no-self. 
‘This daily experience of our self is so familiar, and yet the brain science shows that this 
sense of our self is an illusion. Psychologist Susan Blackmore makes the point that the word 
“illusion” does not mean that it does not exist — rather, an illusion is not what it seems. We 
all certainly experience some form of self, but what we experience is a powerful deception 
generated by our brains for our own benefit.’ (Hood 2012: ix) 
However, ‘there is a real difficulty in discussing the self illusion…the terms I, me, my, mine, 
you, yours, our, us, and we are used, which all imply the existence of a self or multiple 
selves…You might conclude that the premise that the self is an illusion must be false because 
these terms already acknowledge the existence of the self in the first place. The problem is 
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that there is no simple way around discussing the self without using these words that refer to 
this human experience most of us have.’ (ibid: ix) 
Hood (2012: x) pointed out that there were two types of self theories. The first kind, known 
as ‘ego theory,’ represents what most people think the self is, the folk or cultural model. 
(Philosopher Galen Strawson calls it metaphorically the ‘pearl view’ of the self). According 
to the ego theory of self, an average person in the street would most likely describe their self 
as the individual who inhabits their body. 
‘They believe they are more than just their bodies. Their bodies are something their 
selves controls. When we look in the mirror, we regard the body as a vessel we 
occupy…This pearl view is the common notion that our self is an essential entity at 
the core of our existence that holds steady throughout our life. This ego experiences 
life as a conscious, thinking person with a unique historical background that defines 
who he or she is. This is the “I” that looks back in the bathroom mirror and reflects 
upon who is the “me.”’ (ibid: x) 
‘In contrast to this ego view, there is an alternative version of the self, based on the “bundle 
theory” after the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, David Hume. Three hundred years 
ago… [Hume] tried to describe his inner self and thought that there was no single entity, but 
rather bundles of sensations, perceptions, and thoughts piled on top of each other. He 
concluded that the self emerged out of the bundling together of these experiences. It is not 
clear whether Hume was aware of exotic Eastern philosophy but in the sixth century BC, 
thousands of miles away in much warmer climates, the young Buddha, meditating underneath 
a fig tree, had reached much the same conclusion with his principle of anatta (no self). 
Buddha was seeking spiritual rather than intellectual enlightenment and thought that this state 
could only be achieved by attaining anatta through meditation.’ (ibid: x-xi) 
Hood (ibid: xi) pointed out that contemporary brain science, or neuroscience, has found much 
evidence ‘to support the bundle theory as opposed to the ego theory of the self.’  
The scientific discoveries about the nature of self are mainly threefold. First, who we are 
depends on our brains, but we are not just our brains in isolation. Each brain exists in an 
ocean of other brains that affect how it works. Second, there is no center in the brain where 
the self is constructed. The brain has many distributed jobs. Although it appears that when we 
are looking at paintings and listening to music, we do these under the guise of a self, the 
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sense of self that most of us experience is not to be found in any one area. Rather it emerges 
out of the orchestra of different brain processes like a symphony of the self, just as Buddha 
and Hume said. Third, our brain constructs models of, or simulate, the external world. It can 
weave experiences, with incomplete information, into a coherent story that enables us to 
interpret and predict what we should do next — an evolved survival strategy. Who we are is a 
story of our self — a constructed narrative that our brain creates. Some of that simulation is 
experienced as conscious awareness that corresponds to the self illusion that the average 
person in the street reports. (ibid: xii-xiii) 
‘Dan Dennett also thinks the self is constructed out of narratives: “Our tales are spun, but for 
the most part, we don’t spin them; they spin us.” There is no self at the core. Rather, it 
emerges as the “center of a narrative gravity.”’ (ibid: xiii)  
This narrative or constructive theory of self helps throw light on our understanding of the 
Quantified Self from a scientific perspective. In order to integrate into the human society, 
through learning and socialisation, we continually develop our sense of self from childhood 
on and elaborate our self narratives in an effort to learn and adapt to different situations. 
‘Sometimes we even describe our self illusion as multifaceted, as if we have the work self, 
the home self, the parent self, the political self, the bigoted self, the emotional self, the sexual 
self, the creative self, and even the violent self. They seem to be almost different individuals 
but clearly there is just one body.’ (ibid: xv) So these different aspects and facets of the self 
are the different stories we tell about ourselves, consisting of respective scripts, schemas and 
cognitive models, for us to deal with respective social situations. Arguably, these self-
narratives can be constructed verbally but also digitally through measuring and monitoring 
our bodies with self-tracking tools. So the QS apps and devices are a type of self-narrative 
generator, assisting the QSers in managing their social situations. 
Counter-intuitively, according to the neuroscience model of self, it is not us who switch 
between our different selves. There is no individual doing the switching. ‘That’s part of the 
illusion. There is not one self or multiple selves in the first place. Rather, it is the external 
world that switches us from one character to another. This idea that we are a reflection of the 
situations is sometimes called the “looking-glass self” —we exist as the reflection of those 
around us.’ (ibid: xv-xvi) If the external environment has such a huge influence on our 
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everyday social behaviours, then it is imperative for us, collectively rather than individually, 
to grasp it. Navel-gazing in this case does not help. 
An ethical consequence of narrowly focusing on our selves is the fundamental attribution 
error in human reason, ‘When did this game of life become so unfair that we blame 
individuals rather than the circumstances that prevent them from achievement?… When other 
people screw up, it’s because they are stupid or losers, but when I screw up it’s because of my 
circumstances. The self illusion makes the fundamental attribution error an easy fallacy to 
accept. Also, putting all the blame on the individual self is tantamount to excusing all the 
policies that create inequality in our society.’ (ibid: xvii). 
Although Hood and probably many other social psychologists and philosophers can use the 
new scientific evidence to suggest or urge that people should rethink success and failure ‘not 
so much as issues of the self alone, but more of society in general,’ most of the people are 
recalcitrant to change in regard of their ego theories or pearl views on self. The cultural 
model of self’s influence is too strong to overcome. As discussed in Section 2.3.2.1, the 
anthropologists have observed that out of custom and habit, people in the US, and perhaps in 
many other Western countries as well, generally believe passionately in individual success 
and independence. The flip side of this self model is that if people lose, they would not blame 
the society, or the cultural environment would not encourage them to. 
Moreover, if the self is social and if our cognition and identities are largely shaped by our 
environment, as the scientists have indicated, then it may be precisely the social and 
environmental conditions that constrict our moral mind into individualistic an egoistic 
thinking. The status quo of our world today is that almost everyone has been incorporated 
and integrated in a globalised market economy as consumers, willingly or not. We all have to 
consume one way or another, from food and drugs to housing, healthcare and education 
(which were once provided publicly out of taxpayers’ money in welfare states, but are not 
increasingly privatised under the aegis of neoliberalism), or we cease to be on this planet. 
This includes the QSers, naturally. 
According to the British sociologists Yannis Gabriel and Tim Lang, ‘Until recently, in 
affluent economies, first, legal provisions in what the consumer can expect from a 
commercial transaction and second, fear of media exposé have curbed the worst excesses. 
Today, however, the mechanisms for legislation to counteract global fraud and the systematic 
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long-term damage to the interests of consumers or the environment across national 
boundaries are vague or non-existent. Not only redress for individual victims, but collective 
measures to protect consumers internationally and the future are severely hampered. The new 
globalized economy constrains justice for consumers to the individual level, when often what 
is needed is action at the collective level.’ (Gabriel, Lang 2006: 120) This reduction of 
consumer protection on a global scale, along with the advancement of economic 
globalisation, has to some extent forced the consumers to fall back onto the conventional ego 
theory of self. The QSers have every motive to take control and safeguard themselves and 
their loved ones, if the overall social protection is being inevitably shrunk and shredded. 
When the going gets tough, the spirit of self-reliance, though never really gone, comes back 
with a vengeance. 
In addition, the sophistication of marketing practices and rhetoric, assisted by the 
development in consumer psychology, has also helped frame the consumers (that is, everyone 
of us) as atomic individuals, putting emphasis on consumers’ self-responsibility and 
reinforcing the cultural model of self. ‘More recently, marketing text-books have adopted the 
language of risk assessment, whereby every purchase can be assessed for the risk it carries. 
Risk assessment is being used by today’s corporations, particularly in high-profile areas such 
as agrochemicals and nuclear industries, to counter consumer claims that they have been 
turned into unwitting victims. They claim that the every form of consumption carries a risk. It 
quickly follows that consumers ought to be prepared to carry some risk. Risk assessment for 
today’s management serves the same function that many psychological models from the 
1950s did: it allows the enterprise to decide what is good (or bad) for the consumer while at 
the same time blaming the victim whenever things go wrong.’ (ibid: 121-122) ‘Blame the 
victim’ has become an implied and affiliated condition in the neoliberal frame of pro-
consumer choice rhetoric, i.e. if the consumer chooses, then they would not be able to blame 
the seller or others for giving them faulty products or services, irrespective of whether the 
consumer has been well-informed, or whether other consumer rights have been respected. It 
all falls on their own shoulders to assess and accept the risk. 
For example, “[t]he sugar still gets put into babies drinks and rots teeth, but a new ‘sugar-
free’ drink is brought on to the market. In this way, a victim story has helped create a new 
niche product. It also places the responsibility on the consumer by making it his or her choice 
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whether to purchase the old product. Blame is now placed squarely on the victim. ‘If you care 
about your children’s teeth, why did you not purchase our sugar-free brand?’” (ibid: 118) 
So our current social, political and economic environments are not conducive to promoting a 
scientifically informed view of ‘the self is social.’ Since the QSers, facing such conundrums 
as aforementioned, largely take an individualistic, empirical and local approach towards 
fitness and self-improvement (and hence their success), it is more sensible to turn to the 
cultural model of self, the model they have adopted, as a frame of reference in my research. 
The cognitive anthropologist D’Andrade (1995: 163-164) offered an elaborate account of the 
folk (cultural) model of the self when he was depicting the cultural model of the mind, 
‘The conscious, perceiving center of awareness and agency is the self. However, in 
the folk model the self is a composite entity; it is composed of both a conscious, 
aware perceiver and a thing that is perceived as doing the perceiving. William James 
called the perceiver the “I” and the entity perceived the “me.” The perceiving self not 
only observes things in the world, it also perceives that it is perceiving — that is, it is 
conscious. The perceiving self has a continuing identity through time; it knows that it 
is the same perceiving self that it was aware of across previous observations — it 
observes that it is the same observer that was observing before… 
The other half of the self is the perceived self. The two halves are inseparable; there 
cannot be a perceived self with (sic) a perceiving self, and there cannot be a 
perceiving self that has nothing about itself to perceive. 
The perceived self in the folk model has an onion-like character with many layers 
which can be peeled away. That is, one can say “I want a cigarette”; here the the 
center of awareness and agency includes the desire. Or, one can say “I’m going crazy 
for a cigarette.” Here the desire is treated as outside the self; acting on the self. “The 
thought struck me” and “I was overcome by my feelings” are other examples of 
phrases where the process of thinking and the process of feeling are treated as outside 
the self. However, intentions are always within the self — an intention is the self 
deciding to act. 
For most people, their body is an important part of their perceived self, but there are 
people who say that they feel that their actual body is not really their self — that they 
are really a woman, not a man, or really young, not the old person you see. Also the 
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perceiving self sometimes notices inconsistencies in what it thinks, likes, wants, 
feels, etc. These inconsistencies can lead to a sense of being “divided,” “fragmented,” 
etc., and sometimes thoughts and feelings are said to be experienced as “not really 
me” as if the perceiving self was experiencing someone else. However, the normal 
expectation is that one’s body, one’s past actions, one’s perceptions, thoughts, 
feelings, desires, and intentions are part of oneself. The real self…is that part of the 
perceived self which is not divided or fragmented, but which is a natural and 
spontaneous source of thought, feeling, and desire. 
The perceived self cannot only contract, it can expand. Certain things and certain 
people can become a part of the self in the sense that the things that happen to these 
things and people are experienced as happening to the perceived self — my child is 
hurt and I feel the hurt, my country is insulted and I feel insulted, my car is admired 
and I feel good. This expansion of the self is linguistically coded in the first person 
plural forms we, us, and our in which some aspect of identity is shared.  16
The total self is thought to be able to control actions — most of what one does one 
intends to do, so one could have decided to do differently. However, although one is 
not able to control what one feels or desires, because one can control what one 
things, one can (sometimes) affect what one feel or wants by not thinking of the 
things that give rise to these feelings or wants. Thought is also important in creating 
the objects of desire; generally speaking one can only want what one can think of 
(however, sometimes one wants something without knowing what one wants). 
It is interesting that the folk model acknowledges that many events can happen which 
are not predicted on the basis of the model. In hypnosis, one can be induced to “not 
see” what is in front of ones eye’s (sic), and to “see things” that are not there. In 
depression, one has feelings of despair that have no rational source. However, such 
events do not challenge the truth of the model. Instead such events are defined as 
“abnormal”; the sort of thing that happens in “depression” or “addiction” or 
“compulsion” or “fever” or “hypnosis” or “mental breakdown.” By defining what it 
 My observation of the QS blogs suggested that this expansion of the perceived self is also linguistically coded 16
in the first person singular possessive my. Whenever a QSer puts my before a thing, such as my data, my heart 
rate, my account and my cat, the perceived self expands to include that thing as a part of itself. Cleverly, a QS 
app maker branded their app as ‘MyFitnessPal,’ thus linguistically and cognitively blending the app with the 
QSers’ identities, increasing its ‘stickiness.’
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fails to explain as abnormal, the folk model protects itself from falsification. The folk 
model may have a good deal of truth to it, but it is not science.’ (original emphases) 
2.3.2.2.1 Subject-self(-other) relations, distributed cognition, posthumanism 
Similarly, though independent of the cognitive anthropologists’ work, Lakoff and Johnson 
have proposed a Basic Subject-Self Metaphor Schema, which I have used to analyse the 
cultural model of QS. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 267-289) said, ‘What we call our “inner 
lives” concerns at least five kinds of experience that are consequences of living in a social 
world with the kinds of brains and bodies that we have. First, there are the ways in which we 
try to control our bodies and in which they “get out of control.” Second, there are cases in 
which our conscious values conflict with the values implicit in our behavior. Third, there are 
disparities between what we know or believe about ourselves and what other people know or 
believe about us. Fourth, there are experiences of taking an external viewpoint, as when we 
imitate others or try to see the world as they do. And last, there are the forms of inner dialog 
and inner monitoring we engage in.’ 
‘The general structure of our metaphoric system for our inner lives was first uncovered by 
Andrew Lakoff and Miles Becker (Lakoff and Becker 1992). Their analysis showed that the 
system is based on a fundamental distinction between what they called the Subject and one or 
more Selves. The Subject is the locus of consciousness, subjective experience, reason, will, 
and our “essence,” everything that makes us who we uniquely are. There is at least one Self 
and possibly more. The Selves consist of everything else about us-our bodies, our social 
roles, our histories, and so on,’ said Lakoff and Johnson. 
‘The ultimate philosophical significance of the study is that the very way that we normally 
conceptualize our inner lives is inconsistent with what we know scientifically about the 
nature of mind. In our system for conceptualizing our inner lives, there is always a Subject 
that is the locus of reason and that metaphorically has an existence independent of the body. 
As we have seen, this contradicts the fundamental findings of cognitive science,’ they pointed 
out. 
In regard to the structure of the metaphoric system they proposed for describing the folk 
model of self, Lakoff and Johnson said, ‘Our metaphoric conceptions of inner life have a 
hierarchical structure. At the highest level, there is the general Subject-Self metaphor, which 
conceptualizes a person as bifurcated. The exact nature of this bifurcation is specified more 
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precisely one level down, where there are five specific instances of the metaphor. These five 
special cases of the basic Subject-Self metaphor are grounded in four types of everyday 
experience: (1) manipulating objects, (2) being located in space, (3) entering into social 
relations, and (4) empathic projection-conceptually projecting yourself onto someone else, as 
when a child imitates a parent. The fifth special case comes from the Folk Theory of 
Essences: Each person is seen as having an Essence that is part of the Subject. The person 
may have more than one Self, but only one of those Selves is compatible with that Essence. 
This is called the "real" or "true" Self. 
Finally, each of these five special cases of the general Subject-Self metaphor has further 
special cases. It is at this third level of specificity that the real richness of our metaphoric 
conceptions of Subject and Self emerges.’  
Specifically, the special-case conceptual metaphors Lakoff and Johnson (1999) have 
identified for their Basic Subject-Self Metaphor Schema include, 
SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT CONTROL 
SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION  
SELF CONTROL IS BEING IN ONE’S NORMAL LOCATION 
THE SELF AS CONTAINER 
SELF CONTROL AS BEING ON THE GROUND 
ATTENTIONAL SELF CONTROL IS HAVING THE SELF TOGETHER 
VISION FROM THE INSIDE (OF SELF) IS SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE  
VISION FROM THE OUTSIDE (OF SELF) IS OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
SUBJECT AND SELF AS ADVERSARIES 
SUBJECT AS PARENT AND THE SELF AS CHILD 
SUBJECT AND SELF AS FRIENDS 
SUBJECT AND SELF AS INTERLOCUTORS 
SUBJECT AS CARETAKE OF SELF 
SUBJECT AS MASTER, SELF AS SERVANT 





THE INNER SELF 
THE EXTERNAL REAL SELF (REAL ME) 
THE TRUE SELF 
In addition to the metaphors of self, I will review the literature of metaphors of big data in the 
next section of 2.3.3. 
Responding to my examiners’ insightful questions and advice, I also want to draw a 
distinction here between the subject and self based on a posthumanist view of distributed 
cognition, as well as illustrate the dynamic interplays between the two with some QS 
examples. 
According to N Katherine Hayles, a literary critic and pioneering scholar on posthumanism 
studies, ‘“Thinking,”…refers to the thoughts and capabilities associated with higher 
consciousness such as rationality, the ability to formulate and manipulate abstract concepts, 
linguistic competencies, and so on. Higher consciousness is not, of course, the whole or 
indeed even the main part of this story: enhancing and supporting it are the ways in which 
the embodied subject is embedded and immersed in environments that function as distributed 
cognitive systems.’ (2017: 2, emphasis mine) 
‘From a cluttered desktop whose complicated topography acts as an external memory device 
for its messiness-inclined owner, to the computer on which I am typing this, to the 
increasingly dense networks of “smart” technologies that are reconfiguring human lives in 
developed societies, human subjects are no longer contained—or even defined—by the 
boundaries of their skins.’ (ibid, emphasis mine) 
Hayles wrote, ’When my focus is on individual subjects, I will use the more processually 
marked term “nonconscious cognitive processes.” The power of these assemblages, however, 
is maximized when they function as systems, with well-defined interfaces and 
communication circuits between sensors, actuators, processors, storage media, and 
distribution networks, and which include human, biological, technical, and material 
components. In these instances, I will refer to the cognitive nonconscious, a term that 
crucially includes technical as well as human cognizers.’ (ibid, original emphasis) 
Thus, in a posthumanism sense, the subject is an assemblage of ‘nonconscious cognitive 
processes’ which are embodied and embedded in techno-socio-cultural environments and 
function as distributed cognitive systems the support higher, rational consciousness. 
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Arguably, the cognisers’, or cognitive systems’, embodiments can be biological (such as 
human subjects), but also technical (such digital subjects as smart phones) and informational 
(such as avatars and data doubles). This conceptualisation is compatible with Floridi's 
proposal of inforgs in an infosphere, as discussed at the beginning of Chapter 1. 
More importantly, for the human subjects, meaning and a sense of the self, which is a part of 
the human consciousness, emerge from the interactions and mutual shaping with the other 
cognitive subjects, i.e. from the self-other relations. 
Like Wayne Booth (who compared fictions to the company we keep, as discussed in Section 
1.2.1), Hayles also wrote about books, materially embodied as physical cognisers, and their 
shaping effects on human subjectivity, ‘[B]ooks are more than encoded voices; they are also 
physical artifacts whose material properties offer potent resources for creating meaning. 
Indeed, it is impossible not to create meaning through a work’s materiality. Even when the 
interface is rendered as transparent as possible, this very immediacy is itself an act of 
meaning-making that positions the reader in a specific material relationship with the 
imaginative world evoked by the text.’ (2002: 106-107, emphasis mine) 
She further illustrated her point, extending from physical subjects to digital ones, with 
commentary on a digital artistic installation called database, that ‘subjectivity is an emergent 
property produced in part by the work’s materiality. The interplay between semiotic 
components and physical attributes that gives rise to materiality simultaneously and with the 
same gesture gives rise to subjects who both perceive and are acted upon by this 
materiality.’ (ibid: 107, emphasis mine) 
Echoing Hayles, Italian posthumanist philosopher Francesca Ferrando wrote, ‘In the 
economy of knowledge, humans are both subjects and objects: even when trying to avoid 
anthropocentric positions, humans are still communicating specific and situated human 
understandings in a human language to other human beings. Posthumanism shares with 
humanism the fact that it is still enacted by human beings, but accesses such an 
epistemological standpoint through the feminist policies of situating the self, and also by 
acknowledging the self as plural and relational. Posthumanism postulates a specific self-
awareness, which recognizes its own embodied location without placing it at the top of any 
epistemological hierarchy.’ (2019: 23, emphasis mine) 
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In the notes to the above exposition of the human subject-self-other relations, Ferrando cited 
Michel Foucault (1970 [1966]) as saying that ‘“[the human science] appeared when man 
constituted himself in Western culture as both that which must be conceived of and what is to 
be known” (345).’ This is in line with the cognitive anthropologist’s observation of the 
cultural model of the ‘perceiving and perceived selves,’ expressed through language use, as 
discussed in the previous section of 2.3.2.2. 
Ferrando also cited Hannah Arendt, who ‘in The Human Condition (1958), evocatively 
wrote: “It is highly unlikely that we, who can know, determine, and define the natural 
essences of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able to do the same 
for ourselves—this would be like jumping over our own shadows (10).” Consequently, we 
could define this self-awareness as a recognition of the unredeemable presence of the 
“shadows,” to use Arendt’s expression.’ (emphasis mine) That is perhaps why the QSers, 
seeking self-knowledge through numbers, use external monitoring by the other cognisers (i.e. 
digital devices) in an effort to jump over their own ‘shadows.’ In other words, they 
voluntarily subject themselves to being perceived and acted upon, during which processes 
they objectify themselves (or certain versions of their selves) as things that can be known, 
determined and defined.  17
In summary, for a human subject, meaning and awareness of the self — where there can be 
multiple versions of it, are enacted by the subject, and they emerge or arise from their 
interaction with the other (variously) embodied human and/or non-human subjects. As Hayles 
put it briefly, ‘Generally speaking, the “subject” is understood to be the socially positioned 
embodied entity that includes unconscious, nonconscious and subconscious thoughts and 
beliefs, whereas the “self” is a narrower set of ideas that consciousness has about itself.’  18
I want to make use again of my personal experience of self-tracked jogging in a park, used in 
Section 2.2, for an illustration here of how a distributed subjectivity can be formed and 
 It has been reported that companies using surveillance technologies, such as the US retailer Target, motivated 17
by creating loyal customer base for profits, and the major Web 2.0 platforms such as Amazon, Google and 
Facebook, know better or more about you (i.e. your shopping, searching, sharing and other habits) than you do 
yourself. (Duhigg, 2012) Part of the reason is because the technical subjects ‘remember’ better than humans, 
with all the recorded details being stored forever in and easily retrievable from the data warehouses. We may 
even not be aware of many of those digital footprints, for their lack of cognitive saliency. Unlike human 
memory, which is emergent every time we try to recall, computer memory is stored and retrieved as physical 
states on hard drives, hence far more stable. Also, a statistical technique used by digital surveillance is 
exponentially increase sampling frequency, which may be invasive, in order to improve their respective 
prediction models. Hence the big data (at least, one of its etymologies).
 Personal communication after viva voce on 23 November 2020.18
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mutually shaped by the technologies I have adopted. (Hayles (2017: 2-3) gave a similar 
example of a mobile phone user.) 
By wearing the sensors that monitor my body positions in three-dimensional space and record 
my heart rate and by connecting them to my running apps on my smartphone, I have enacted 
a human-technical assemblage of different levels of cognitive processes. From a user’s, i.e. a 
human subject’s, perspective, I could perceive and act upon the sensors through manipulating 
the graphic interfaces in my apps, clicking on respective icons and buttons, all of which were 
material metaphors,  mapping onto different levels of software codes and scripts, or different 19
levels of abstraction (including those of the applications, middleware and underlying 
operating system) and pointing (or indexing) to their corresponding, preprogrammed 
hardware operations. During the manipulation of and interaction with the apps and sensors, 
the graphic displays (of my running time, distance, pace, etc) and machine-generated voice 
prompts (based on real-time analysis of my postures and performance levels) helped evoke an 
imagination, or a dynamic image metaphor, of my being in an outdoor running lab on a 
moving treadmill with a personal coach. It is a carefully designed metaphor that the 
equipment manufacturers worked out to signify to (or, in a naive sense, brainwash) me and 
other users through multi-media/modality. My cognitive system was thus extended by the 
digital prostheses beyond my skin into a third, blended space of both the park I was running 
in and the other places and experiences I had had. I was at the same time in the park and not 
in the park. Thus, the boundary of the park was actually transgressed, and the park itself was 
being appropriated and adapted into my assemblage. 
Furthermore, as I have observed throughout the years of my PhD in the parks both near my 
campus and far away, many jogging hobbyists have practised self-tracking with, at least, a 
smartphone app, if without a variety of DIY accessories. They apparently have, I assume, 
enjoyed the liberating pleasure of transgressing and appropriating brought about by the new 
tech. Perhaps it was due to the increasing popularity of jogging in the parks, the municipal 
government has actually spent millions of the infrastructure budget in paving synthetic rubber 
tracks in several parks and along some riverside and lakeside trails. Hangzhou, our 
neighbouring capital city of Zhejiang Province and home to the Chinese platform 
 The concept of material metaphor was first proposed by Hayles (2002: Chapter 2), and then further developed 19
for media-specific metaphor analysis or ‘reverse-engineering’ by Van den Boomen (2014). However, because of 
the limitation of the scope of the current thesis, focusing on conceptual and systematic metaphors, I will not 
elaborate this method and will only apply it selectively.
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conglomerate Alibaba, even advertised in newspapers in 2016 its completion of a major 
riverside rubber track system, extending 7.4 kilometres in total and touted as the longest in 
the country. (Anonymous 2016) It was a landscape metaphor and symbol that was 
constructed, both metaphorically and literally, to signify the city's health-oriented 
environment and vitality, a utopia aiming to attract teach-savvy young talents and evoking 
positive imaginations (there was a visualisation in the news signifying blossoms of 1,300 
cherry trees along the riverside running track). 
Therefore, on one hand, by tracing the metaphors, I have illustrated how a subjectivity, from 
a human subject’s point of view, was brought into being across the overlapping conceptual, 
virtual and material networks, even extending beyond the individual into the socio-economic 
and eco-political environments. 
On the other hand, if we can think in the digital subjects’ shoes, so to speak, or in the app 
designer’s shoes, we can probably also think about how the human subject is acted upon, 
shaped and socially positioned by the technologies. Since the sensors and computers did not 
speak in natural human tongues, I could not communicate with them verbally. Rather, I was 
messaging, or signifying, to them nonverbally, with my heart beats and body movements. 
Meanwhile, unlike previous generations of passive cognisers such as books, the programmed 
and networked apps and sensors could actively tend to and have a preconfigured ‘intention to’ 
listen to, capture, model and profile my nonverbal messages. So these material human-
computer interfaces translate and transcode the biological into the digital, in a material 
metaphor sense (Van den Boomen 2014: 189). (Admittedly, the translation is a highly 
technical and complex process, involving data approximation and model estimations.) In 
parallel, within my body, the neural signals of my bodily states and functions, for instance, 
whether my heart needs to pump out more blood or how I should adjust my posture to keep 
balance, were also processed by my proto-self, or the cognitive nonconscious. So, in a way, 
the technical assemblage simulated, however imperfectly, a part of the function of my neural 
systems. 
The concepts of proto-self and cognitive nonconscious need some elaboration here. 
According to Hayles (2017: 45-46), what the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio calls the proto-
self is ‘“an interconnected and temporarily coherent collection of neural patterns which 
represent the state of the organism, moment by moment, at multiple levels of the brain” 
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(Damasio 2000, 174.) The proto-self, Damasio emphasizes, instantiates being but not 
consciousness or knowledge; it corresponds to what I have been calling the cognitive 
nonconscious. Its actions may properly be called cognitive in my sense because it has an 
“intention toward,” namely the representation of body states. Moreover, it is embedded in 
highly complex systems that are both adaptive and recursive.’ In addition, citing ‘Edelman’s 
Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (TNGS), which he calls “neural Darwinism” (Edelman 
1987),’ Hayles pointed that the proto-self also includes ‘the neuronal mechanisms and 
dynamics that constitute a proto-self from the underlying neurons and neuronal clusters, as 
well as the processes by which scenes are built from maps through recursive interactions 
between an organism’s representations of body states and representations of its relations with 
objects.’ 
These representations are grounds for higher-level simulation in our consciousness : if the 
information from the underlying neuronal clusters ‘is contextually appropriate to the 
(conscious) executive control that determines the focus of attention,’ then it will be 
feedforwarded into the conscious brain in a sustained manner of activation through a 
mechanism of combined bottom-up and top-down neural signalling, which Dehaene (2009), 
cited by Hayles (2017: 53), calls ‘ignition of the global workspace.’ The simulation of our 
experience in the outer world, important for our survival in it, although inaccurate, is our 
narrative self, according to the neuroscience model of self discussed in the previous section 
of 2.3.2.2. 
So what are the relations between our own narrative-self simulation and the external 
numerical simulation by the quantified-self apps ? And how do the digital subjects, embedded 
and operating in the human-technical assemblage, shape and position the human subjects and 
their self-awareness ? As Hayles (2005) has pointed out, human life and cognition as well as 
many other organisms in our world are dynamic systems that are too complex to be reduced 
to linear mathematical equations — the ‘irreducible complexity of contemporary posthuman 
configurations,’ as she emphasised. Broadly speaking, ‘as Nicholas Gessler, among others, 
has pointed out,’ there were three ways the human cognisers have taken to understand the 
world around us, i.e. ‘mathematical equations, simulation modeling, and discursive 
explanations. Of mathematical equations, I have little to say, other than to note the point that 
Harold Morowitz, Stephen Wolfram, and others make about the limited usefulness of 
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mathematics in describing complex behaviors. Because complex systems exhibit nonlinear 
behaviors that typically cannot be described by equations having explicit solutions.’ (ibid: 5) 
Of the other two modes of understanding, while similar in some aspects, Hayles has pointed 
out that there are also important differences between simulations and such discursive 
explanations as literary texts. ‘Whereas computation is essential for simulations that model 
complex phenomena, literature's stock-in-trade is narrative…Narrative, with its evocation of 
the human lifeworld, speaks to subjectivities that remain rooted in human perceptual systems, 
human languages, and human cultures. Simulations, by contrast, are essentially numerical 
calculations. Although they can be rendered in visual forms that evoke the perceptible world 
that humans see…these appearances are generated through algorithms that operate first and 
foremost with numerical quantities…The dynamic tensions between simulation and narrative 
thus involve a dialectic between the human lifeworld and the (relatively) inhuman world of 
massive numerical calculations’ (ibid: 6) 
‘This entanglement of the bodies of texts and digital subjects is one manifestation of what I 
call “intermediation,’' that is, complex transactions between bodies and texts as well as 
between different forms of media. Because making, storing, and transmitting imply 
technological functions, this mode of categorization insures that the different versions of the 
posthuman will be understood, in Kittlerian fashion, as effects of media.’ (ibid: 7) 
Following Hayles’ categorisation, I propose that there are intermediations between the QSer 
and the apps and gadgets he has used, or between the narrative simulations he has in his mind 
and the numerical simulations he has in his apps. There are three layers of implications. First, 
both sorts of simulations are imprecise, but in different ways: the narrative-self simulation 
leaves out largely cognitively inconspicuous or contextually irrelevant information to the 
nonconscious, specialised neural processors, so that the conscious brain is not overwhelmed, 
whereas the quantified-self simulation uses simplified causalities, or correlation models 
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(throwing out many variables that cannot be captured  or that are impractical to calculate) to 20
approximate such complex psychosomatic interactions as heart-rate, body posture and 
performance , and it then uses visualisation to accentuate this simulated (approximated, 21
second-order) nonconscious cognitive information, i.e. to artificially increase its energy level, 
so that it can be perceived and conceived by (feedforwarded into) the consciousness, thus 
shaping the human subject’s narrative self-awareness. In some cases, this purposefully 
accentuation of the partial cognitive nonconscious may complement the QSer’s narrative self.  
For instance, my own self-tracking experiences have inculcated in me a habit of paying 
attention to my biometrics, more so than most of my non-self-tracking or non-gym-going 
peers. As I have kept practising and experimenting with various sorts of self-tracking in many 
different scenarios, the QS apps have helped sustain the activation of the awareness of my 
changing and fluctuating vital signs (which are parts of my self). So when my health derailed 
from the ‘normal’ course, I was aware of and could recognise the signposts that could lead 
me back on track, so to speak. (Although this was an unintended consequence, given that 
when I started self-tracking, I was healthy and sound.) 
For the other QSers, whose blogs I have collected into my corpus analysis, I have identified 
that they are also more likely to pay attention to, or more interested in, their biometrics (i.e. 
this information has become more cognitively salient to them) in their everyday life, not 
necessarily for health purposes. In one of the more prototypical blogs I have analysed,  titled 22
Visualizing HR, HRV, and GSR While Watching ‘Interstellar’ (file name 056_28_1), the 
 Such as interior feelings, or qualia. ‘Feeling states first arise from the operation of a few brain-stem nuclei 20
that are highly interconnected among themselves and that are the recipients of highly complex, integrated 
signals transmitted from the organism’s interior. In the process of using body signals to regulate life, the activity 
of the nuclei transforms those body signals. The transformation is further enhanced by the fact that the signals 
occur in a looped circuit whereby the body communicates to the central nervous system and the latter responds 
to the body’s messages. The signals are not separable from the organism states where they originate. The 
ensemble constitutes a dynamic, bonded unit. I hypothesize that this unit enacts a functional fusion of body 
states and perceptual states, such that the dividing line between the two can no longer be drawn. Neurons in 
charge of conveying to the brain signals about the body’s interior would have such an intimate association with 
interior structures that the signals conveyed would not be merely about the state of the flesh but literally 
extensions of the flesh. Neurons would imitate life so thoroughly that they would become one with it.’ (Damasio 
2010)
 Despite of Hayles’ (2005: 7) urge to never reduce the ‘irreducible complexity of contemporary posthuman 21
configurations’ ‘to linear dynamics or simple causalities,’ linearisation, or linear programming, is still an 
important class of technique that has been commonly used not only in computer simulations but also in ‘guiding 
quantitative decisions in business planning, in industrial engineering, and—to a lesser extent—in the social and 
physical sciences.’ (Gregersen, 2020) It is used conveniently under multiple constraints to approximate a 
nonlinear problem and find local optimal solutions.
 C.f. technical discussion of prototypicality identification in Section 4.3, particularly 4.3.2.22
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QSer took their wearable equipments with them to an IMAX theatre and recorded the 
biometrics during a three-hour movie watching. They recorded more granular data than I did, 
not just heart-rate, but also heart-rate variability (HRV) and galvanic skin response (GSR), 
the kinds of data one would get when going to a hospital and do an electrocardiography 
(ECG).  23
In yet another more prototypical blog entry, Quantified Splunk: Tracking My Vital Signs (file 
name 012_05_2), another self-tracking enthusiast also purchased medical-grade equipments, 
blogging, ‘Recently – as my friends and colleagues will tell you – I’ve taken this concept of 
self-tracking to the next level. This has included purchasing both a blood sugar and a blood 
pressure monitor.’ But it was not immediately obvious that they were monitoring their blood 
for any disease, such as diabetes, since they were trying to figure out ‘what does this mean ?’ 
by comparing their personal data with the ‘“normal”’ reference ranges from the website of 
Mayo Clinic but also correlating with the data from ‘other life logging devices’ using the 
tools on data aggregating platform Splunk, where they also worked as an employee. 
Tellingly, when the QSer tried to show-and-tell the blog readers how they did a visualisation 
of their pulse and blood pressure data over time with Splunk, they used a novel metaphor as 
section heading, ‘Step 5: Start searching yourself.’ This conceptual metaphor is particularly 
interesting, because it is arguably an outlier or atypical case in Lakoff and Johnson’s CMT. 
The source domain is data and the target domain is self. SELF IS DATA. Both domains are 
abstract generally speaking, or, at least, for non-QSers. However, for a QSer who regularly 
manipulated data through graphic interfaces, data has become more concrete and tangible 
than self. Data is searchable (thanks to a searchable database infrastructure behind the 
interface and screen, of course), so the self is searchable, too. Perhaps it is more of a blended 
metaphor (Fauconnier, Turner 2002), where the input space of data and that of self were 
mixed into a blended space of disembodied, quantified and searchable narrative-self. There is 
also another Haylesian factor to be considered here that has probably given rise to, or 
activated, this novel metaphor in the QSer's mind. The computer-generated graph is a 
classical (interface) material metaphor (Hayles 2002: 22), and in the self-tracker’s case, the 
 When I went to check out the app the Interstellar watcher used, SweetBeat HRV (https://23
www.sweetwaterhrv.com/SweetBeatHRV.shtml), the manufacturer stated on the product's webpage that it was 
an ‘EKG-like heart beat trace.’ That is, a metaphor. Unlike a medical EKG or ECG, in this consumer-grade app’s 
feature description, it did not specify what monitoring accuracy it had under what testing conditions. Common 
sense tells us that even for high-accuracy medical equipments, if we took them outside the lab, the test results 
will not be medically reliable. But it’s perhaps another story for lifestyle self-trackers.
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graphs mapped or corresponded proportionally to their vital signs, without a glitch. This 
smooth proportion-preserving translation, as Van den Boomen (2014: 67, 192) has 
elaborated, of biological phenomenon onto a digital inscription device gave the self-tracker 
an impression that the data doubles were authentic copies of their self, like in photography 
where both analogue and digital pictures could be rendered to represent and index the 
photographed person.  In other words, through data visualisation the digital cognisers have 24
spun an apparently authentic story of what happened to/in/about the human subject and fed it 
to the human in order to co-construct and influence their narrative-self. 
The second implication of the intermediations between the digital and human subjects is that 
the human's interest is activated in quantifying an ever increasing number of aspects of their 
daily life and environments beyond biometrics. Two QSers I have analysed tracked their pets, 
human’s best friends, and I can only speculate that we may one day read in the news or blogs 
about self-tracking geeks quantifying their girl/boyfriends, colleagues, students and 
supervisors. This could naturally happen, because the self is inherently relational. In order to 
know ourselves, especially for gaining more control of ourselves, we would want to know the 
other humans and non-human animals alike that are embedded in our same material 
environment as well as to know the environment itself, critical for our survival. (E.g. 
measuring daily particulate matter density in the air, especially PM 2.5, as an indictor of air 
pollution levels, has become a great health-environmental-political issue and big business in 
China since 2012. ) 25
Although not studying the QSers specifically, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) also mentioned 
briefly about the Western culture of quantification. ‘LABOR IS A RESOURCE and TIME IS A 
RESOURCE are by no means universal. They emerged naturally in our culture because of the 
 ‘In Peirce’s terminology photography is both iconic (based on analogy and similarity with the object 24
represented) and indexical (based on a physical, causal relation with the object). This combination seems to 
secure an equivalence and verisimilitude between what ‘has been there’ and what is represented, based as it is 
on the causal physicality of a technological apparatus that is able to capture physical traces of light reflected 
from an object and translate these to analog inscriptions on an artifact. The apparent objective causality of 
photographic technology yielded to an all too easy equation between indexicality and truth for photography and 
documentary film…indexicality is far from dissolved by digitality. I would even argue that digital indexicality 
has become predominant in any digital praxis, ranging from forensics to governance to daily computing. The 
ubiquitousness of databases, IDs, passwords and login names estab- lished a regime of indexicality, driven by 
the logic of assigning privileges and legitimate positions to indexable, addressable subjects as users, customers, 
and citizens.’ (Van den Boomen, 2014: 56-57)
  It was reportedly started by the American Embassy in Beijing tweeting their own daily PM 2.5 numbers on 25
Chinese social media Weibo. They claimed it was for their own embassy staff's information, but it quickly 
gained traction in public discourse due to heavy air pollution, raising the public’s health awareness and 
concerns.
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way we view work, our passion for quantification, and our obsession with purposeful 
ends.’ (ibid: 68, emphasis mine) 
As I was fascinated by and retraced this mentality of quantification in Western history, I have 
found that what the late American environmental historian Alfred W Crosby (1997) called 
‘the new [cognitive] model’ of quantification, which emerged around the 14th century, could 
serve as a precursor to today’s QS culture. I excerpt a few relevant paragraphs below, 
footnotes omitted (ibid: Chapter 11). 
‘Beginning in the miraculous decades around the turn of the fourteenth century (decades 
unmatched in their radical changes in perception until the era of Einstein and Picasso) and 
continuing on for generations…sometimes in one terrain of mentalité and sometimes another, 
Western Europeans evolved a new way, more purely visual and quantitative than the old, of 
perceiving time, space, and material environment. 
Vision was and is a martinet and an aggressor, encroaching on the realms of the other senses. 
Record events in chronological order on parchment or paper and you have a time machine. 
You can step back and observe beginnings and endings simultaneously. You can alter time's 
direction, and you can halt time so as to examine individual events. If you are an accountant, 
you can proceed backward to find a mistake; you can construct a balance sheet like a still 
photograph of the whistling storm of transactions. 
… 
In practical terms, the new approach was simply this: reduce what you are trying to think 
about to the minimum required by its definition; visualize it on paper, or at least in your 
mind, be it the fluctuation of wool prices at the Champagne fairs or the course of Mars 
through the heavens, and divide it, either in fact or in imagination, into equal quanta. Then 
you can measure it, that is, count the quanta. 
Then you possess a quantitative representation of your subject that is, however simplified, 
even in its errors and omissions, precise. You can think about it rigorously. You can 
manipulate it and experiment with it, as we do today with computer models. It possesses a 
sort of independence from you. It can do for you what verbal representation rarely does: 
contradict your fondest wishes and elbow you on to more efficacious speculation. It was 
quantification, not aesthetics, not logic per se, that parried Kepler's every effort to thrust the 
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solar system into a cage of his beloved Platonic solids and goaded him on until he grudgingly 
devised his planetary laws. 
Visualization and quantification: together they snap the padlock reality is fettered (at least 
tightly enough and for long enough to get some work out of it and possibly a law of nature or 
two). 
… 
The West's lead overall was not nearly as great as in the nineteenth century (when the gap 
became, so to speak, a matter of the steamboat versus the junk and dhow), and in some areas 
the West still lagged behind. For example, the Ottoman armies were better organized and 
trained and demonstrably superior to the West's: in 1529 the Turks were at the gates of 
Vienna. For another example, the Chinese version of the heavens, with no crystal spheres but 
celestial bodies floating in space, was closer to the truth than the West's. But Westerners' lead 
in the way they perceived reality and could, thereby, reason about and then manipulate it was 
enormous. They were cultivating what Eviatar Zerubavel calls the rationalistic character of 
modern culture: “precise, punctual, calculable, standard, bureaucratic, rigid, invariant, finely 
coordinated, and routine.” All, we might add, pertain to or at least smack of the visual and 
quantitative.’ (original emphases) 
For a smack of the discourses of the QSers who were activated and motivated by their digital 
subjects to track their quantified cat and dog, respectively, I present some excerpts from the 
corresponding blogs 050_23_3 and 033_17_1 from my corpus below. 
‘Fitbit Fitness Tracker on a Cat — Java’s Story 
October 29, 2014 
I planned on writing a blog post about attaching my old Fitbit One to my cat, Java, but it took 
me so long to write it that Java has now been walking around wearing his Fitbit for more than 
a year. So instead I’ll cover some of the background around attaching the Fitbit One to my 
cat, as well as having a look at some of the data and trends I have uncovered from Java’s 12 
months of fitness tracking. 
Quantified Cat: Background 
Having originally purchased a Fitbit One and loving it, when the Fitbit Flex came out I 
decided to upgrade to that and retire my Fitbit One. A lot of my friends were still satisfied 
with their Ones, and I felt kind of guilty just chucking my old Fitbit One into the cupboard — 
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so I figured: why not duct tape it to the cat instead? It would probably be pretty interesting to 
know how many steps Java does, especially during the day when no one is around the house. 
I had some big, important, very serious questions in my mind: Does he walk around when 
humans aren’t around? What are his most active hours? How much does he adventure during 
the middle of the night, when cats are supposedly at their peak? All of this and more could 
surely be answered by trusty, and available, old Fitbit One.’ (File 050_23_3) 
‘Building a Sleep Tracker for Your Dog Using Tessel and Twilio 
September 16, 2014 
Have you ever wondered how long your dog sleeps while you’re away at work? I have. As a 
hacker this seemed like the perfect excuse to strap a microcontroller to my dog, Gif, and see 
if I could find out. To make it a little more fun I thought I could have it text me when Gif 
wakes up to let me know how long he slept for. In this post I’ll show how to build your very 
own sleep tracker for your dog using Tessel and Twilio.’ (File 033_17_1) 
In the case of ‘Quantified Cat’ Java, its owner probably named it after JavaScript, which is an 
‘object-oriented computer programming language commonly used to create interactive 
effects within web browsers,’ according to the online version of Oxford Dictionary of 
English.  Moreover, the owner not only wanted to map the computer domain conceptually 26
onto the cat by naming it, but also went on to physically map, i.e. attach/latch, a used Fitbit 
tracker onto the cat. The owner obviously personified the digital subject positively (or 
perhaps playfully) by feeling ‘kind of guilty just chucking my old Fitbit One’ and later calling 
it ‘trusty, and available, old Fitbit One.’ So they attached the tracker onto the cat out of 
affection or guilt for the digital one. It was much more than a conceptual metaphor, and could 
be an emotional metaphor as well. With regard to the Quantified Dog Gif, I believe the name 
also derived from the fashionable computer source domain of GIF (Graphic Interchange 
Format). Most of the animated emoticon images, or memes, that are popular on nowadays’ 
social media are in this format. 
Besides, for both of the owners of the Java and Gif, they were also motivated by their desires 
to dig into the cognitive nonconscious information in their assemblage, i.e. the behaviours of 
their pets when they were asleep or away from home. Arguably, these desires were activated 
 https://www.lexico.com/definition/javascript26
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and fuelled by the imagined promises of their automated, available and trusty digital friends 
to visualise the invisible. 
The third implication of the intermediations between the QS digital and human subjects is 
that the latter may become objectified, because the former has evolved the capabilities to 
actively categorise and classify the humans on a large scale. In perceptual psychology's 
terms, any object can have several affordances. So when a human animal becomes a 
quantifiable and classifiable object for a digital cogniser such as an app, they also come to 
have several affordances in the app’s (ubiquitous) eye, so to speak. For a human, one of the 
salient affordances of an app is that it is clickable . Conversely, for an app, one of the salient 27
affordances of a human is that it is activate-to-click-able, i.e. they can be activated or 
motivated to click on user interfaces. Perhaps like a lexicon, a human-click is also 
polysemous for an app, but in a slightly different way. A click can take place in different 
places, or enacted on the digital symbols and icons in different contexts (such as a hyperlink 
on a webpage and a like button within an app) on a user interface, so the same clicking action 
(one-click, double-click, left-click, right-click, touch-click, mouse-click, etc) will lead to 
different digital objects, operations and destinations in the cyberspace. However, unlike a 
semantic polysemy, whose meanings can be created by a human subject interacting with 
another human subject for ad hoc or one-off situations, i.e. emerging intersubjectively, a click 
polysemy always consists of preprogrammed mappings between networks. Admittedly, the 
mappings can be changed, but they are for most of the time meticulously designed to stay 
relatively stable and rigid, so that after updating my operating system, for instance, I can still 
reliably find my files through the same steps of clicking (or I would be rather surprised or 
upset).  Therefore, the clicking polysemy for a digital subject, though many, is still finite, 28
while the semantic polysemy for human (inter)subjectivity is, in theory, infinite (think of 
poetry and fiction as well as everyday conversations. Anything can be used by humans to 
 Clickability is also a typical computer material metaphor discussed by Van den Boomen (2014) in several 27
places. ‘User interfaces are built around various metaphors of one-click immediacy: icons, menu options, 
hyperlinks, like buttons, share buttons. Though these clickable or tappable interface metaphors certainly 
contribute to user-friendliness and wider adoption of digital devices, they also withhold user control and 
knowledge about the system. They are sign-tool-objects that hide their tool-being. Their clickability is based on 
indexical connections to the machinery of hardware, software, and protocols, but this indexicality is superseded 
by icontology: the seductive iconicity of metaphorical objects that ontologize iconic representations into taken-
for-granted icon-objects.’ (ibid: 190)
 Hayles (2002) offered some interesting artistic and experimental projects as counter-examples, i.e. user 28
interface designs that intentionally violated a common user’s expectations, or taken-for-granted habits of 
interacting with digital subjects.
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signify anything else, hence every thing and word having potentials to be activated and 
become metaphorical, in the sense of cross-domain mappings.)  
So in this train of thought, intermediating with the digital subjects can entail that the humans 
may lose some of their flexibility and creativity, but also gain some certainty and veracity. If 
a QSer’s objective was to create digital versions of their authentic selves, as discussed in 
Section 1.2.2, or to increase efficiency in communication and work, then this kind of 
subjectivity-shaping could be helpful for them to create truthful self-images. If their purpose 
was to create fictional self-narratives, or to be creative and experimental, then this might not 
be beneficial or fit for the purpose. 
Another kind of significant human affordance emerging from this type of intermediation is 
that the humans become position-able or segment-able for the apps, or more precisely, for the 
parties who design, manufacture and deploy the apps as agents for collecting consumer 
market intelligence. Through continuously enticing the human subjects to click in different 
places and settings and through aggregating and analysing these various human clicking 
behaviours with correlated data, an app, or, more likely, a platform running many sorts of 
these apps, can easily classify a human user, positioning them in one or several social 
categories. Afterwards, logically, the human’s categorial features can be automatically 
capitalised upon, for instance, to push targeted advertisements to them.  
But perhaps the most transparent positioning metaphor here is software customers are drug 
users. It may be an urban myth, but there has been for some time a poignant quote widely 
attributed to Edward Tufte,  a visualisation expert and professor emeritus of computer 29
science, political science and statistics at Yale University, i.e. “There are only two industries 
that call their customers ‘users’: illegal drugs and software.” Although indeterminable, a 
software or app customer may be potentially compared to a drug user or addict.  30
Etymologically, the sense of ‘[a] person who takes illegal drugs on a regular or habitual basis; 
an addict’ (first entry in OED: 1923) appeared much later than the sense ‘[a] person who has 
 For instance, in a recent review of Netflix’s 2020 documentary The Social Dilemma, which criticised the 29
social network platforms’ business models of monetising on clicks, the quote was still attributed to Professor 
Tufte. (https://sundial.csun.edu/161195/arts-entertainment/review-netflixs-the-social-dilemma-is-a-great-
conversation-starter-but-not-enough-to-create-change/)
 Natasha Dow Schüll, a cultural anthropologist at New York University, explored the relations between 30
technology design and the experience of addiction in her book Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las 
Vegas (Princeton University Press, 2012). She also studied the QS. During a personal communication with her 
at a QS conference in Amsterdam in 2017, she concurred that some apps were designed to be addictive.
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or makes use of a thing, esp. regularly; a person who employs or practices something’ (first 
entry in OED: c1425), according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). However, a search 
in the Corpus of Contemporary American English showed that currently, drug user has the 
highest collocation frequency (1784), higher than internet user (1026), facebook user (502), 
twitter user (425), app user (118) and software user (60), for examples. So drug user has the 
potential to be construed as a basic discourse meaning in the metaphorical use of the term. 
It is noticeable that app customers or clients are now almost universally positioned as users. It 
is not only the people in the app industry address their customers thus, the customers 
themselves are also ‘brainwashed’ and voluntarily or unconsciously take up the ‘user’ identity 
tag. In my QS blog corpus, I have identified the following KWIC concordances for user, 
using AntConc. (Figure 1) All of the bloggers identified themselves as app, software or Web 
services users. 
In concordances 4 and 8, for instances, the full co-texts of the respective clauses revealed that 
the QS bloggers were aware of and concerned about their own or others’ spending too much 
time on social media and smartphone apps, being addicted like drug users. One of the blogs 
were explicitly titled ‘Where My 90 Hours of Mobile Phone Screen Time In September 
Went.’ Here is the full co-text of concordance 4, ‘Also, compared to your average Twitter 
user, I'd say I don't tweet alot [sic], generally only once every two days or so on average.’ 
And here of concordance 8, ‘When I first read the Yahoo Tech article that quoted some recent 
research showing that the average smartphone user spends three hours a day looking at their 
mobile screen, I thought “no way am I spending that much time using my Samsung Note 3.”’ 
In sum, the human subject, the QSers in my studied case, with a dynamic cognitive system 
that is embodied and largely nonconscious, has recruited such digital subjects as self-tracking 
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Figure 1. KWIC concordances of user in QS blog corpus
sensors, apps and smartphones to co-construct a cognitive ensemble, known as a human-
technical assemblage, which, by making use of conceptual and material metaphors and cross-
domain, cross-network mappings, extend the human cognition beyond the skin. Hayles, citing 
Hutchins, has pointed out in How We Became Posthuman (1999) that ‘[m]odern humans are 
capable of more sophisticated cognition than cavemen…because they have constructed 
smarter environments in which to work.’ In other words, 'material and informational 
scaffolding becomes part of that in which and out of which rhetorical and cognitive activity 
occur’ (Rickert 2013: 70). During the interaction and intermediation between the human and 
digital subjects, the former manipulates the latter to gain self-knowledge through numbers, 
while the latter simulates the former's nonconscious cognition and feedforwards visualised, 
energised quantitative information into the formers’ consciousness for helping them spinning 
a self-narrative, surreptitiously positioning the human subject into social categories that can 
be monetised. 
2.3.3 Metaphors of big data 
Drawing inspiration from Lakoff and Johnson (1980), technology critic Sara M Watson 
(online) has offered an elaborate overview of big data metaphors. ‘Metaphors are helpful for 
understanding abstract concepts that, because of their complexity or scale, lie beyond our 
human comprehension. In their seminal work Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson 
describe the conceptual metaphors that help with “referring, quantifying, identifying, setting 
goals, and motivating actions” for an abstract concept such as inflation. Given its 
ephemerality and abstraction, data is ripe for metaphoric description.’ 
‘Metaphors prime us to take for granted the ways we think about things. Most of the 
metaphors we use to talk about data in popular culture make sense to technocratic 
corporations and their leaders, those building and disseminating information technologies, 
but they are fundamentally dehumanizing… The dominant industrial metaphors for data do 
not privilege the position of the individual. Instead, they take power away from the person to 
which the data refers and give it to those who have the tools to analyze and interpret data. 
Data then becomes obscured, specialized, and distanced.’ (Watson, ibid) 
The dominant metaphors today for understanding data are industrial, Watson said. (ibid) 
‘They start from Gartner and O’Reilly Conferences, make their way into the business section 
of The New York Times, and seep further into the style section as we parse our evolving 
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relationship to technology. Journalism itself has become data-driven in the likes of explainers 
like Vox and FiveThirtyEight.’ 
‘Many of the metaphors we have for personal data today come from the big data industry.’ As 
Tim Hwang and Karen Levy (2015) have suggested, these metaphors describe data as a 
“natural, inexhaustible good—ripe for exploitation in the name of economic growth and 
private gain.” Also citing Lakoff and Johnson’s work, Cornelius Puschmann and Jean 
Burgess (2014: 1698-1700) collect data metaphors into two categories: 
BIG DATA IS A FORCE OF NATURE TO BE CONTROLLED  
BIG DATA IS NOURISHMENT/FUEL TO BE CONSUMED  
Puschmann and Burgess (ibid) argued, ‘The complexity of big data lies in the increased 
abstractness of the means by which it is created and used. In contrast to commonly accepted 
rhetorically constructed knowledge (“givenness” in the early sense of data) or the outcome of 
collection and interrogation by a scientist (in the modern sense of the word), big data grows 
seemingly by itself in environments designed specifically for its cultivation. Its individual 
units are indistinguishable and form a mass of information in which exploitation is scalable. 
Rather than being recorded and analyzed by human analysts in relatively clearly bounded 
settings, big data exists ephemerally in the cloud.’ 
Puschmann and Burgess (ibid: 1701) argued that the meaning of data and big data are 
contested and evolving.  
‘In some of the accounts provided, data accurately reflects nature, society, and 
culture; the units in which it is packaged are comparable; and similar results can be 
produced under similar circumstances. The path of interpretation between the data 
and its meaning is short, and conclusions are independent of a particular context of 
the subjective views of the analyst. Through the use of a highly specific set of terms, 
the role of data as a valued commodity is effectively inscribed (e.g., “the new oil”; 
Rotella, 2012), most often by suggesting physicality, immutability, context 
independence, and intrinsic worth.  
We agree with van Dijk’s contention that “metaphors are crucial narrative tools in the 
popularisation of knowledge; they provide prototypes for imaginary creations” 
(1998, p. 22). Because of the degree of abstractness of science and technology, 
conceptual metaphor is particularly salient in these domains. Science is often 
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associated with metaphors of discovery and adventure, with “findings” being 
“uncovered” rather than explanations for natural phenomena articulated by 
researchers in the rhetorical fashion Rosenberg (2013) ascribed to early natural 
philosophy. Scientific facts are, like data, regularly framed as givens that are valid 
outside of a particular context rather than simply being pieces of discourse that are 
ascribed to specific actors and embedded in a specific context (Latour & Woolgar, 
1979).’ (ibid) 
Meanwhile, Lupton (2013c) identified that the most commonly employed metaphors to 
discuss big data are those related to water or liquidity: streams, flows, leaks, rivers, oceans, 
seas, waves and so on. “Both academic and popular cultural descriptions of big data have 
frequently referred to the ‘fire hose’ of data issuing from a social media site such as Twitter 
and the data ‘deluge’, ‘flood’ or ‘tsunami’ that as internet users we both contribute to and 
which threaten to ‘swamp’ or ‘drown us’. These rather vivid descriptions of data as a fluid, 
uncontrollable entity possessing great physical power emphasise the sheer volume and fast 
nature of digital data movements, as well as their unpredictability and the difficulty of control 
and containment. They suggest an economy of digital data and surveillance in which data are 
collected constantly and move from site to site in ways that cannot easily themselves be 
monitored, measured or regulated.” 
In addition, “data are also often referred as living things, as having a kind of vitality in their 
ability to move from site to site and morph into different forms. The rhizome metaphor is 
sometimes employed to describe how digital data flow from place to place, or from node to 
node, suggesting that they are part of a living organism such as a plant. This also suggests a 
high level of complexity and a network of interconnected tubes and nodes.” The byproduct 
data that are generated are often compared to data ‘trails’, ‘breadcrumbs’, ‘exhausts’, ‘smoke 
signals’ and ‘shadows.’(ibid) 
Watson (online) commented that DATA AS A BYPRODUCT metaphors describe the transactional 
traces of digital interactions but suggest it is also wasteful, pollutive, and may not be 
meaningful without processing. Meanwhile, DATA AS A NATURAL RESOURCE suggests that it 
has great value to be mined and refined but that it must be handled by experts and large-scale 
industrial processes. Data has also been described as a fungible resource, as an asset class, 
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suggesting that it can be traded, stored, and protected in a data vault. These conceptual 
metaphors have been identified also in my QS blogs discourse, reflecting their popularity. 
Watson (ibid) further offered her own list of conceptual metaphors for big data: 
DATA IS A NATURAL RESOURCE: oil, gold rush, ecosystem, gathered, raw, trove  
DATA IS AN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT: mining, refining, platform, breach, big data 
:: big pharma, big business  
DATA IS A BYPRODUCT: exhaust, data trail, breadcrumbs, smog, janitor, cleanser, 
smoke, signals, signal and noise  
DATA IS A MARKET: economy, paying with data, currency, asset, vault, broker  
DATA IS LIQUID: ocean, deluge, tsunami, torrent, wave, firehose, lake  
DATA AS TRENDY: data is the new oil, data is the new currency, data is the new 
black, data is the new bacon, data scientist is the sexiest job of the 21st century, 
frontier, revolution, wild west 
Particularly, Watson (ibid) discussed the relations between the QS and embodied metaphor. 
She argued the ‘most effective metaphors—ones so fundamental that we forget they are 
metaphors—draw on embodied experience, or “embodied cognition,” fundamentally part of 
the way we think and act in the world.’ Most of the industrial metaphors for big data are 
disembodied, thus lacking a personal and emotional connection, she said. In comparison,  
‘The metaphors used in the Quantified Self community offer a more personal, 
autobiographical, embodied, or practice-oriented conceptual model of data. Studying 
the early adopters of self-tracking technology, I’ve identified a set of emerging data 
metaphors starting from a personal, rather than industrial perspective. Some are still 
mechanistic, drawing on Taylorist theories about “managing what you measure.” But 
others are more sympathetic and focus on embodied experience and personal 
reflection. 
DATA IS A MIRROR portrays data as something to reflect on and as a technology for 
seeing ourselves as others see us. But, like mirrors, data can be distorted, and can 
drive dysmorphic thought. 
DATA IS A PRACTICE references the self-tracking process that has been criticized as 
navel-gazing, but which can also be a means of introspection and a practice toward 
self-knowledge.’ (ibid). 
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Although I have not found yet the two types of conceptual metaphors in my QS blogs as 
Watson mentioned, I agree that there is potential for embodied metaphor, or DATA IS A BODY, 
in the QS discourse to develop, since the QSers have already used many biometric concepts, 
such as blood pressure and heart rate. 
2.4 Cognitive mapping and utopia 
Since the digital technologies are born from abstract, mathematical ideas, people need to map 
their properties and uses onto a more concrete time-space in order to make sense of them, 
making use of a large number of familiar spatial metaphors. For example, the Web, the Net, 
site (or website) and cyber-space are all conventional spatial metaphors in CMC. More 
creative spatial metaphors include comparing such Internet services as amazon.com and 
tmall.com to online shopping malls. In reality, these Internet conglomerates operate like 
bureaucracies rather than supermarkets. In their offices and headquarters, they do not have 
shelves of groceries and necessities to sell and there are no customers, either. Instead, there 
are aisles of desks for employees working on computers and laptops and stacks of mainframe 
machines and hard discs in their enormous data warehouses. 
This cognitive process of putting abstract and unfamiliar things into more concrete and 
familiar ideas using spatial metaphors is known as cognitive mapping. It helps an individual 
subject situates and reorients themselves within a vast, unrepresentable totality, a process that 
corresponds to the workings of ideology. Thus, cognitive mapping does not have to be 
accurate representation, and in fact it is often distorting the reality. 
To elaborate this ideological process of cognitive mapping and its relation to QS movement 
as utopianism, I first draw on Jameson (1991: 51-52), who compared it to a physical process 
of locating oneself geographically, 
‘[T]he conception of space that has been developed here suggests that a model of 
political culture appropriate to our own situation will necessarily have to raise spatial 
issues as its fundamental organising concern. I will therefore provisionally define the 
aesthetic of this new (and hypothetical) cultural form as an aesthetic of 
cognitive mapping. 
In a classic work, The Image of the City, Kevin Lynch taught us that the alienated 
city is above all a space in which people are unable to map (in their minds) either 
their own positions or the urban totality in which they find themselves: grids such as 
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those of Jersey City, in which none of the traditional markers (monuments, nodes, 
natural boundaries, built perspectives) obtain, are the most obvious examples. 
Disalienation in the traditional city, then, involves the practical reconquest of a sense 
of place and the construction or reconstruction of an articulated ensemble which can 
be retained in memory and which the individual subject can map and remap along the 
moments of mobile, alternative trajectories. Lynch’s own work is limited by the 
deliberate restriction of his topic to the problems of city form as such; yet it becomes 
extraordinarily suggestive when projected outward onto some of the larger national 
and global spaces we have touched on here. 
There is, for one thing, a most interesting convergence between the empirical 
problems studied by Lynch in terms of city space and the great Althusserian (and 
Lacanian) redefinition of ideology as “the representation of the subject’s Imaginary 
relationship to his or her Real conditions of existence.” Surely this is exactly what the 
cognitive map is called upon to do in the narrower framework of daily life in the 
physical city: to enable a situational representation on the part of the individual 
subject to that vaster and properly unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of 
society’s structures as a whole. 
Therefore, the practices of self-tracking can also be considered as cognitive mapping, i.e. the 
people use QS gadgets and tools to draw a situational representation of, or map out, the vast, 
abstract, changing and ephemeral space of big data in their everyday life, so that they know 
by numbers on a daily basis where they are, how they are doing and how they should proceed 
to reach certain goals and destinations in the hyper complex infosphere. In this sphere, as 
mentioned earlier in Section 1.1.2.2, not only humans are decentred, but also they need to 
learn how to deal with the other emerging informational agents, which may not have physical 
embodiments in the offline world. The blurring of the boundaries between online and offline 
means that people, who by convention are more familiar with the offline reality, have to find 
a way to map the online spaces and the entities therein onto their embodied experiences 
offline. 
2.4.1 Types and functions of utopias/dystopias 
The QS movement has also been associated with a form of technological utopianism, known 
as the Californian Ideology. According to Barbrook and Cameron (2001: 364),  
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it refers to a new millennium faith that ‘has emerged from a bizarre fusion of the 
cultural bohemianism of San Francisco with the high-tech industries of Silicon 
Valley. Promoted in magazines, books, TV programs, Web sites, newsgroups, and 
Net conferences, the Californian ideology promiscuously combines the free-wheeling 
spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies. This amalgamation of 
opposites has been achieved through a profound faith in the emancipatory potential 
of the new information technologies. In the digital utopia, everybody will be both hip 
and rich.’  
This is arguably a good life worth aspiring to, and if realised, it would be a great personal 
success. Success and fitness are what the QSers aim at. 
‘Not surprisingly, this optimistic vision of the future has been enthusiastically 
embraced by computer nerds, slacker students, innovative capitalists, social activists, 
trendy academics, futurist bureaucrats, and opportunistic politicians across the United 
States. As usual, Europeans have not been slow in copying the latest fad from 
America. While a recent European Union Commission report recommends following 
the Californian “free-market” model for building the “information superhighway,” 
cutting-edge artists and academics eagerly imitate the “posthuman” philosophers of 
the West Coast’s Extropian cult.’ (ibid: 364) 
According to feminist utopian scholar Sargisson (2012a), “[t]he word ‘utopia’ phonetically 
conflates an etymological pun on three Greek terms: ‘eu’, good, ‘ou’, non or not, and ‘topos’, 
place. Utopia is thus the ‘good place that is no place’, or the ‘good-no-place’, or the ‘good 
place that is not’.” 
For Kumar (1987, 1999), utopia is first and foremost a form of fiction of imaginary worlds. 
His definition is perhaps the strictest, since he claimed that there is only one utopia, i.e. “the 
modern western utopia invented in the Europe of Renaissance.” Nevertheless, the modern 
utopia has inherited classical and Christian traditions, e.g. the Golden Age, Arcadia, Paradise, 
Cockaygne, the millennium and the Hellenic ideal cities, all perfect worlds. 
Kumar (1987) listed More’s Utopia, Campanella’s City of the Sun, Andreae’s Christianopolis 
and Bacon’s New Atlantis as classics of positive utopia (eutopia). Meanwhile, the satirical 
strand in utopia has developed on its own and formed a negative pole, i.e. dystopia or anti-
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utopia, to show the extremes of folly and unreason. The dystopias range from Swift’s 
Gulliver’s Travels to Orwell’s Nineteen Eight-Four. 
In particular, scientific utopias (or dystopias), e.g. Huxley’s Brave New World, can point out 
particular areas of techno-social concern and “warn us about issues and patterns that we can 
still change. (Sargent 2005: 47-49) Levitas (2010) proposed that ‘the expression of desire for 
a better way of being’ will remain a common factor in all kinds of utopias. 
Furthermore, literature professor Moylan (1986: 1-2) has identified what he calls ‘critical 
utopia’ mainly according to utopia’s function and social value. ‘Utopia negates the 
contradictions in a social system by forging visions of what is not yet realized either in theory 
or practice. In generating such figures of hope, utopia contributes to the open space of 
opposition.’ 
Moylan (ibid: 10) said that utopia as a literary genre once fueled the early capitalist dream of 
a new world, and, working within the oppositional ideologies, has helped pushing beyond 
that dream. However, utopia’s power to drive change was subdued in the 20th century, 
because it was coopted into the maintenance of the totalising systems, from the Stalinist state 
to the consumer paradise, such as Disneyland, which is one of the more surveilled places on 
earth. 
Suvin (2003) said that Disneyland fairy tales are an ‘exemplary (bad) case of a dystopian 
misuse of eutopian images.’ If utopia prompts imagination of alternative futures, then the 
disneyfication of utopia kills it. 
In recent years, there have been some interesting research on the literary utopia’s or science 
fiction’s contributions to human-computer interaction (HCI) and ubicomp designs, including 
the designs of QS gadgets, promoting the use of design fiction for creating alternative 
technological futures. (Satchell 2008;  Blythe 2006, 2014a, 2014b; Markussen, Knutz 2013; 
Sterling 2009) Personal and Ubiquitous Computing journal recently dedicated an entire issue 
to the relation between science fiction and ubicomp. (Kaye, Dourish 2014). Julian Bleecker 
(2009), an interaction designer at Near Future Laboratory, has pointed out that HCI designs 
are often constrained by pre-existing and predominant metaphors made popular by 
Hollywood sci-fi movies, such as Minority Report’s impact touchscreen designs. 
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2.4.2 QS as utopia 
The connections between the QS and utopia can be understood through Foucault’s ideas on 
the utopian body and the technology of the self. 
First, Foucault (2006) considered the human body as ‘the principal actor in all utopias,’ or 
that whose senses, especially the visual, give rise to all human impulses and wishful thinking.  
But the utopian impulses are locked inside the body, so, historically, masks, tattoos, makeups 
and clothes were used to launch the body into an other space to free up the imagination. 
“Everything that touches the body … lets the utopias sealed in the body blossom into sensible 
and colourful form.” 
The above description fits the QS gadgets well. For example, wearing a Nike Fuelband on a 
wrist to record body data, the QSer is stimulated to fantasise about the futures of their body, 
self and good life. Those which were invisible, e.g. heart beat, and to which the person was 
insensible, e.g. eating habits, are made visible and sensible by the gadgets’ pattern 
recognition algorithms through quantification, evaluation and visualisation. The evaluated, 
qualitative data then assemble the QSer’s ‘data-doubles’, which facilitate shaping the QSer’s 
inforg identity. 
Second, in the Western tradition, an important technology of the self is self writing 
(hupomnemata): a person writes down daily activities with great details in order to derive 
moral lessens, guides for conduct and a genealogy of thoughts. (Foucault 1983b) Similarly, 
the QSers draw up their lifestyle guide to the digital galaxy based on their self-data. Their 
posthumanism ideals and implicit models about life and society are implied and embedded in 
these guidelines. 
Sargisson (2012a) defines utopianism as a human impulse or tendency based on 
dissatisfaction with and critique of the present; it engages in contemporary social and 
political debates; and it desires and imagines alternative possibilities to the status quo. 
Utopias are manifestations or expressions of utopianism. They come in many forms including 
texts (fiction and theory) and lived experiments. By stretching the critique of the present to 
extremes, people either come up with an imagination of a better society (i.e. eutopias) or of a 
worse one (i.e. dystopias). (See Figure 2.) 
Some QSers also articulate their own theories about why certain things happen, e.g. why their 
body weights increase, what should be done about it, and what should take place ideally. 
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These are utopian fictions and theories in Sargisson’s model, and they can be found in QSers’ 
online discussions and during the show-and-tells. 
Meanwhile, the self-trackers do not only think, they do. They use their body data to examine 
how they follow their self-imposed, metrics-defined everyday life regimes and thus conform 
to their ideals. These attempts to make changes and realise the good self, driven by utopian 
impulses, are the lived experiments. 
2.4.3 Two QS cases 
In this section, I will review two types of self-tracking apps, i.e. those for quantifying sexual 
and reproductive functions and behaviors and for keeping logs of body weight. 
2.4.3.1 Quantified sex 
Self-tracking fertility apps target both women and men, according to Lupton (2015a). The 
female-oriented apps track women’s body data to predict their ovulation and menstrual cycles 
in order to either facilitate or avoid conception. 
Many of these apps are designed for helping female users know their own ‘best time to mate,’ 
thus boosting fertility rates for those with reproductive difficulties and serving to chart a 
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Utopianism: a human impulse/tendency  
- Dissatisfied with and critical of the present  
- Engages in contemporary debates  
Utopias 
- Manifestations or expressions of utopianism 
- Come in many forms including Texts (fiction & 
theory), Lived Experiments 
Eutopias  
- Dissatisfied with and critical 
of the present 
- Engaged in contemporary 
debates 
-  Desire and imagine better 
society/world 
Dystopias 
- Dissatisfied with and critical of 
the present 
- Engaged in contemporary debates 
- Imagine worse society/world 
 
Figure 2. Sargisson’s model, reproduced from (2012a: 9)
roadmap to a eutopia of 'easy pregnancy.’ However, if we stretch such an ideal of 
reproduction under self-surveillance, then it could turn into a dystopia depicted in Morrow’s 
Auspicious Eggs, where ideology and state-sanctioned forces combine to monitor and control 
reproduction. (Sargisson 2012b) 
The male-oriented apps gamify sexual activities and put emphasis on male performance and 
achievement. They keep logs of number of partners, locations, duration, thrusts per minute, 
noise levels and etc. 
Lupton (2015a) said, “These technologies, therefore, act to support and reinforce highly 
reductive and normative ideas of what is ‘good sex’ and ‘good performance’ by encouraging 
users to quantify their sexual experiences and feelings in ever finer detail and to represent 
these data visually in graphs and tables. The discourses of performance, quantification and 
normality suggest specific limited types of sexualities.” 
2.4.3.2 Weight control apps 
The same reductive and normative logic can also be found in weight control apps. Many of 
these apps simply transform their users into objective units of calorie intakes and burning. 
Thus, these QS apps, in effect, suggest that complex weight management can become as 
simple as manipulating a few sets of data and meeting arbitrary body mass index (BMI) 
standards. 
Despite various social and medical perspectives on weight issues, from anti-obesity 
structuralist approach to fat pride activism (c.f. Lupton 2013d), most fitness apps just adopt 
the dominant view of fighting against “obesity epidemic,” emphasising personal 
responsibility and self control. 
Sociologically, many competing, collaborating social forces are contributing to obesity 
discourse (ibid), and app developers are inevitably influenced by them, or piggyback on them 
to market and promote their products. Similar to Bleecker’s metaphor problem mentioned in 
Section 2.4.1, a totalising obesity discourse can foreclose possibilities for alternative designs 
and lead to product homogeneity. 
2.5 Research questions 
Having reviewed the literature about the linguistic, social, cultural, political and 
technological contexts in which the Quantified Self is situated and from where it arises, I put 
forward my research questions as follows. 
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Since no linguist or discourse analyst, to my best knowledge, has systematically examined 
the relations between the QSers’ discourse and their mind, my study aimed to fill in this gap 
by collecting and analysing a proprietary corpus of 40 QSer blogs, and map out the cultural 
model of the quantified self in this discourse community. This approach was possible because 
according to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), the abstract concepts people use in 
everyday life are structured by complex conceptual metaphors, which are composed of 
primary metaphors that are embodied in the human nervous system, including the brain, and 
embedded and extended in their bodily experience in the world (Lakoff  and Johnson 1999: 
16-73). The conceptual metaphors are an “essential part” of the concepts (ibid: 73). 
Therefore, by studying systematically the metaphors the QSers used in their blogs, I was 
drawing a picture of their (collective) mind, mapping out their self-related cultural models 
and schemas, or thought patterns. Meanwhile, since the conceptual metaphors are not directly 
accessible, ‘the main way of identifying them has been through’ clusters of linguistic 
metaphors (Deignan 2010: 52), or ‘metaphorical expressions’ (Lakoff 1993: 203). 
Hence my research questions in this thesis, 
I. What linguistic and conceptual metaphors did the QSers use in their blogs ? 
II. What concepts did they hold as regards self, data and self-control ? 
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3. Methodology 
This section will explain some of the cognitive linguistics (CL) methods I will use to analyse 
the metaphors in the QS discourse. First, I will explain how I have decided to use a CL-
informed discourse analysis approach.  
Earlier research on self-tracking were carried out by health researchers in the areas of tele-
health, e-health and m-health, mainly studying clinical benefits of self-tracking technologies 
in treatments of illness. Later, sociologists have brought in a different analytical approach, 
focusing on “understanding the use of these technologies in relation to notions of the self and 
group and individual identity formation and with an emphasis on fitness rather than illness.” 
(Till, 2006) Besides, the first QS research network was launched by sociologists Christopher 
Till and Mark Carrigan at the University of Leeds in the UK in 2013. (University of Leeds, 
2013) Meanwhile, political theorist Lucy Sargisson (2014) argued that the QSer have bought 
into a sham utopia, which purportedly promotes self-perfection, but actually represents 
corporate’s and government’s agenda. 
So far, no linguist has tackled the problems on the QS language and identities, but it does not 
mean they cannot. “Research in various fields such as psychology, sociology… has now 
firmly established the fundamental role of language processes and strategies in the 
construction, negotiation and establishment of identities,” said Polish applied linguist Kamila 
Ciepiela (2011), asserting, “language and identity are inseparable.” So it is not only possible 
but also necessary to study the QS identities using a linguistics approach. 
Specifically, my theoretical orientation is cognitive linguistics (CL), especially the 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) and mental spaces blending theory, as both the concepts 
of quantification and self are abstract and contested, and they need to be grounded in 
embodied experience for people to understand and for themselves to propagate. Since the 
CMT, and CL in general, have started with embracing and developing the idea that both 
language and thinking are embodied, they are especially suitable for studying the complex 
system of how the abstract ideas and concepts of the QS are embodied. Also, as 
psycholinguist Margaret Dowens suggested,  CL has a methodological advantage over 31
psychological experiments, because CL can study various discourses in a large range of 
contexts on the Internet, whereas psychological experiments will need controlled 
 Personal communication during PhD annual review.31
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environment and structured questionnaires and interviews. The third reason for choosing a 
CL approach is because my study subject is multimodal (linguistic, visual, auditory, haptic, 
etc). The embodiment statement has literally put the language on the same ground with the 
other cognitive capacities, so the CL will be more useful for identifying potential connections 
among different modes of communication and persuasion (e.g. linking verbal metaphors with 
the photos we see in an advertisement through mental image schemata.) 
In the rest of the chapter, I will explain in details how a cognitively-informed discourse 
analysis method, developed by cognitive linguists Gerard Steen, can work for my research. 
3.1 CMT and cognitively-informed discourse analysis 
I am using Steen’s CL-informed discourse analysis to help me answer my first research 
question. Here I will explain why and how. In the 1980s, two of the cognitive linguistics 
cofounders, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, wrote several classic books, including 
Metaphors We Live By and Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, which serve as the 
foundation of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory in cognitive linguistics. (Lakoff and Johsnon, 
1980; Lakoff, 1987) Their basic argument is that humans think mostly and essentially in 
metaphors, and these conceptual metaphors are not innate software in the brain, but are rather 
embodied in humans’ worldly experiences. As Lakoff and Johnson put it in Philosophy in The 
Flesh (1999), ‘The mind is inherently embodied, reason is shaped by the body.’ This is 
because, as cognitive linguist Charles Forceville (2006) interpreted it, 
‘Human beings find phenomena they can see, hear, feel, taste and/or smell easier to 
understand and categorize than phenomena they cannot. It is perceptibility that 
makes the former phenomena concrete, and the lack of it that makes the latter 
abstract. In order to master abstract concepts, humans systematically comprehend 
them in terms of concrete concepts.’ 
An abstract concept of, say, time is systematically understood as a substance, an object 
moving in space, a resource, a person and so on. Life is understood as a journey, a story and 
so on. Conceptual metaphors also differ from linguistic metaphors. For example, the 
following linguistic expressions: The time for action has arrived; Time is flying by; He 
passed the time happily; all reflect an implied or underlying conceptual metaphor, that is, 
TIME IS SPATIAL MOTION. (Forceville 2006)  
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Moreover, according to the CMT, a conceptual metaphor consists of a target domain (topic, 
tenor) and a source domain (vehicle, base). ‘A metaphor’s interpretation boils down to the 
“mapping” of pertinent features from the source to the target.’ (ibid) An example from Lakoff 
is the conceptual mapping of the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, which may include: The 
lovers correspond to travellers; The love relationship corresponds to the vehicle; The lovers' 
common goals correspond to their common destinations on the journey; Difficulties in the 
relationship correspond to impediments to travel. (Lakoff 1993: 207) Many metaphors have 
become entrenched after repeated use, so a mapping in the case of entrenched metaphors, 
such as I’m at a crossroads in my life (LIFE AS A JOURNEY) or I was overwhelmed (EMOTION 
AS FORCE), occurs automatically. (Forceville 2006) As we can see (which is another 
entrenched metaphor), metaphorical source domains are deeply rooted in the functioning of 
the human body, thus grounding our thinking on a human scale. This is what the CMT means 
by ‘reason is shaped by the body.’ 
3.1.1 Embodied, enacted metaphors 
In a 2003 Afterword to their 1980 classic Metaphors we live by, Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 
244-274) explicated a neural theory of metaphor, developed by computer scientist Srinivas 
Narayanan (1997). They wrote, 
‘Narayanan developed a theory in which conceptual metaphors are computed neurally via 
neural maps—neural circuitry linking the sensory-motor system with higher cortical areas. 
… 
The maps or mappings are physical links: neural circuitry linking neuronal clusters called 
nodes. The domains are highly structured neural ensembles in different regions of the brain. 
… 
Metaphor is a neural phenomenon. What we have referred to as metaphorical mappings 
appear to be realised physically as neural maps. They constitute the neural mechanism that 
naturally, and inevitably, recruits sensory-motor inference for use in abstract 
thought.’ (Lakoff, Johnson 2003: 255-258)  
Thus, they have put the embodiment thesis of conceptual metaphor more concretely and 
precisely in human neural system, mainly the brain. Elsewhere, Lakoff (2008b: 18) has stated 
more explicitly, making the brain centrally important. ‘Every action our body performs is 
controlled by our brains, and every input from the external world is made sense of by our 
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brains. We think with our brains. There is no other choice. Thought is physical. Ideas and the 
concepts that make them up are physically “computed” by brain structures. Reasoning is the 
activation of certain neuronal groups in the brain given prior activation of other neuronal 
groups. Everything we know, we know by virtue of our brains. Our physical brains make 
possible our concepts and ideas; everything we can possibly think is made possible and 
greatly limited by the nature of our brains.’ 
Lakoff also explained, in this line of reasoning, what the shaping of brain meant ‘Each 
neuron has connections to between 1,000 and 10,000 other neurons. Between birth and age 
five, roughly half of the neural connections we are born with die off. The ones that are used 
stay; the others die. That is how the brain is shaped, and such a shaping is necessary if the 
brain is to learn to do the huge number of things it does.’ (ibid) 
Furthermore, the neural theory posited that metaphors were not only embodied, but also 
enacted and dynamic. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) wrote, 
‘We will use the term enactment for dynamic brain functions shared both during perceiving 
and acting and during imagining. An enactment, real or imaginative, is dynamic, that is, it 
occurs in real time. 
… 
Fixed concepts are neural information structures called neural parameterzations that can 
guide imaginative enactments when activated. Conceptual metaphors, at the neural level, link 
source domain parameterizations to target domain parameterizations. By this means we can 
carry out metaphorical enactments—forms of imagination in which abstract reasoning is 
governed by sensory-motor enactments unfolding in real time and in real contexts. 
Multiple enactments are always being carried out by the brain, and single enactments can be 
guided by multiple parameterizations. Consequently, target domain enactments can be 
governed by multiple metaphors. This explains why there are complex metaphorical 
sentences like I’ve fallen in love, but we seem to be going in different directions. Here a 
number of metaphors structure the enactment: Lack of Control Is Down, as with “fall”; States 
Are Locations, as with “in love”; Changes Are Motions, as when falling in love is 
characterized as a change to a new state; and Love Is A Journey, as when lovers may be 
“going in different directions.” 
… 
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In Narayanan’s model (1997), parameterization gives rise to what we will call structural 
inferences, which characterize static inferential structure. Enactment inferences arise, on the 
other hand, only in the unfolding of a dynamic process. 
… 
The enacted inferences are embodied; as such, they are carried out in the source domain. 
Their effects are mapped to the target domain and hence to the discourse space.’ (ibid: 
258-261) 
Drawing on the critical concept of ‘mirror neurons,’ Lakoff (2008b: 19) also wrote, 
'Simulation semantics is based on a simple observation of Feldman’s: if you cannot imagine 
someone picking up a glass, you can’t understand the meaning of “Someone picked up a 
glass.” Feldman argues that, for meanings of physical concepts, meaning is mental 
simulation, that is, the activation of the neurons needed to imagine perceiving or performing 
an action. One thing we know is that not all imagination or memory is conscious, and so not 
all mental simulations are. That is why we typically have no conscious awareness of most 
such simulations.’ 
The embodied and enacted metaphors were also used by QSers in their blog discourses. This 
is because, arguably, in order to make sense of, or meaning out of, their daily experiences 
interacting with the digital devices and cyberspace, whose operations were mostly abstract 
entities that required imaginative thinking to understand, they had to make use of their 
embodied, though unconscious, simulations from previously basic and nonverbal 
experiences, already packaged as neural parameterzations (i.e. the neurons that wired 
together because they had repeatedly fired together under certain circumstances). That is, the 
digital subjects must have stimulated and activated the QSers’ multiple neural 
parameterzations, both enabling and constraining the QSers’ reasoning and sense-making 
activities. The following are a few concordance line examples from some of the more 
prototypical texts from my QS blog corpus. The italics are the lexical units whose 
metaphoricity potentials can be activated or construed by a metaphor analyst.  
From 012_05_2: 
1. Splunk to track data from devices including a Fitbit, a Nike Fuelband, a Basis Band, and  
2. every time I save a new measurement Splunk automatically reads and indexes the 
3. Step 3: Indexing the CSVs  In Splunk I navigated to: “Settings” > “Data Inputs” > “Fil 
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4. index data from a file or directory this Splunk instance can access”. 
5. a number of tracking devices and I use Splunk to analyse the data they produce. 
From 022_10_3: 
1. *Then I cd into the mmal directory and run the sleeplogger.py script  32
2. Then I brought my Macbook in and started an SSH session into the 
3. briefly ran into a problem: whenever I launched raspistill it would hang. 
4.  I hooked everything up:  Here is my finished Arduino sketch, which tells the Arduino to 
5. that it is very easy to get the Arduino to send values to the Pi via a 
6. I had most of these components already laying around from other projects 
From 033_17_1: 
1. Run this app on your tessel and send yourself a text message. 
2. it’s been more than 5 minutes we call the sendText function we wrote earlier to notify you 
3. wrapping this code in a function called sendText(). If you’ve worked with the Twilio 
4. we’ve tested our app let’s use the tessel push command to push our app into Tessel’s  
5. We successfully used the  Tessel to enter the world of #DogHacking. What’s next? 
6. position of the x-axis on our accelerometer. We’re trimming this position to 1 decimal 
From 050_23_3: 
1. I am Twitter addict, my Twitter account, @zzap, also tweets my daily Fitbit steps. 
2.  a Fitbit One and loving it, when the Fitbit Flex came out I decided to upgrade to 
3. decided to upgrade to that and retire my Fitbit One. 
4. smart tech and crowd-funding solutions like Kickstarter, pet oriented life tracking is 
5. This device, similar to a Fitbit solution, concentrates on tracking the pets activ 
From 056_28_1: 
1. H7 heart rate monitor paired with the SweetBeat HRV app on my iPhone, along with my 
2. Heart Rate Variability uses a technique in whic 
3. an inverse relationship between heart rate and HRV, which makes sense 
These potential metaphorical units, mainly verbs and nouns but also prepositions, indicate 
how previously basic or primary human nonverbal experiences, such as manipulating objects, 
moving in a physical space and interacting with other humans in different ways, already 
 I include an outlier here, because cd into is, roughly speaking, not a metaphor mapping from basic nonverbal 32
experience only. It is mainly a direct borrowing from the computer command line, however, into sill points to a 
basic spatial or container metaphor, that is, DATABASE/CYBERSPACE IS A CONTAINER/PHYSICAL SPACE, but 
entering it takes new, disembodied ways. In other words, it is a mixed space.
96
packaged as neural parameterisations, could be recruited to help the QSers apprehend novel 
experiences and construct self-conscious meanings from them. Personification of the digital 
subjects is a classic trope, making them more familiar and easier to describe and comprehend. 
(Admittedly, some of these cyberspace metaphors are already conventionalised for the Web 
users after a few of generations. Technically, we are now already in the 5th generation of 
mobile communication technologies.) 
3.1.2 Five steps to identify conceptual metaphor 
However, the Dutch cognitive linguist Gerard Steen (1995) rightly pointed out that Lakoff 
and his colleagues did not spell out how they have arrived at the conceptual metaphors from 
the linguistic ones. So he took the CMT, did a reverse engineering to it and has invented a 
systematic and relatively constrained method that can go from linguistic to conceptual 
metaphors in five steps. In developing this method Steen has mainly borrowed from an 
American cognitive psychologist George A Miller’s (1993) classification of metaphors. Since 
my research direction is from tracing the QS discourse (linguistic expressions) to the 
conceptual schemas embedded in the Quantified Self, this method will be helpful. 
The first of Steen’s five steps to identify a conceptual metaphor in discourse is to identify the 
nonliteral part, called the focus, in a sentence. For example, in the sentence ‘The mermaids 
ride on the waves,’ the predicate ride on does not have any literal referent, while the two 
arguments it takes, the mermaids and the waves, do. Therefore, ride on is the focus. The 
second step is to construct a proposition of the metaphor, including a predicate and its 
arguments (the literal and nonliteral parts). The third step is to rewrite the metaphorical 
proposition according to the metaphorical rewrite rules, which Steen borrowed from Miller, 
for nominal, verbal and sentential metaphors, respectively. After the reconstruction, the 
conceptual comparisons between the target and source domains underlying the metaphors are 
revealed. For notation, Steen uses function F(x) to represents the target domain and function 
G(y) to represent the source domain. Here are the first three steps in summary: 
(1) Metaphor focus identification: find out the nonliteral part (focus) in a sentence; 
(2) Metaphorical idea identification: construct a proposition of the metaphor, 
including a predicate and its arguments (the literal and nonliteral parts); 
(3) Nonliteral comparison identification: rewrite the metaphorical proposition 
according to respective metaphorical rewrite rules, i.e. M1 (for nominal), M2 (for 
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verbal), M3 (for sentential), in order to reconstruct the conceptual comparisons 
underlying the metaphors. 
I reproduce Steen’s (Miller’s) rewrite rules here (Steen 1995: 66-68), 
a. M1. BE (x,y) –> (?F)(?G) {SIM [F(x), G(y)]}  
b. M2. G(x) –> (?F)(?y) {SIM [F(x), G(y)]}  
c. M3. G(y) –> (?F)(?x) {SIM [F(x), G(y)]} 
On the left-hand side of the rules are propositions, which contain the functions and entities 
already known in the sentence. On the right-hand side, the analogy is made explicit, and the 
unknown functions and entities are waiting to be filled in. 
The first three steps of the identification are quite constrained, but the last two steps will 
involve some interpretation, and more so for the last step than for the fourth step. The fourth 
step is to fill in the empty slots, the unknown parts, in the conceptual comparison just 
identified in step three. This often relies on the canonical frames or according to the context. 
The last step is to complete the conceptual mapping between the source and target domains. 
(4) Nonliteral analogy identification: fill in, or solve, the empty slots in the 
comparison formulae, often relying the canonical frames or according to the context 
(e.g. PERFORM (y, y’) could be filled in as PERFORM (poor, duties), PERFORM 
(actors, roles), or both (a pun).) 
(5) Nonliteral mapping identification: complete the conceptual mapping between 
source and target domains. 
Below, I take an example sentence from Steen (1995) and identify the conceptual metaphor in 
it following his ‘Five Steps.’ 
Sentence: I have seen the mermaids riding seawards on the waves (T.S. Eliot, The love song 
of J. Alfred Prufrock) 
(1) Nonliteral: mermaids RIDING ON waves 
(2) Proposition: RIDE ON (mermaids, waves) 
(3) Comparison reconstruction: 
RIDE ON (mermaids, waves) –> (?F) (?y, y’) {SIM [F(mermaids, waves), RIDE ON 
(y, y’)]} 
(4) Completing analogy: 
SIM [FLOAT(mermaids, waves), RIDE ON (people, horsebacks)]  
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(5) Completing conceptual mapping: 
THE MERMAIDS-AS-PEOPLE MAPPING: 
Figure: 
The mermaids correspond to people. 
Ground: 
The waves correspond to horsebacks. 
The rises and falls of the waves correspond to those of the horsebacks. 
The mermaids’ movement toward a direction in the sea correspond to the people’s 
movement on the road. 
As you can see in Step 4, I have chosen to fill in the source domain function as RIDE ON 
(people, horsebacks) according to my own interpretation and the context, or background (c.f. 
Searle 1983). I have made such a decision because the source domain should be rooted in 
everyday human experience and close to the human body. Typically, a human rides on a horse 
or horseback (to be more specific), hence the solution. Of course, a human can ride on a 
donkey, a buffalo or other animals, but they are not so typical, as far as I am concerned. An 
analyst hailing from a donkey-riding region may differ. Thus, I have explained and 
demonstrated the use of Steen’s analytical method. 
3.2 Applications of method 
In this section, I will demonstrate my applications of Steen’s five-step method to identify the 
conceptual metaphors in the QS discourse. These identifications are preliminary and are by 
no means systematic, so they will likely be modified, updated or discarded later. But for now, 
they serve the purpose of illustration well. 
3.2.1 Individual metaphor snapshots 
First, in this section I demonstrate how Steen’s metaphor identification procedure can be 
applied to taking snapshots of individual linguistic metaphors in discrete clauses from the QS 
blog texts, and establishing the source-target domains conceptual mappings therein. In the 
next section of 3.2.2, I will discuss a more dynamic view of activation and transformation of 
connected metaphors in QS blogs. 
The following demonstration clauses of a, b, c are taken from Stanke (2014, online) 
a. Where My 90 Hours of Mobile Phone Screen Time In September Went 
(1) Nonliteral: time WENT somewhere 
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(2) Proposition: GO (time, somewhere) 
(3) Comparison reconstruction:  
GO (time, somewhere) –> (?F) (?y, y’) {SIM [F(time, somewhere), GO(y, y’)]} 
(4) Completing analogy: 
SIM [BE SPENT IN(time, somewhere),  GO(person, somewhere)] 
(5) Completing conceptual mapping: 
THE TIME-AS-PERSON MAPPING: 
Figure:  
The time corresponds to the person. 
Ground:  
The (virtual) place where an activity happens corresponds to the destination the 
person goes to. 
The spending of the time corresponds to the movement of the person in space. 
This is a headline from a blog piece on using the app Trackerfy to measure the blogger’s time 
use on a Samsung Note 3 pad over the period of a month. The identification here shows 
clearly that the linguistic expression links to one or two of the conceptual metaphors of time, 
i.e. TIME IS A PERSON or TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT IN SPACE. 
b. 90 hours is a ton of time to be staring at a 6-inch screen. 
(1) Nonliteral: a TON of time –> time is a TON 
(2) Proposition: BE (time, ton) 
(3) Comparison reconstruction:  
BE (time, ton) –> (?F) (?G) {SIM [F(time), G(ton)]} 
(4) Completing analogy: 
SIM [LASTS LONG (time), WEIGHS HEAVY (ton)] 
(5) Completing conceptual mapping: 
THE TIME-AS-TON MAPPING: 
Figure: 
The time corresponds to the ton (a metric unit standing in for a heavy substance). 
Ground: 
The duration of the time corresponds to the weight of the ton. 
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The (psychological, economic) value of the time corresponds to the (physical, 
measurement) value of the ton. 
This expression belongs to another time metaphor, that is, TIME IS SUBSTANCE, and, perhaps, 
a very valuable (as suggested by its heaviness) substance, such as gold. Since for a long time 
in history, gold is equivalent to money, through the linking principle (Lakoff 1987: 12-57), 
the expression can also belong to the category TIME IS MONEY.  
There are more expressions from the same weblog (Stanke 2014, online) that represent, 
perhaps more typically, the concept TIME IS MONEY, and I list them below: 
1. No way am I spending that much time using my Samsung Note 3. 
2. I spent just a tad under 90 hours using my mobile device in September. 
3. I spent 32 hours watching streaming video on my device. 
4. I spent just under two hours using my device for gaming 
5. I only spent 40 minutes all month online shopping using the Amazon app. 
6. I spent the same amount of time (40 minutes) managing my fantasy football team. 
7. I spent almost two hours checking weather forecasts. 
8. Five and a half hours cruising Facebook is the biggest waste of time ever. 
9. No value and disappointed it got to #6 on the top ten list. 
As we can see, the verb spend is the predominant predicate-structure here, but the nouns 
waste and value in the last two items also make obvious connections to the metaphor TIME IS 
MONEY. 
c. I used an app called "Trackerfy" that basically sits in the background and tallies up 
the different apps you use and for how long. 
(1) Nonliteral: Trackerfy TALLIES UP apps 
(2) Proposition: TALLY UP (Trackerfy, apps) 
(3) Comparison reconstruction: 
TALLY UP (Trackerfy, apps) –> (?F) (?y, y’) {SIM [F(Trackerfy, apps), TALLY UP 
(y, y’)]} 
(4) Completing analogy: 
SIM [RECORD ACTIVITY OF (Trackerfy, apps), TALLY UP (person, numbers)] 
(5) Completing conceptual mapping: 
THE TRACKERFY-AS-PERSON MAPPING: 
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Figure: 
Trackerfy corresponds to the person. 
Ground: 
Trackerfy’s recording corresponds to the person’s writing down (the numbers). 
The multiple apps correspond to the many numbers (on a bill, a scorecard, a voting 
record, etc). 
The duration of an active app corresponds to the value of a number. 
The addition (a mechanic function) of the apps’ active durations corresponds to the 
addition (a cognitive function) of the numbers’ values. 
Not only Trackerfy is a person, but there are more apps that are personified in the QS 
discourse from another source (Anderson, R. J. 2014, online). APPS ARE PEOPLE, or even 
FRIENDS. 
1. The Trackerfy app doesn't lie. 
2. Communication apps such as Hangouts, Gmail, and the Phone made up 18 hours 
of time. 
3. Sleep Cycle doesn’t help me get out of bed, which is a problem, but I think it’s me, 
more than the app. 
4. Before going with Fitbit, Moves did serve as a great pedometer, but now that 
feature is quadruply redundant between the Fitbit app, MyFitnessPal, DayOne for 
iPhone, and Reporter app tracking my steps. 
5. As it stands, Moves is just one more thing sucking up battery. 
6. Mint is actually very helpful, especially since I’ll be renting an apartment again 
and need to keep a closer eye on my finances. 
As Steen (1995: 59) has suggested, after the identification, there could be another, the sixth, 
step, that is, to compare and connect the conceptual metaphors found out individually to form 
a coherent, systematic metaphor network. In the network, we can further identify some 
patterns, such as that which metaphors are predominant (or have been used, or referred to, 
more frequently than others) in the system, and that different self-trackers may have shared 
some metaphors at different levels of the metaphor hierarchy, e.g. whether at a higher level of 
TIME IS SUBSTANCE or in its sub-category TIME IS MONEY. 
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The entailment of this is I need the assistance of a QS discourse corpus, which will help 
indicate the frequencies of use of each conceptual metaphor in the overall QS discourse. 
Since there was none, I built such a corpus by myself, and I used a method to sample a 
representative text from the corpus for close reading, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
3.2.2 Dynamic metaphor activation, transformation 
All of the QSers I have analysed in my corpus did self-tracking for lifestyle purposes, rather 
than being prescribed by a doctor to do self-monitoring for curing a disease. Nevertheless, 
personal change for a better, more ideal, balanced and efficient lifestyle, or life-optimisation, 
is still a major theme, such as weight loss. In a blog entry, titled Quantified Self: 3 Months 
Later (File 002_01_2), an avid QSer reported what they did to shed over 15 pounds in three 
months and how they felt. 
Theoretically, a change in physical states can lead to a change in mental states. Losing weight 
in itself may change how people use language to describe themselves and their experiences. 
Also, in a top-down neural activation fashion, some of the QSers may use language and 
metaphors to help them shape up, priming themselves in such a way so that they can imagine 
a fitter physical state and pay closer attention to bodily functions and feelings. In other words, 
physical changes may correspond to dynamic metaphor transformations, coming from both 
bottom-up and top-down neural activations. 
Therefore, in this section, I briefly demonstrate tracing through the dynamic metaphor 
transformations made by a fitness QSer in a medium-length show-and-tell blog (1194 words). 
Compared with the methods to be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, this demonstration applied a 
relatively simplistic method, by mainly concordancing the keywords of me, myself, my, self 
and I (yielding 113 concordances in AntConc) and identifying the metaphors used in their co-
texts. To set up the scene, I first present below the opening paragraphs of the blog, which 
QSer wrote enthusiastically. 
‘At the beginning of July, I began my experiment with the quantified self, and three months 
later, I’m happy to report: This. Shit. Works. Metrics on physical activity, eating, and sleeping 
have helped me make better decisions and develop new healthy habits that I can sustain going 
forward. In other words, my data is helping to change my default behaviors. I surpassed my 
goal of losing 15 pounds in 3 months, and I did it without going paleo or committing to an 
exercise regimen designed to make me puke. 
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I devised just three simple rules that I could follow every day without feeling to[sic] 
constrained: 
Burn more calories each day than you consume. 
Get at least 10,000 steps with Jawbone UP every day. 
Weigh in before breakfast every day.’ 
The rest of the blog text was divided into five sections, namely ‘Pick a KPI,’ “Many Paths to 
Success,’ ‘Spend Your Resources Wisely,’ ‘Combine Short-Term and Long-Term 
Goals,’ ‘What’s Next?’ I make a selective list of concordance lines below, following the 
textual staging order. The italics are potentially metaphorical lexical units, and my construals 
of their corresponding conceptual metaphors and source domain inferences are in the squared 
brackets trailing behind the concordance lines. 
Pick a KPI 
1. I was looking for a way to lose weight and keep it off.  
[WEIGHT IS AN INVADER TO WELLBEING. Losing weight for the QSer three months before 
was framed as competition or fight. Given that body weight is also a metonymy for the 
QSer’s bodily self, they did not seem to be happy with their self-image in the 
consciousness.] 
2. With the combination of hardware and software from RunKeeper, Jawbone, WiThings, 
and MyFitnessPal, I had data on every relevant metric 
[DIGITAL SUBJECTS ARE BOXING MOVES. This is a sport metaphor. Since the QSer was 
ready to go into a fight, they needed some effective moves and techniques as their 
weapons.] 
3. I picked my KPI: calories. 
[CALORIES ARE OPPONENT IN WAR ON WEIGHT. In order to be effective and efficient, the 
QSer chose to focus on a targeted opponent.] 
4. your body will turn to its other reserves (namely, fat) for energy. This leads to weight 
loss. 
[BODY IS AN ARMY. WEIGHT IS ENEMY. These are related war metaphors, and the QSer 
was imagining a (straightforward, linear) success, winning against their negative self-
image.] 
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5. The amount of daily exercise and the dietary mix was entirely my decision. 
[QSER IS A COMMANDER. In order to help them make progress, the QSer also created a 
positive self-image of being in control and resolute.]  
6. Every morning before breakfast I weighed in on the WiThings Smart Body Analyzer 
[QSER IS A BOXER/FIGHTER. The QSer performed a boxing ritual every morning, perhaps 
boosting their morale in order to persevere. The ritual was also precise and involved 
money or other resources.]  
Many Paths to Success 
1. I started looking for ways to insert more steps in my day, and there were plenty. 
[TIME IS PLACE TO BE CONQUERED. The QSer needs to conquer every day on the way to 
their triumph over weight. It took some effort to arrange daily physical activities.] 
2. As an optimizer, I’ve historically looked for ways to minimize travel time. 
[QSER IS A RESOLUTE CONQUERER. Both optimiser and minimize implied absoluteness in 
will, hence determination (in Latin, optimus means the best, and minimus means the 
least.)] 
3. Now I optimize for steps. 
[Demonstrating resolution again.] 
4. The UP platform pits you against yourself, much the way HubSpot does, constantly 
challenging you to improve. 
[ME AND MYSELF ARE ENCLOSED ANIMALS FIGHTING EACH OTHER. The QS apps and 
platforms not only help the QSer to change, but also add pressure on them, making the 
transformation an imperative: You must be fit !] 
5. ‘What’s the highest number of steps I can fit in a single day?’ (So far, it’s 37,416.) 
[TIME IS SOCIAL SPACE THAT HAS STRICT REQUIREMENTS. More pressure.] 
6. The UP app became my central hub for quantification, so much so that I redesigned the 
app. 
[APP IS A WHEEL OF A MILITARY VEHICLE TO HELP QSER CONQUER WEIGHT. App also 
gravitates QSer's attention towards the metrics.] 
Spend Your Resources Wisely 
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1. Learning how many calories were in different meals and foods had a strong impact on my 
eating and exercise habits. 
[KNOWLEDGE IS FORCE/POWER.] 
2. Constant awareness of my calorie intake also impacted my exercise. 
[KNOWLEDGE IS FORCE/POWER.] 
3. Beer was something to be earned, not guaranteed. 
[CONSUMPTION IS LABOUR. There is no welfare, so be a prosumer.] 
4. There were nights when I had to say no to a drink because I wanted the good weigh in the 
next morning. 
[FITNESS IS SELF-DISCIPLINE.] 
Combine Short-Term and Long-Term Goals 
1. This gave me a reason to get off my ass and run more. 
[SITTING IS A GUILT.] 
2. I spent $20 to upgrade my RunKeeper account to Elite status so I could get more data 
analysis. 
[QSER IS A MACHINE. As the QSer made progress, their self-image also started to 
improve, replacing the old image with new, higher-status-signifying components — 
hyperbole.] 
3. I know some people go running for the solitude and the mental break, but for the past 
three months I’ve relied heavily on the company of RunKeeper. 
[APP IS A FRIEND, so long as the QSer kept working hard. No pain no gain.]  
4. I even put Murray on RunKeeper so I could tag him on walks I took him on. 
[QSER'S FRIEND IS ALSO A QSER. This is one of the ways how the QS culture was 
activated and propagated through the infosphere’s cognitive nonconscious.] 
What’s Next? 
1. The quantification of my health has allowed me to take control of my health in ways I 
previously couldn’t. 
[QUANTIFICATION IS KIND AND HELPFUL. After the successful weight loss, the QSer had a 
positive self-image. Before, it was negative.] 
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2. since I get daily feedback on my weight, body fat, and heart rate. 
[QSER IS A SMOOTH-RUNNING MACHINE. The apps helped improve the human as a 
machine.] 
3. I’ve been able to ween myself off some of the measurement routine without impacting the 
results. 
[APPS ARE PARENTS. The QSer was like an infant who needed help three months before, 
but grew up quickly with the help of self-monitoring. The weight problem was no longer 
a forceful threat now.] 
4. I’ve developed enough of a sense of “good foods” and “bad foods” that I trust myself not 
to have to take pictures of every bar code in my refrigerator anymore. 
[INTUITION IS AN ORGANISM. It grows. The apps provided assistance for growth, but they 
were also stressful, as the metaphors in the previous sections indicated.] 
5. Eating what I normally eat and walking 12,000 steps a day generally helps me stay at an 
even weight. 
[WEIGHT IS BALANCE. The QSer’s body has recovered balance, so did their mind. The 
weight was no longer an enemy now.] 
6. This summer, I ate plenty of pizza and drank plenty of beer. I had lazy Sundays on the 
couch. 
[COMFORT IS POSSESSION. Compared with three months before when they had to conquer 
almost every day because they were in a battle, now they were more relaxed in mind, as 
they did not need to fight any more, but had won and and owned the days.] 
7. However, some critical tweaks to my routine have enabled a sustainable lifestyle change. 
[QSER IS A FINE, FLEXIBLE, COMPETENT MACHINE. Now that the QSer was in a much 
more ideal physical state, they were also psychologically more positive than before, 
feeling capable.]  
8. I’m now focusing on reducing my body fat percentage. 
[This is probably much less metaphorical than the expression used initially, keep it off. 
Hence no worries or invasion anymore, though the weight loss project went on.]  
9. This winter may have fewer steps, but more burpees (ugh). 
[EXERCISES ARE CHALLENGING BUT DESIRABLE OBJECTS. Staying positive.] 
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By tracing the metaphors through the blog text and analysing their enactive source domain 
inferences, I have demonstrated how the use of metaphors has transformed dynamically 
alongside the changes in a QSer’s reported physical states. At first, the QSer reported that 
they did not have an ideal body weight, and their use of metaphors revealed that, at least 
during the recall, they were threatened, stressful, effortful, like being in combat and being 
restricted. But they were also determined to win the fight, with the helpful QS devices. The 
quantification devices also gave them pressure to make fast progress. So after three months, 
the QSer claimed that they lost over 15 pounds. They were turned into a new, competent 
machine, being in control, in comfort and secure. Overall, the QSer’s consciousness, 
cognitive nonconscious and the digital devices and environments together mutually shaped 
the dynamics of metaphor activation, transformation as well as the development of QSer’s 
self-narrative. 
3.3 Discussion and summary 
Metaphors play a significant part in constructing the idealised roles the QSers play in the 
process of cultivating their new selves. They also facilitate the blend-in of new cognitive 
frames so that an increasing number of people are becoming identified with the movement 
and participating in self-tracking activities and show-and-tells. Although the metaphors are 
dispersed in different communication channels and modes, such as verbal, visual, auditory 
and tactile, they can be identified and regrouped systematically using a cognitively-informed 
critical discourse analysis methodology. However, the research I present in my thesis is just 
textual instead of multimodal, which will be interesting venues to explore in future work. 
Moreover, it is obvious that the methods I have chosen necessarily involve an analyst’ 
subjective interpretations to various degrees, so it entails doing reflections by myself. 
Nonetheless, I argue that a methodic analysis of the QS discourse carried out in such a 
fashion is sound and valid, because it is theoretically informed and disciplined. If any other 
analyst comes to dispute with my analysis, they can always check the method(s) and point 
out where in which step or section they disagree. And we can agree to disagree. 
In empirical science, one scientist’s experiment necessarily awaits another’s results to 
validate, applying the same universal and rigid conventions, such as the periodic table and 
metrological systems, as discussed in Section 2.2 above. Replicability is critical. However, I 
take a less positivist approach towards text analysis, and metaphor analysis in particular, for 
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social sciences and humanities, because of the background issue (Searle 1983) and 
indeterminacy nature of most metaphors’ meanings (Ritchie 2006: 48) . No two people hold 33
the same background; the conventions in social sciences and humanities are always contested 
(or contestable) and negotiated, for example, the grammars. So even applying the same 
method to the same text, two interpreters can arrive at two different conclusions. Admittedly, 
the inter-rater reliability procedure offers some help and allows room for negotiation, but 
therein lies a further problem of mind shaping (Zawidzki 2008).  
When two coders discuss and negotiate their metaphor identification results, for instance, 
they also shape each other’s mind through their own implicit, habitual expectations and 
reactions to the other’s linguistic and non-verbal behaviours. So it cannot be a completely 
objective process, and we may not even know what factors influence its objectivity. Thus, the 
problem with an additional inter-coder reliability test is twofold: First, it aims to eliminate 
uncertainties from a process where indeterminacy is the natural order of things. Second, 
aiming at this target, it uses a not-so-objective method. 
When the French rationalist Descartes used radical scepticism to doubt everything except for 
the doubt itself, he demonstrated a high level of insecurity and a desire for extreme certainty. 
When we follow his steps to eliminate uncertainties from the natural order of things, we can 
easily fall into the trap of the excess of reason. On the contrary, the empiricists and cognitive 
scientists know, through experiments and probability theory, that both our social and natural 
worlds are fraught with randomness that cannot be avoided. Its common sense explanation is 
chance or luck. 
As Foucault (1983a) forcefully argued, philosophers since Kant have taken on the role to 
‘prevent reason from going beyond the limits of what is given in experience; but from the 
same moment–that is, since the development of the modern state and the political 
management of society–the role of philosophy is also to keep watch over the excessive 
powers of political rationality. Which is a rather high expectation.’ 
 ‘As Vervaeke and Kennedy suggest, a novel metaphor ‘may be interpreted very differently by different 33
audiences’ (1996, 283); I would suggest that most metaphors, including many of the most familiar, are subject to 
this indeterminacy (see Keysar and Bly, 1999). When a term such as ‘attack’, ‘defend’, or ‘strategy’ appears in a 
discussion of an argument, we cannot be sure whether any particular person will associate the term with chess, 
boxing, or all-out war – or with nothing beyond an abstract concept. How any particular speaker intends a 
metaphor to be interpreted, and how any particular hearer does interpret the metaphor, can never be absolutely 
determined. Knowing the communicative context helps, but even then, it is difficult to know which aspects of 
the context are salient to the hearer – or to the speaker.’  
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4. Data collection: Corpus-assisted identification of prototypical QS blogs 
I needed to identify some representative, or prototypical QS blogs from my corpus to study. 
Therefore, this empirical chapter details the steps and measures I have taken to build a corpus 
of QS blogs and how to systematically identify the prototypical texts in the corpus. 
4.1. Sampling methods 
Since I made my argument based on linguistic evidence, I needed some representative, or 
prototypical, QS texts to analyse. This involved sampling methods. 
4.1.1 Theoretical sampling 
Generally, I used two kinds of sampling method for choosing the QS texts to analyse. First, I 
relied on theoretical sampling – a widely used sampling method for qualitative research, 
originated in grounded theory in ethnography – to collect the primary data on the Web for 
constructing a QS corpus. Since the emphasis of theoretical sampling was on conceptual 
development and saturation rather than data completion (Corbin, Strauss 2007, chapter 7) it 
allowed me to build the QS corpus through iterations, rather than completing it at once. 
Without having a hypothesis before analysing the data, each iteration would help develop and 
modify my model of what conceptual metaphors the QSers use in understanding their selves. 
The current chapter deals with the data collected in the first iteration. 
4.1.2 Prototypical sampling 
Second, to avoid cherry-picking and to be more systematic, I used a sampling method called 
‘prototypical sampling’ based on keywords to choose a few representative texts from a corpus 
of QS blog entries. This sampling method was proposed by Anthony and Baker (2015), and 
reified in the corpus analytics ProtAnt. I used ProtAnt in my research to generate keywords 
lists for the entire corpus and identify prototypical QS blogs that contained the most 
keywords. 
This sampling method was statistically rigorous and more quantitative and objective than 
theoretical sampling. Thus, I combined both qualitative and quantitative sampling methods in 
my study. 
4.2 Corpus construction 
Since there was no existing corpus of QS discourse, I have constructed one of my own to 
serve as a target corpus. In order to generate a meaningful keywords list, I also needed a 
larger, more general reference corpus, which I have also complied myself. 
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4.2.1 Target corpus 
I have arbitrarily chosen a QS archive maintained by the California-based social enterprise 
QS Labs as the ground zero for my corpus construction. One of the reasons was QS Labs was 
a major campaigner of the QS movement. It organised offline QSer meetups and annual 
conferences in many parts of the world, and maintained a website quantifiedself.com that 
regularly gathered and disseminated QS-related information. 
The QS archive, hosted on tinyletter.com, contained all of the What We're Reading (WWR) 
newsletters the organisation had sent out to its subscribers since 2014. In each issue of the 
WWR, there was a section called Show and Tell, which usually included the hyperlinks to 
two to three pieces of blog articles hosted on other websites, such as WordPress, Tumblr and 
Medium. The Show and Tell briefly summarised these blogs and let the readers explore 
further by themselves. 
These blogs narrated the QSers’ self-tracking experiences, methods and techniques from a 
first-person perspective, such as how to monitor sleep, control weight, avoid getting parking 
tickets, learn a new language and analyse music listening habits. 
Here is some statistics on the archived QS blogs in 2014. Between its first issue in 23 May 
and 20 December, the WWR published 29 issues. After excluding broken links, non-blogs 
and duplicates in these issues, I have extracted 58 Show-and-Tell blog articles from them 
Among the 58 blogs, seven were published on blogging service websites, including 
WordPress, Tumblr and Medium; 38 were published on personal homepages using blogging 
service tools, including WordPress and Blogger. The rest were neither published on a 
dedicated blogging site nor on a personal homepage. They were published on company 
websites (such as software and communications companies' sites), social media platforms for 
sharing of documents and general information (instructables.com, reddit.com), media 
websites (thedailybeast.com, vox.com), a collective rather than individual blog 
(chrisspeed.net), a book promotion website (hackingtheimpossible.com) and a social 
movement campaign website (quantifiedself.com). 
I copied these blogs from the Web and pasted them, respectively, into separate plain text files. 
After cleaning data noise in each text file, such as traces of markup language, blog metadata, 
hyperlinks, footnotes, references and programming code, I got 58 texts with a total of 69,926 
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words (calculated using MS Word). The lengths of individual texts varied between 269 and 
4,112 words, and the median length was 990 words. 
However, not all of the 58 blogs were qualified to be included in the target corpus. Three of 
them were on the topics of illness (such medical diseases as Type-1 diabetes, cystic fibrosis 
and Parkinson’s disease), so they have been excluded. The remaining 55 are all on various 
lifestyle topics, including both work and leisure. 
Furthermore, I have filtered out blogs by the same authors. The criteria was to keep only one 
blog by the author, which was closest to the median blog length. I also arbitrarily decided to 
cut the blogs whose lengths were under 500 words, in order to reduce the gap in number of 
words between the longest and shortest blog entries. 
In the end, my final target corpus consists 40 unique blog entries, one blogger one blog 
article, in plain text format. The corpus size was 52,177 words. This size was not particularly 
large but workable, as this was only the first iteration of my data sampling, and I would be 
able to repeat the above process to collect the QS blogs in 2015 and 2016, if need be. Again, 
the focus here was not on data completion, but using small data through several iterations to 
quickly develop the conceptual model. 
In comparison, the VU Amsterdam Metaphor Corpus (2016), ‘the largest available corpus 
hand-annotated for all metaphorical language use’ by collective effort, had about 190,000 
lexical units, but it was not genre-specific. 
The naming system of the text files in my target corpus was as follows, file number_QS 
newsletter issue number_blog’s position in Show and Tell. For example, the prototypical text 
I had identified had the file name of 016_07_2, meaning that file no. 16 contained the second 
blog in the Show and Tell section in the seventh issue of QS newsletter. 
4.2.2 Reference corpus 
Only a target corpus was not enough for carrying out a corpus-assisted analysis of keywords, 
since comparing absolute word frequencies in a corpus is usually not (statistically) 
meaningful. To make meaningful comparisons, we have to know how a word’s frequency in 
one corpus stands against the same word’s frequency in another corpus, i.e. whether it 
appears more frequently or less frequently in corpus A than in corpus B. Therefore, I needed a 
much larger corpus of general contemporary English to serve as my reference corpus. 
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For this purpose, I have checked the Bank of English, Corpus of Contemporary American 
English (COCA) and Oxford English Corpus, but none of them was suitable, not only 
because they either had expensive paywalls or required applications and approvals to use, but 
also because none of them contained enough blog contents. I needed a reference corpus that 
included substantial blog contents in order to make my target and reference corpora 
comparable with respect to discourse type or genre. 
Therefore, I decided to compile my own reference corpus. I have combined three openly 
available corpora which I downloaded from the Net to build my reference corpus. First, there 
was a Blog Authorship Corpus of over 140 million words, compiled by gathering posts of 
19,320 bloggers on blogger.com in August 2004. The corpus incorporated a total of 681,288 
posts and 144,200,489 words (estimated).  (Schler, Koppel, Argamon, Pennebaker, 2006) It 34
was originally built for the purpose of studying gender and age effects on blogging. This 
blogger corpus was saved in xml format, and it took me some time to find a way to properly 
convert nearly 20,000 xml files in batch into plain texts (because ProtAnt only accepts files in 
txt format). 
Second, I have downloaded the open portion of the American National Corpus (OANC) (first 
release), which, luckily, has txt files readily available. Excluding the spoken part, the written 
parts of the corpus together consisted of 11,406,155 words gathered discretely between 1990 
and 2005 (this time of period was my estimation, because in the written OANC some sub-
corpora were compiled without a gathering date) (American National Corpus Project 2016). 
This corpus did not contain any blog data. 
Third, I used a 2009 version of Crown-CLOB corpus, which combined Crown and CLOB 
corpora using the Brown Corpus sampling frame. The 2009 Crown and CLOB corpora 
contained 1,026,226 and 1,023,466 tokens, respectively, so the total word count for the 
combined Crown-CLOB corpus was 2,049,692. The data were collected between 2008 and 
2011, but the majority of them were dated in 2009. It did not have any blog data, either.  
I also downloaded the British National Corpus (BNC), which was recently opened up for free 
download. However, it was coded in xml format and, after being converted into plain texts, it 
contains too many noisy HTML tags to be useful, unlike the blogger corpus, which contained 
 I used AntConc to calculate its total size.34
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a limited amount of HTML tags after conversion. Also, the BNC was a relatively old (before 
2000), so I did not incorporate it into my reference corpus. 
As for the OANC, excluding the spoken part, the written parts of it together consisted of 
11,406,155 words gathered discretely between 1990 and 2005 (http://www.anc.org/data/oanc/
contents/).  The 2009 Crown and CLOB corpora contained 1,026,226 and 1,023,466 tokens, 35
respectively, so the total word count for the combined Crown-CLOB corpus was 2,049,692. 
The data were collected between 2008 and 2011, but the majority of them were in 2009 (Xu 
and Liang 2013: 175–183). 
In sum, my QS reference corpus included three sub-corpora with files all in plain text format. 
The total word count was 157,656,336, and 91.5 percent of the data were from blog posts. It 
included both American and British English sources, and, possibly, some other varieties of 
English in the blogger sub-corpora. I considered this reference corpus fit for my research 
purpose, because it was blog-skewed and big enough.  36
In sum, my QS reference corpus included three sub-copora with files all in plain text format. 
The total word count was over 153,455,847 words, and over 90 percent of the data were blog 
posts. It included both American and British English sources, and, possibly, some other 
unidentified varieties of English in the blogger sub-copora. I considered this blog-skewed, 
written language reference corpus fit for my research purpose, because my target corpus was 
completely made up of blogs. 
4.3 Identifying prototypical QS blogs using ProtAnt 
PortAnt was a new prototypical text analysis tool first released in April 2015, and I was using 
its 1.2 version released in July 2016. According to Anthony and Baker (2015), prototypicality 
in corpus refers to having ‘the characteristic features of the corpus as a whole.’ In corpus 
linguistics, one of the widely accepted ways to describe a corpus characteristic features is 
using keywords. 
‘Keywords have been commonly used in corpus research as a way of identifying a 
salient set of lexis in one or more corpora, which can then be subject to more 
qualitative, interpretative analyses of collocates and concordance lines.’ (ibid: 278) 
 This period is my estimation, because the written OANC contains some sub-corpora without a gathering date.35
 There is no criteria for the size of a reference corpus. However, a current general corpus is usually over 100 36
million words, e.g. the BNC had 100 million words (http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/corpus/index.xml).
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The software provided “a more principled way of selecting texts for close reading based on a 
ranking of texts in terms of the number of keywords (unusually frequent words in the target 
corpus compared with a reference corpus) they contain” (ibid: 274). 
It thus required an analyst to import their own target and reference corpora in plain text 
format for word-by-word comparisons. After the comparisons, the software ‘generates a 
ranked list of keywords based on statistical significance and effect size, and then orders the 
texts [in the target corpus] by the number of keywords in them’ (ibid: 274). Thus, I used 
ProtAnt in my research to generate a keywords list for the entire QS corpus and identified a 
prototypical QS blog that contained the largest number of keywords. 
My ProtAnt parameters were as follows, keyness: log likelihood (4-term), p-value: 0.05, 
effect size measure: %Diff, normalisation frequency: 500 words, ignore case ticked. The 
%Diff method indicated “the proportion (%) of the difference between the normalised 
frequencies of a word in two corpora” (http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/ll/DIFF_FAQ.pdf). 
In particular, Anthony and Baker (2015 July) said, ‘Texts containing high numbers of key 
words are those that contain more words that characterize the corpus as a whole and thus can 
be considered to be prototypical of the corpus as a whole.’ 
By identifying the prototypical blog texts, I could reduce the amount of my analytical work to 
a manageable level by reading a few number of blog articles that could represent the whole 
corpus. Meanwhile, relying on statistically rigorously generated keywords, ProtAnt also 
identifies the outlier texts, which contain very few keywords, or not at all. 
4.3.1 Keywords generation 
As mentioned above, keywords served as the key to unlock prototypical texts in a corpus, 
and, specifically, in ProtAnt, keywords meant those words appearing more frequently in the 
target corpus than in the reference corpus. 
There were a few statistical methods for measuring the ‘keyness’ of keywords. A preferred 
method was log likelihood (LL), because it did not presuppose a normal distribution of words 
in natural language (McEnery, Hardie 2012: 51-52; Dunning 1993). However, some corpus 
linguists recently have argued that LL was still not good enough, because it only measured 
confidence level of a difference (corresponding to p-value), but not how large the difference 
was. To measure the size of the difference, corpus experts have recommended measuring the 
effect size of keywords. In other words, it was not enough to know with a certain level of 
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confidence that a word in corpus A was overused compared to corpus B, but also we needed 
to know, or measure, how much the overusage was. For example, a word with high LL value 
and small effect size could mean that we could be highly confident that there was a small 
frequency difference of ‘data’ between the target and reference corpora (Gabrielatos, Marchi, 
2012). In a personal correspondence with Anthony on 1 June 2016, he also advised using an 
effect size measurement against p-value, 
‘You should never rank by p-value. Instead, you should be using an effect size 
measure such as Log Ratio (included in ProtAnt) to reduce the number of words you 
use in your analysis.’ (Anthony, personal correspondence) 
Since I chose to rank the keywords by %Diff values rather than LL values, I did not need to 
set a too conservative p-value. Also, the smaller the p-value, the fewer keywords ProtAnt will 
generate. In my case, this risks omitting the words that had large effect sizes but low LL 
values. 
For example, if I set p-value at 0.0001, everything else remaining the same as the above, then 
I got a list of 671 keywords. If I set p-avlue at 0.00001, everything else being equal, then I 
got 451 keywords. Some keywords disappeared in the second list not because they had a 
smaller effect size, but because their confidence levels were lower than those of some other 
words with the same effect size. For instance, in the former list (p-value=0.0001), sensoria 
had LL: 27.7852424785, %Diff: 539629.142643, while spotify had LL:15.8017724956, 
%Diff: 539629.142643. In the latter list (p-value=0.00001), spotify was omitted. Obviously, it 
was because spotify’s LL value was smaller, despite the fact that both keywords’ effect size 
values were the same and considerable. 
In this case, it was problematic to omit spotify from the keywords list, because first, it had a 
very large effect size, meaning there was a considerable difference in usage, and second, its 
LL value was lower but not insignificant. According to the University Centre for Computer 
Corpus Research on Language (UCREL) at Lancaster University (http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/
llwizard.html), a p-value of 0.0001 corresponds to a critical LL value of 15.13, and spotify’s 
LL value of 15.8017724956 was larger than this, signifying that we could be more than 99.99 
percent sure that there was a difference. 
For this reason, I opted for controlling the p-value at 0.05, that is, I only needed to be 
reasonably confident, but not extremely so. Then I selected four different cut-off thresholds 
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for the keywords list, namely, the top 100, 200, 400 and 800 words. When I set the threshold 
at -1 in ProtAnt, it would give me a full list of keywords. In this case, it yielded a complete 
list of 1,983 keywords measured by %Diff. 
This means that, essentially, I had only one keywords list, but four different versions with 
varying cut-off points on the list. This was different from changing the p-value in order to 
change the lengths of keywords list, because once the p-value was changed, a new list 
containing a different set of keywords got produced. 
4.3.2 Identifying prototypical QS blogs 
Each time I run the ProtAnt, it produces at the same time a keywords list, a list of ranked 
texts (by normalised key types and normalised key tokens) based on how many keywords 
from the list each of them contains, and a list of all the texts with their respective keywords. 
(For example, see Table 1 for ranked texts by normalized key types based on top 100 
keywords list) 
So when I had four lists of top 100, 200, 400 and 800 keywords in target corpus measured by 
%Diff, I also had, in the meantime, four lists of ranked texts (from the most typical to the 
least) based on their respective keywords list. Putting these four lists of ranked texts together 
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TABLE 1: PART OF RANKED TEXTS BY 
NORMALIZED KEY TYPES BASED ON TOP 
100 KEYWORDS LIST
in a table and compare, I have identified a group of texts that are most typical of the corpus 
(Table 2) as well as some outliers (Table 3). 
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TABLE 2: COMPARISONS OF FOUR LISTS OF RANKED TEXTS FOR IDENTIFYING 
PROTOTYPICAL TEXTS
TABLE 3: COMPARISONS OF FOUR LISTS OF RANKED TEXTS FOR IDENTIFYING 
OUTLIER TEXTS
Specifically, I have counted in the top 5 range of Table 2 which texts appeared twice or more 
in the matrix. It turned out that there were eleven such texts, whose file names were 
008_03_3, 012_05_2, 016_07_2, 022_10_3, 033_17_1, 043_21_3, 047_22_4, 050_23_3, 
055_27_1, 056_28_1 and 057_29_1. Also, within the top 5 range, file 016_07_2 appeared 
eight times, the most, followed by 022_10_3 (five times), 056_28_1 (five times), 050_23_3 
(four times), 012_05_2 (three times) and 033_17_1 (three times). Of the rest, each appeared 
up there twice. 
By the same measure, I have identified the outliers appearing twice or more in the bottom 5 
range. These outlier texts were files 023_11_1, 027_14_1, 032_16_2, 037_19_1, 039_20_1, 
041_21_1, 042_21_2, 044_22_1, 048_23_1 and 049_23_2, subtotalling ten blogs. Among the 
outliers, 023_11_1 and 027_14_1 both showed up in the bottom 5 matrix eight times, while 
039_20_1, 041_21_1 and 049_23_2 showed up four times each. 
4.3.3 Keywords in prototypical texts group 
Having identified the prototypical texts, I went on to discover which keywords they 
contained as a group, drawing on the list of files with their respective keywords produced by 
ProtAnt. I have found that this prototypical texts group altogether contained 61 keywords 
from the top 100 keywords, compared with merely seven keywords in the outlier texts group. 
(C.f. Appendix for the top 100 keywords) This should be obvious, because prototypical texts 
in ProtAnt are by definition those that have the higher number of keywords. 
I have further analysed the composition of the 61 keywords in the prototypical group, and the 
results showed that 33 of them, or over half, were brand names, including brands of 
consumer products (apps, hardware and services), such as beeminder, fitbit and echonest, 
trademarks of consumer and office products, such as tessel and splunk, and a business service 
brand, twilio. 
In addition, there were 12 jargons related to statistical, biomedical and computer knowledge 
(such as grs, hrv, raspi and rmssd) and 11 coinages (mostly used for computer programming, 
and an Internet slang, scrobbling). 
4.4 Discussion 
It is both surprising and interesting to find out that the QSers use so many brand names in the 
prototypical blogs. It is perhaps more apparent and easier to understand why the blogs 
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contain many computer and biomedical terms, because quite a few of the self-trackers are 
programmers and they pay attention to their vital signs with the help of QS gadgets. But why 
do brand names figure so prominently here ? 
What’s in a name ? That which we call a Fitbit would by any other name track us as closely, 
be it called MyFitnessPal, RunKeeper or Beddit. 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, QS devices are mostly made from global 
positioning devices, gyroscopes, altimeters and accelerometers, or a combination thereof. So 
why do the QSers not call their devices as what they are, or use a more generic name, such as 
a sensor, a tracker, or a pedometer with wireless connection, to refer to those products ? 
As aforementioned, the evidence showed that many of the brands are of consumer products, 
and even if some products are not strictly for consumption (for example, splunk is usually a 
data analytical service for companies, not for individuals), they have still been re-
appropriated for consumer use in a home or lifestyle context. The mixture of consumer and 
business trademarks in QS discourse may signify a proliferation of technologies from the 
industry into everyday life. It is, therefore, arguable that the QS movement is connected to 
consumerism and consumerist understanding of wellbeing. 
In fact, this is not novel and it corroborates with some previous findings by sociologists on 
alternative therapies and wellbeing as well as on QS. 
A critical study of selected British newspaper reports on the shifting notions of wellbeing 
from 1985 to 2003 indicated, ‘Whereas wellbeing tended to be a term utilised in relation to 
the body politic in the mid-1980s, wellbeing has now emerged as a significant attribute being 
sought through a variety of personal wellbeing practices that often have a consumerist 
character.’ (Sointu, 2005) In other words, whereas (a nation’s) ‘economic wellbeing’ was a 
more probable collocate in the news discourse in the mid-1980s, the term wellbeing became 
increasingly associated with personal health and choosing consumers from the late 1980s and 
early 1990s onward. 
Moreover, Lupton (2013: 27-28) pointed out about the QS, 
‘[W]hen notions of health, wellbeing, and productivity are produced via data drawn from 
self-monitoring, the social determinants of these attributes are hidden. Illness, emotional 
distress, lack of happiness, or lack of “productivity” in the workplace become represented 
primarily as failures of individual self-control or efficiency, and therefore as requiring greater 
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or more effective efforts, including perhaps increased intensity of self-tracking regimens, to 
produce a “better self.” 
The quantified self approach may therefore be viewed as one of many heterogeneous 
strategies and discourses that position the neoliberal self as a responsible citizen, willing and 
able to take care of her or his self-interest and welfare. Foucault’s writings on the practices 
and technologies of the self in neoliberalism are pertinent to understanding the quantified self 
as a particular mode of governing the self.’ 
Therefore, in terms of wellbeing, the QS practice is in line with a ‘personal turn’ since the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, when the responsibility of taking care of the individuals was 
shifted from the state to the consumerist self, and when the interrelated notions of self-
responsibility, self-reflexivity and self-control became established as key frames of reference 
behind the mainstream discourse on wellbeing.  
In this connection, the QS gadgets and apps are considered, to use a Foucauldian term 
(Foucault, 1988), as new technologies of the self, which the self-trackers use to monitor and 
reflect on their everyday life experiences in order to gain more self-knowledge for the 
purpose of improving self-discipline and self-control. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how to use a corpus-assisted approach to systematically 
find out the prototypical QS blogs, combining qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Particularly, I showed how to use ProtAnt, a novel prototypical text analysis tool to generate 
keywords lists and use them as basis for deeper analyses. 
Although some researchers such as Mittelstadt (2013) have already studied lifestyle 
monitoring with mobile devices in a health or clinical context for diagnosis purposes, not 
enough study has been done on the devices’ applications outside of the clinical environment, 
not on their uses for life-optimisation or life-management purposes. 
Therefore, from an applied linguistics perspective, I believe the language of QS, or self-
tracking for life management, is worth more analyses, because, first, it is a very recent form 
of discourse, appearing around 2007 with the start of QS movement in the US and is still 
developing, exhibiting a novel way of discussing the (idealised) self through statistical frame 
(the QS movement’s slogan is ‘self-knowledge through numbers’). The use of statistical 
frame as a rhetorical device in QS also coincides with similar contemporary developments in 
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the popular discourse of economics (e.g. Freakonomics), behavioural psychology (e.g. 
Thinking, Fast and Slow), politics (e.g. Nate Silver’s blog FiveThirtyEight), sports (e.g. 
Moneyball) and ‘big data.’ (Butterworth, 2014) 
Second, from a cognitive linguistics point of view, studying the conceptual metaphors in 
relation to the ideal of wellbeing in QS discourse can throw light on the QSers’ understanding 
of their experiences and perceptions of life in ‘infosphere,’ a space increasingly shaped by 
information and communications technology (ICT) as infrastructure, where its inhabitants’ 
life is always on, always connected, according to information philosopher Floridi (2014, 
chapter 2).  
This is exemplified by the fact that many QS bracelets are designed with and promoted for 
the features of sleep monitoring and water-proofing, so that the users will never have to take 
them off to take a shower and are encouraged to keep them on when sleeping. As some 
surveillance scholars put it, the QSers voluntarily live in constant self-surveillance (Best, 
2010). 
In this regard, studying the conceptual metaphors related to wellbeing in QS discourse 
promises to contribute to our better understanding of life in such a space. 
Therefore, the next empirical chapter will identify and analyse the conceptual metaphors in 
the most prototypical QS blog in my corpus. 
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5. Finding systematicity of metaphors in prototypical QS blog 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have identified several prototypical texts in the corpus of QS blogs, 
so now I am going to thoroughly analyse the most prototypical one, namely, file 016_07_2. It 
is the second Show and Tell blog included in the seventh issue of What We’re Reading 
newsletters. During the prototypicality sampling in the previous chapter, it ranked in the top 5 
range eight out of eight times. The highest record of other more prototypical blogs was only 
four out of eight times in the top 5 ranking. As a result, file 016_07_2 has been chosen for a 
detailed analysis of its metaphors. 
5.2 QS metaphor identification and systematic metaphor analysis 
The QS blog entry 016_07_2 was 629 words long, and its title and subtitle were Using Self 
Monitoring and Data: A Summary of My Quest to Use Self Monitoring and Technology to 
Get Healthy. It was hosted on blogspot.com, dated Tuesday, December 17, 2013. Its section 
headings were, consecutively, Hardware and Beginning Tracking, Refining Tracking and 
Exploring Data Analysis and Visualization, Another Hardware Update, Pulling it Together 
and Data Integration and Analysis. The blogger’s byline was omitted. Its style was typical of 
asynchronous written CMD, as it had many of the features close to formal writing, but also 
omitted the subjects in several sentences, omitted punctuation marks in a few places, had a 
couple of typos (such as presssure and coulple), and did not have a conclusive ending. 
I used two methods for identifying the metaphors in it. First, I used the “Metaphor 
Identification Procedure” (MIP) developed by the Pragglejaz Group (2007: 1-39) to brush 
through the entire text word by word, in order to determine which lexical units were used 
metaphorically. Second, I used an approach recently proposed by Cameron et al (2010) to 
extract a special kind of metaphor clusters, called systematic metaphors, from the linguistic 
metaphors that had been identified using the MIP. This approach was also used by Deignan et 
al (2013: 9) for several case studies of figurative language in a recent book. 
Below, I will detail consecutively how I have applied the MIP and “systematic metaphor 
analysis” (SMA) to the identification of linguistic and conceptual metaphors in blog 
016_07_2. I have to note beforehand, though, that the SMA developed beyond the CMT, as it 
recognised that linguistic metaphors could be motivated by the conceptual metaphors, but 
there were also many other ways from which the linguistic metaphors came into use, 
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including conventionalisation. Meanwhile, not every condition for prompting the metaphor 
use was knowable from discourse data. (see Cameron 2010: 85-88) So Cameron (online) 
proposed that “[a] linguistic metaphor… is a stretch of language that has the potential to be 
interpreted metaphorically” (emphasis is mine). Moreover, if language and culture can be 
considered in terms of complex dynamic systems, then metaphors “are not ‘owned’ by the 
individuals who produce them, but are ‘interindividual’, belonging to both speaker and 
listener” (Morson and Emerson 1990: 129 quoted after Cameron online) and “intrinsically 
connected to the specific context of use.” (ibid) 
So in my case, I was not arguing that the linguistic metaphors I identified were necessarily 
processed metaphorically by the blogger (he might as well not). My arguments about the 
metaphoricity of those words and phrases in the blog were largely based on my identification 
method, interpretation according to the blog’s co-text and my understanding of the QS culture 
(informed by my attendance at several QS meetups in the UK, watching their show-and-tell 
videos online, reading their blogs, meeting the QS Labs people in the US, reading the QS 
literature, including the sociological accounts, media commentaries and a dystopian novel, 
The Circle by Dave Eggers, etc.). Since I was taking a “maximal approach” set forth by the 
Pragglejaz Group (2007: 2), I might have identified more metaphors than the blogger would 
have processed in his mind. 
With the help of Word software, I converted the blog file 016_07_2 from a string of words 
into a comma separated values (CSV) file. Opening the CSV file in Excel gave me a list of 
each and every word in the 629 words document. First, I decided if a word or a collocation 
constitutes a lexical unit. Following the Pragglejaz Group’s maximal principle, I determined 
that most lexical units were made up of single words. Second, I determined the basic meaning 
of each lexical unit,  using a corpus-based learners’ dictionary tool 37
oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com and a corpus-based contemporary English dictionary tool 
en.oxforddictionaries.com. Both Pragglejaz (2007: 15, 17-18) and Deignan (2015: 151-154) 
argued for the use of a learner’s dictionary and taking a corpus approach.  Third, I 38
 A basic contemporary meaning was defined by the Pragglejaz (2007: 3) as “—More concrete [what they 37
evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, feel, smell, and taste]; —Related to bodily action; —More precise (as 
opposed to vague); —Historically older; Basic meanings are not necessarily the most frequent meanings of the 
lexical unit.”
 Deviating somehow from the Pragglejaz, I used an online contemporary English dictionary in addition to a 38
learner’s dictionary, because the learner’s dictionary sometimes did not have a definition that was “basic.” 
124
determined the lexical units’ contextual meanings based on my own reading of the blog and 
understanding. Fourth, I compared the contextual meaning with the basic meaning, and 
judged if the contextual meaning could be considered as being derived from the basic 
meaning. If yes, then the lexical unit was tagged as “metaphorically used.” For instance, in a 
sentence from the blog, 
(1) my blood pressure was elevated 
the metaphoricity of lexical unit elevated was thus determined (Table 4), 
There were a few exceptions that were excluded from the metaphor tagging. The preposition 
to, used after a verb to signal purpose or intention, is metaphorical in a CMT sense (GOAL IS 
DESTINATION), but was arbitrarily omitted from consideration because its such usage was 
too common. When it was not used after a verb, however, its metaphoricity was pondered. 
The articles or determiners, a, an and the, were not taken into account, either. Neither were 
conjunctions. The modal verb can was considered for it signalled human agency and volition, 
and, when coupled with an object in the subject position, could constitute personification. 
There were many instances of personification of the QS gadgets and services in the text. 
Besides, abbreviations were not considered for their metaphoricity, even if they were 
metaphorical in the first place when they were invented and unabbreviated. 
I was the only analyst in this QS metaphor identification, so no inter-rater reliability test was 
carried out. However, two measures were made to enhance reliability. First, I consulted both 
of the online dictionaries for checking the basic meaning of every word. Second, I carried out 
two passes of the analysis, leaving some of the uncertain cases as they were during the first 
pass, rather than rushing to make a judgement. On the following day, I reviewed the results, 
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Lexical unit Contextual 
meaning





 elevated. The level of 
blood pressure 
was increased.
Higher than the 
area around; 
above the level 
of the ground
An increase in 
blood pressure 




TABLE 4: DETERMINING METAPHORICITY OF A LEXICAL UNIT USING MIP
made my judgements and completed all the tagging. The final results of the MIP applied to 
blog file 016_07_2 can be found in Section 5. 
After finding out all of the 166 metaphorically used lexical units in the blog text, I went on to 
analyse the systematicity in these metaphorical units, or linguistic metaphors. “A systematic 
metaphor is not a single metaphor but an emergent grouping of closely connected metaphors” 
(Cameron 2010: 91) It is different from a conceptual metaphor in three ways that it puts 
language as prior to thought, individuals as prior to speech communities, and the specific as 
prior to the more general. But systematic metaphors share with conceptual metaphors the idea 
that connected patterns of metaphors are “important tools in understanding and talking or 
writing” (see ibid: 91). 
In order to differentiate itself from conceptual metaphor analysis (CMA), SMA uses such 
labels as vehicle and topic, similar but not equivalent to target and source domains in CMA. 
Also, in SMA, the metaphors are written in SMALL ITALIC CAPITALS, instead of SMALL 
CAPITALS used in CMA. (Cameron et al 2010: 116-118) 
Carrying out an SMA on the QS blog involved four steps: first, I identified the vehicle of 
each metaphorical unit by referring to its basic meaning identified during the MIP. The entire 
blog was also divided into 73 lines, largely based on clauses, so I knew a unit appeared in 
which clause or context. This helped me better determine the vehicles. Second, after labelling 
all the vehicles, I collected the metaphorical units belonging to the same vehicle groups 
together, respectively. Third, based on my reading of the blog and its staging, I identified five 
key discourse topics, or main themes, of the blog article. I then marked down which 
metaphorical unit belonged to which topic or sub-topic. Fourth, I re-organised the vehicles 
labelled in the second step under their corresponding topic groups, respectively, so the 
systematic metaphors were derived. Then I pulled the same systematic metaphors together in 
a list, which will be presented in Section 5. 
With regard to the third step above, I identified and coded the following five key discourse 
topics: 
1. The QSer’s own health conditions, including blood pressure, weight, sleep, etc 
2. QS devices and services, or QS tools (2T), used to track the body (and activity) data 
(2D), including blood pressure, diet, weight, sleep, steps or activity 
3. How the tools are used for self-tracking 
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4. How the body data are processed with the tools, including integration, analysis and 
visualisation 
5. Other topics outside the blog’s main areas of interest, such as seeing a doctor and the 
blogger’s ideas and thoughts 
These topics were resulted from the fact that the blogger had divided his article into five 
sections, namely Hardware and Beginning Tracking, Refining Tracking and Exploring Data 
Analysis and Visualization, Another Hardware Update, Pulling it Together and Data 
Integration and Analysis. In addition to this staging information, my research interest on the 
QSers, their self-tracking tools and methods and how they process and deal with their body 
data also helped me come up with the six topical categories (including two sub-categories in 
Topic 2). 
5.3 QS metaphor results 
Following the MIP, I determined 596 lexical units out of 629 words in the QS blog 016_07_2, 
and 166 of the lexical units were judged as metaphorically used, or 27.9 percent. In 
comparison, in an analysis of a newspaper article of 676 words using the same method, 
Pragglejaz (2007: 18) identified that 24.6 percent of the lexical units were metaphorically 
used. 
There were also many cases of metonymy and synecdoche, such as using a brand name of QS 
device to stand in for the device itself and using a bodily activity to refer to the data 
generated by the activity. Although interesting, they will be discussed in another essay. 
Based on the above results of MIP, I carried out further systematicity analysis. First, I present 
below the vehicle groupings of the SMA (Table 5). 






CONTAINER into, in, out, within
CONTROL managed
DIRECTION back, from, for, to, into
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DISCOVERY analysis, exploring, figured, key, lose, quest
DIVISION analysis
DOCUMENT reports, charts
FOLLOW tracking, track, tracks
GEOGRAPHY trends
LINES network
LOCATION in, on, by, further, around, over, out, within
LOSE/FIND lose
MONEY invested, account, wealth
PATH from
PHYSICAL ACTION gathering dust, start, started, exporting, run, pulling it together, 
offers, makes, produce, pull, pulls, sync, measures, use, updates, 
update, get, gets, got, based, does. set up, set this up, settled
PLACE site, sites
POSSESSION my, keep, have, share
POWER can, able














Vehicle grouping Metaphor units collected into the grouping
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Then I connected these vehicles to the topics in an Excel sheet, containing the topics, 
metaphors, and their respective lines (see Table 6). 
By comparing and connecting the topics and vehicles, I further put them together in a 
summarised list (see below), without the linguistic metaphors and their co-texts as seen in 
Table 6, thus systematically mapping out which systematic metaphor vehicles were used by 
the blogger in his discussion of each topic. There were in sum six topical categories, each 
containing a various number of vehicles. 
I HEALTH CONDITIONS 
A ARE OBJECTS  
   (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED) 
  (THAT CAN BE FOUND OR LOST) 
                        (THAT CAN BE KEPT IN A PLACE) 
B HAVE DIRECTIONS (SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL) 
TRAVELLING exploring
UP elevated
VOLITION allows, allow, allows for, with
WATER sources
WRITING logging, logs, log, records
WRITTEN TEXT script
TABLE 5: METAPHOR VEHICLE GROUPINGS ACCORDING TO SMA
Vehicle grouping Metaphor units collected into the grouping
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TABLE 6: GATHERING TOGETHER TOPICS, VEHICLES AND METAPHORS USING SMA
C ARE WILD BEASTS THAT ARE HARD TO CONTROL 
D ARE PUZZLES 
E ARE MOVING OBJECTS 
F ARE PRODUCTS 
II QS TOOLS 
A ARE DESTINATIONS 
B ARE OBJECTS 
C ARE VISIBLE OBJECTS 
D ARE OBJECTS OF RATIONALITY 
E ARE OBJECTS (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED) 
F ARE PLACES 
G ARE SOCIAL PLACES 
H ARE PEOPLE 
I ARE WORKERS 
J ARE INTELLIGENT 
K HAVE POWER AND VOLITION 
L CAN BE CONTROLLED 
M SEND SIGNALS OVER LINES 
N ARE CONTAINERS (OF VALUABLE THINGS) 
III BODY DATA 
A ARE WRITTEN TEXTS 
B ARE MOVING OBJECTS 
C ARE OBJECTS 
D ARE OBJECTS (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED) 
E ARE OBJECTS (THAT CAN BE MOVED IN DIRECTIONS) 
F ARE WATER 
G ARE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS 
H ARE MONEY 
I ARE NUMBERS 
IV USING QS TOOLS 
A IS FOLLOWING 
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B IS SEARCHING 
C IS A JOURNEY 
D IS AN OBJECT THAT NEEDS PURIFICATION 
E IS SEEING 
V PROCESSING BODY DATA 
A INVOLVES DIVISION AND COMBINATION 
B INVOLVES SEEING 
C IS A JOURNEY 
VI Other topics: 
A MAKING A DECISION IS SEEING 
B VISITING IS SEEING 
C SERVICES CAN BE POSSESSED 
D IDEAS ARE OBJECTS 
E THINKING IS CALCULATION 
F BODY IS A CONTAINER 
G METHOD IS AN OBJECT 
H INFOSPHERE IS THE SAME AS ANTHROPOSPHERE 
I DIGITAL PRESENTATIONS ARE PEOPLE 
J ENERGY IS AN OBJECT 
5.3 Discussion 
I have presented in Section 5.2 the linguistic and systematic metaphors that I found in the QS 
blog 016_07_2. However, their significance needed further examination, especially with 
regard to the conceptual frames the QSer used for the concepts of self and data. So in Section 
5, I discuss what the data meant by presenting three interesting “metaphor trajectories” in his 
thought,  or thought patterns, that I traced through connecting the linguistic metaphors, using 39
the systematic metaphors as guidance. 
The first trajectory was about the QSer’s self, or more specially, an aspect of his self, his 
health. The QSer conceptualised that his HEALTH CONDITIONS ARE OBJECTS, which was a 
framing probably influenced by his primary care physician, who told him many times to “lose 
weight.” E.g. 
 See Cameron et al 2009: 7ff39
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(2) His advice (previously stated, as well) was, "Lose Weight.” (7)  40
(3) I log my blood [presssure] on FitBit (56) 
Of course, it might also be conventional to think of health as an object. It was consistent with 
the CMT’s finding that people think of abstract ideas in concrete terms, or ABSTRACT IS 
CONCRETE, so that they can be grasped, manipulated or controlled. 
Nevertheless, early in the article, the blogger stated that his experience was that his health 
conditions were not so controllable, and sometimes puzzled him. 
(4)  I’d managed to keep my weight in control (9) 
(HEALTH CONDITIONS ARE WILD BEASTS) 
(5)  I realized self monitoring was key.  (10) 41
(HEALTH CONDITIONS ARE PUZZLES) 
Therefore, the blogger used the help of self-monitoring devices and services and went on a 
journey of discovering the secret to good health. The related systematic metaphors here were 
USING QS TOOLS IS A JOURNEY and IS SEARCHING and PROCESSING BODY DATA INVOLVES SEEING. 
There was also in line with the CMT metaphors, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, GOALS ARE 
DESTINATIONS and KNOWING IS SEEING. E.g. 
(6)  A Summary of My Quest to Use Self Monitoring and Technology to Get Healthy (2) 
(7)  I also started tracking my diet, daily steps, and weight on MyFitnessPal. (25) 
(8)  Did not have an easy way to integrate and visualize the data (36) 
And since this journey was not easy, it required effort, as the systematic metaphor indicated 
USING QS TOOLS IS AN OBJECT THAT NEEDS PURIFICATION. 
(9)  Refining Tracking and Exploring Data Analysis and Visualization (29) 
There were also frames related to production (in an office, factory, building site and etc) or 
productivity, which again suggested that his self-tracking was not for leisure and that good 
health required work and effort to get. For instance, his sleep was regarded as a product 
having “quality,” in contrast to, alternatively and perhaps more commonly, being considered 
as relaxation. 
(10)  These sites all produce some reports and charts. (33) 
(QS TOOLS ARE WORKERS) 
 Numbers in the brackets are line numbers in the blog.40
 That is, key to understanding their health.41
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(11)  The FitBitOne records steps, very active minutes, floors climbed, distance and even 
sleep. (46) 
(BODY DATA ARE WRITTEN TEXTS) 
(12)  I log my diet on MyFitnessPal (55) 
(BODY DATA ARE WRITTEN TEXTS) 
(13)  FitBit with a [coulple] of clicks tracks my sleep duration, quality (58) 
(HEALTH CONDITIONS ARE PRODUCTS) 
(14)  I can set up charts within the spreadsheet that automatically update. (69) 
(QS TOOLS ARE WORKERS) 
The second metaphor trajectory was about his use of the QS tools. Since the management of 
his health was framed as a complex and strenuous project, the self-tracker needed some help. 
In this way, the tools, visible or not, were personified (QS TOOLS ARE PEOPLE) and they were 
often conceptualised as people who were productive, capable, intelligent and supportive (QS 
TOOLS ARE WORKERS, HAVE POWER AND VOLITION and ARE INTELLIGENT). E.g. 
(15)  MyFitnessPal offers a smartphone app and a database of foods. (26) 
(16)  These sites all produce some reports and charts. (33) 
(17)  Was able to set up some projects that (40) 
(18)  allowed me to integrate the data from multiple sources (41) 
(19)  Google Spreadsheets can use an API and Script to pull data from my FitBit account.  42
(63) 
From the discourse data, I could not tell why the blogger thought of the QS tools as friendly, 
helpful and kind, instead of threatening. However, my observation of the QS movement 
suggested that commercial self-tracking products were advertised in this way, foregrounding 
their benefits, while the academics, e.g. those who studied privacy problems, foregrounded 
the risks of such practices, calling them self-surveillance and participatory surveillance (see 
Whitson 2013: 167ff), because the QS tools might as well surreptitiously spy on their users. 
Another alternative trajectory was that the QS tools could be conceived as games (see ibid), 
but here the blogger focused on the work in lieu of fun for his self-monitoring activities. 
Since the QSer recruited those tools to help him manage his health, they must also have been 
considered reliable and trustworthy, so the tools were also put into a frame of rationality, 
 A script or scripting involves human intelligence. However, arguably, “Script” here was a specialised term, so 42
it might be delexicalised and used to refer literally to a series of computing instructions.
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management and control, i.e. QS TOOLS ARE OBJECTS OF RATIONALITY and CAN BE CONTROLLED. 
E.g. 
(20)  It was well reviewed and reasonably priced. (16) 
(21)  Also can sync data to a health and wellness site run by my health insurance company. 
(48) 
They were also treated as containers of money or valuable things, i.e. QS TOOLS ARE 
CONTAINERS (OF VALUABLE THINGS). E.g. 
(22)  I invested in a new pedometer, the FitBitOne. (45) 
(23)  as does FitBit with a premium account. (71) 
This was because the body data that the tools helped the QSer gather, process and store was 
framed as valuable resources (e.g. money). So the third metaphor trajectory I traced in his 
blog was about his conceptualisation of data. 
The QSer used such systematic metaphors as BODY DATA ARE MONEY and TIME. 
(24)  Also can sync data to a health and wellness site run by my health insurance company.  43
(48) 
(25)  and automatically logs my weight and body fat data into my FitBit account.  (53) 44
(26)  but a couple of clicks gets me a wealth of data on weight, calories in and out, sleep, 
steps, activity minutes, body fat, bmi. (68) 
According Hwang and Levy (2015 online), data was nowadays frequently framed as liquid 
(e.g. data streaming), solid (e.g. data mining) or gas (e.g. cloud), so that these metaphorical 
expressions became unmarked in everyday discourse. Similarly, the blogger also thought of 
his own body data as solid object, e.g. 
(27)  how to get my blood pressure data into my Google Spreadsheet automatically (67) 
(BODY DATA ARE OBJECTS (THAT CAN BE POSSESSED)) 
and liquid, e.g. 
(28)  allowed me to integrate the data from multiple sources (41) 
(BODY DATA ARE WATER) 
 Sync, short for synchronise, has a basic meaning of ‘adjust (a clock or watch) to show the same time as 43
another’ – which has been entered in the contemporary English dictionary but not the learner’s. Hence 
DUPLICATING DATA ON DIFFERENT COMPUTERS IS LIKE ADJUSTING TIME ON DIFFERENT WATCHES.
 the first definition of account, a basic meaning, in the learner’s dictionary is ‘an arrangement that somebody 44
has with a bank, etc. to keep money there, take some out, etc,’ hence PUTTING DATA INTO AN ACCOUNT IS LIKE 
PUTTING MONEY INTO A BANK ACCOUNT.
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But he never framed the data as something useless or unwanted, such as “‘data exhaust’ – a 
term sometimes used to describe the metadata that are created in the course of day-to-day 
online lives” (ibid). 
Furthermore, it was ambiguous who really owned the QSer’s data. The blogger used my for 
12 times in collocation with body/health data words such as blood pressure, weight, diet and 
steps, e.g. 
(29) I’m logging my steps and weight on WalkerTracker and MyFitnessPal. (31) 
(30) FitBit automatically tracks my steps, activity minutes, floors (57) 
but it could be argued that the possessive phrases’ meanings were to an extent indeterminate 
(see a discussion of Récanati (2001: 85) in Attardo 2005: 170f), i.e. they could signify the 
data was generated by the blogger or owned by him. From the examples of 29 and 30, I could 
see clearly that both the human or human body and the devices and apps were involved in 
data collection. In other words, although the data was collected during the QSer’s bodily 
activities, the generation, transmission, processing and storage of the data all required the 
work of applications, computers and complex communication networks. 
Again, this tied into Floridi’s proposal to consider that people in the more developed areas 
“are increasingly living onlife,” since “the threshold between here (analogue, carbon-based, 
offline) and there (digital, silicon-based, online) is fast becoming blurred” thanks to the 
proliferation of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in everyday life. (see 
Floridi 2014: 43ff). 
There was linguistic evidence of metaphors in the QS blog studied here to support such a 
claim, i.e. INFOSPHERE IS THE SAME AS ANTHROPOSPHERE. 
(31)  The site allows you to compete and encourage friends (23) 
(32)   A tutorial by Ernesto Ramirez explains how to set this up. (64) 
These two examples showed that reading a do-it-yourself instruction blog or watching an 
instruction video online was framed like having a class in a university, though they were two 
different sorts of realities; and the digital profiles, or avatars, on social network sites were 
like the blogger’s offline, carbon-based friends. 
This conceptual ambiguity, motivated by the aforementioned blurring in the social, 
technological context, could arguably entail some privacy problems, because in fact, the data 
could be accessed, or “owned” by the ICT providers legally, once a user electronically signed 
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off a user agreement. The user, nonetheless, probably had not understood or had time to read 
through its terms. For example, Google has always had access to all Gmail users’ emails, 
which were stored on its servers, and it constantly mined or analysed them for its own profits, 
but the public only recently became aware of this issue (see Gibbs online). The unclear 
conceptualisation could be culpable for hindering the awareness in this case. 
Lastly, I also wanted to argue that since DATA ARE VALUABLE RESOURCES LIKE MONEY AND 
TIME, companies would have incentives to compete for their possession, as long as they did 
not break the privacy laws. 
5.4 Summary 
In summary, I used the methods of MIP and SMA consecutively to exhaust in a principled 
manner all the linguistic and systematic metaphors in a representative prototypical blog, i.e. 
file 016_07_2, sampled from my proprietary QS corpus of 40 unique blogs. Based on the 
linguistic and systematic metaphors thus identified, I further traced three metaphor 
trajectories, or thought patterns, on the concepts of the self, QS tools and data throughout the 
QSer’s blog text. I found that he thought his HEALTH CONDITIONS WERE OBJECTS that could be 
managed and controlled with hard work and the help of some self-tracking devices. He 
thought the QS TOOLS WERE PEOPLE, who were productive, capable, intelligent and friendly. 
Lastly, he conceived that his DATA WERE VALUABLE RESOURCES, whose ownership was unclear. 
Meanwhile, possible metaphor candidates, or alternative metaphors, along these trajectories 
were considered and discussed.  
Altogether, they demonstrated the framing effects of metaphors, i.e. they could scaffold and 
constrain at the same time the blogger’s understanding of the studied concepts. Future work 
would require metaphor analyses of more prototypical blogs from the corpus in order to 
understand a larger number of QSers’ subjective experience. 
Being put together, these cognitive frames can tell their own stories, as shown in the previous 
section, that may resemble, to some extent, the QSer’s habitual ways of thinking, but also 
reflect the discrepancies between their thought and reality, and how their thoughts are 
entrenched and being limited in certain ways. 
Arguably, this process of mind capturing involves a metaphorist’s subjective decisions and 
experience, more so, perhaps, than the practice of reading brain images by a neuroscientist, 
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so the decisions made by the metaphor analyst are more rhetorical than scientific, as Miller 
(1990) would differentiate. 
Using Aristotle’s conceptualisation of rhetoric as a form of deliberation about ‘things which 
seem to admit of issuing in two ways’ (Rhetoric I.2.1357a, cited in Miller, idem: 162), she 
wrote, 
‘What is central to both the old, Aristotelian rhetoric [in ethics and politics] and to this 
new, extend rhetoric [in philosophy, science and the academic disciplines in general] is 
the function of deliberation, which is made possible and useful by uncertainty. Wayne 
Booth’s definition of rhetoric highlights this central conception: “Rhetoric is the art of 
discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared discourse” 
(Booth, 1974, xiii).’ (idem) 
In my application of both the MIP and SMA, I have found that most of the time I am not 
facing an obvious possibility but two, and the decisions I have to make are often not either/or 
but both. In other words, for example, the same lexical unit in one discourse community, 
being considered by most of its members as ‘metaphorically used,’ may be delexicalised and 
lose its metaphoricity in another discourse community. It may also become delexicalised as 
the reading purpose changes. In this way, counter-intuitively, the lexical unit can be both 
metaphorical and not. The same applies to the grouping of metaphor vehicles and topics, i.e. 
a vehicle or topic can be put into more than one certain group. This kind of deliberation about 
two possibilities throughout a series of decisions I make makes the metaphor analysis 
presented here more of an art (rhetoric) than science. 
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6. Limitations and future directions 
The current research is so far one of the early attempts at a systematic, cognitively-informed 
critical metaphor analysis of the Quantified Self discourse and culture. My PhD project was 
initially formulated at an interdisciplinary doctoral training centre in the UK, led by human-
computer interaction researchers, sociologists of science and technology studies and a 
feminism political scholar. The methodology was ethnomethodological, particularly the 
grounded theory, and critical discourse analysis. Then my project was taken to the School of 
English in China, which mixed in strong positivism elements. This has become 
methodologically interesting but also challenging, as I have tried to ground and situate the 
naïve positivism, giving to airy nothing a local habitation and a name, so to speak. So there 
have been some limitations to this research, which will be carefully avoided or overcome in 
my future research. 
First, I have only applied Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) and Systematic Metaphor 
Analysis, and in practice the CMT, though much sophisticated for conceptual level analysis, 
turned out to be insufficient for tracing the socio-cultural and historical implications. As 
Pishwa (2009: 1) pointed out, ‘Cognitive linguists have made revolutionary discoveries 
concerning the explanation of the nature of language and its functions in recent decades. The 
findings are, however, concerned with knowledge representations and the processes required 
for its management with a heavy emphasis on the effect of human perception. Social aspects 
have not been considered as explanatory factors for the properties of language and its use 
despite the usage-based foundation; Chilton (this volume) argues, however, that cognitive 
linguistics “assumes that social meanings exist in people’s minds”. But this has not been 
tackled yet. Even other linguistic fields have failed to include social aspects of language 
despite the assumption that it is meant to serve neither as a communication tool for 
individuals in isolation nor as a mere knowledge-retrieving device.’ So in the future, I will 
have to go beyond CMT, as the late Van den Boomen has urged. I will apply more socio-
semiotic-oriented methods such as the media-specific analysis using material metaphors, 
proposed by Hayles (2002) and developed by Van den Boomen (2014), to trace the 
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signification mappings and the discourse metaphor method (Zinken, Hellsten, Nerlich 
2008) . 45
Second, with regard to the prototypical sampling method, it was still not ideal, because the 
prototypicality was based on keywords rather than metaphors. However, this is a 
compromise, because without a manually-tagged large metaphor reference corpus, it is 
difficult to generate prototypicality scores based on metaphors. At the moment, few computer 
algorithms, if any, can reliably identify metaphors. Besides, metaphoricity perhaps is always 
about subjective construal (for most metaphors), and cannot be reduced to numerical 
calculations.  
What we really need is a guiding framework for making systematic and principled 
judgements. So corpus tools served such a purpose. As corpus linguist O’Halloran pointed 
out, corpus linguistic method ‘substantially reduces partiality and arbitrariness in manual 
analysis of data.’ (2017: 202) Moreover, ‘[t]he investigation of large amounts of language 
data in electronic form brings significant advantages. First, linguists are able to discover 
things about language use which may otherwise remain invisible. Second, investigation of a 
corpus provides a quantitative, and thus robust, basis for confirming or falsifying intuitions 
about language use. This means that linguists no longer have to speculate about how people 
generally use a language, something which is obviously prone to error. Third, the labour, 
time-drain and tedium of manual analysis of large quantities of language use data have been 
substantially shrivelled.’ (ibid: 101-102) 
O’Halloran concurred ‘with Hayles’ vision of the posthuman as the affordance of new 
subjectivities through use of intelligent technologies…That is to say, use of the web, digitised 
corpora and digital text analysis affords the creation of new subjectivities which rely on 
machinic supplementation – hence posthuman.’ (ibid: 300) Therefore, using corpus methods 
to critically investigate socio-culturally important discourses will also be a posthumanist 
ethical project worth pursuing in the future. 
Third, in this research I have only systematically analysed QS blog texts, while forgoing 
other primary data sources, such as news reports, QS meetup presentations (video 
 Gibbs (2017: 125-128) has disputed with discourse metaphors, citing psychological experiments as evidence 45
to show that CMT did not ignore socio-cultural factors, but it was not convincing enough, because Gibbs still 
worked from an individualist perspective. An emerging branch of neuroscience known as cultural neuroscience 
has shown that cultural specificity could influence human’s brain responses to cultural and emotional stimuli 
(c.f. Chiao et al 2013).
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recordings), app interfaces, QSer interviews and, possibly, coding scripts. In the future, I plan 
to learn and incorporate the research methods from visual/material cultural studies and 
software studies, perhaps also collaborate with other researchers with compatible interests 
and complementary skills, so that my analysis can become multimodal and collaborative. 
Last but not the least, I want to mention another future research direction, that is the socio-
semiotics of authenticity in reinvention societies. QSers are actively involved in a self-project 
of continuous self-reinvention. Here I refer to the concept of reinvention by Anthony Elliott 
(2013), a student of Giddens. He used reinvention to refer to a period of contemporary history 
coming after Gidden’s society of reflexivity and reflexive self, when the self-reinvention was 
facilitated by digital and ICT technologies. Elliott demonstrated with examples on multiple 
social levels that the mandate for continuous self-reinvention or makeover in the polished, 
expensive cities of the West was a result of the new (digital) economy, which was largely 
based on short-term projects and thus required from the middle-class workers ever-increasing 
flexibility and mobility, with an unintended consequence of precarity. 
Elliott (ibid) indicated that for the middle-class to pursue the utopia of success, they had to 
catch up with the speed of reinvention and be flexible, because projects and profits were 
quick to run out and competition was high. It thus invariably demanded a certain amount of 
inauthenticity. The Oprah shows were said to be a prime example that ushered in this 
inauthentic culture and serial self-reinventions for success, however transitory each period of 
success was. Now we have witnessed an explosion of Instagram, Facebook and TikTok 
celebrities thanks to the rise of Web 2.0, whereas famous actors are arguably few and far 
between. 
Under such new circumstances and uncertainties, what I have observed in the QS movement 
is a struggle for authenticity, or more precisely ‘bounded authenticity,’ which still allows the 
people liberty and flexibility (c.f. Elizabeth Bernstein (2007), where she invented such a 
concept for transactional (sex) relations.) In digital/gig economy, people are increasingly 
involved in such transactional, instead of reciprocal, relations. A Uber driver, or a Deliveroo 
cyclist, gets not only paid for each delivery but also rated. The project deliverables and KPIs 
as well as the whole audit culture in the world’s more developed regions put the workers in 
the shackles of external monitoring, or ubiquitous surveillance, forming new posthuman 
social relations.  
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Then it will be worth studying how people manage their identities and the boundaries of their 
bounded authentic selves through computer mediated discourses, especially when they can 
have multiple subjectivities. 
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Appendix 
Top 100 keywords (ranked by keyness, descending, continued from left to right)  
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